Praetorianism & Common Law in Post-Colonial Settings: Judicial Responses to Constitutional Breakdowns in Pakistan by Mahmud, Tayyab
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons 
Faculty Scholarship 
1-1-1993 
Praetorianism & Common Law in Post-Colonial Settings: Judicial 
Responses to Constitutional Breakdowns in Pakistan 
Tayyab Mahmud 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty 
 Part of the Common Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Judges Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tayyab Mahmud, Praetorianism & Common Law in Post-Colonial Settings: Judicial Responses to 
Constitutional Breakdowns in Pakistan, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1225 (1993). 
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/673 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Seattle University School of 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact coteconor@seattleu.edu. 
Praetorianism and Common Law in Post-Colonial
Settings: Judicial Responses to Constitu-
tional Breakdowns in Pakistan
Tayyab Mahmud*
I. INTRODUCTION ................................ 1226
II. THE FIRST REPUBLIC, 1947-55: POsT-COLONIAL
TRANSITION ................................... 1231
A The Constitutional Framework ................. 1231
B. The Political Context: Authoritarian Centralism v.
Representative Federalism .................... 1231
C. The Constitutional Crisis ..................... 1233
D. The Judicial Response: Doctrine of State Necessity 1234
III. THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 1956-58: UNWORKABLE
COMPROMISE .................................. 1242
A The Constitutional Framework ................. 1242
B. The Constitutional Crisis ..................... 1243
C. The Judicial Response: Doctrine of Revolutionary
Legality .................................. 1244
IV. THE THIRD REPUBLIC, 1962-71: "GUIDED
DEMOCRACY" ................................... 1252
A The Constitutional Order ..................... 1252
B. The Constitutional Crisis ..................... 1254
C. The Judicial Response: Doctrine of Implied Mandate 1255
V. THE FOURTH REPUBLIC, 1973-77: THE DEMOCRATIC
INTERLUDE ................................... 1260
A The Constitutional Order ..................... 1260
B. The Scope of Judicial Review: Missed Opportunity .. 1261
C. The Constitutional Crisis ..................... 1273
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland
State University. B.A. 1973, University of Punjab; M.Sc. 1975, University of
Islamabad; Ph.D. 1981, University of Hawaii; J.D. 1987, University of California,
Hastings College of Law. The research for this Article was supported by a grant
from the Cleveland-Marshall Fund. I would like to thank David F. Forte, Deborah A.
Geier, Michael A. Middleton, Steven H. Steinglass, Victor L. Streib, Douglas N.
Wells, and James G. Wilson for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. Any
remaining errors are the author's.
1225
UTAH LAW REVIEW
D. The Judicial Response: Constitutional Deviation
Dictated by Necessity ........................ 1274
VI. THE FIFTH REPUBLIC, 1985-PRESENT: INSTITUTIONALIZED
PRAETORIANISM ................................ 1282
A The Constitutional Order ..................... 1282
B. The Constitutional Crisis ..................... 1285
C. The Judicial Response: Unfettered Executive
Discretion ................................ 1286
D. Is the Fifth Republic Legal? ................... 1290
VII. ROADS NOT TAKEN: APPROPRIATE JUDICIAL RESPONSES
TO CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWNS ................ 1294
A. The Political Question Doctrine and the
Validity of Extra-Constitutional Usurpation ....... 1295
B. Continuity of Law and the Scope of Extra-
Constitutional Legislative Power ............... 1298
VIII. CONCLUSION ................................. 1303
"[Hlowever... effective the Government of a usurper may be,
it does not within the National Legal Order acquire legitimacy un-
less the courts recognize the Government as de jure."'
"A judiciary's job is to interpret the law and administer justice,
not to challenge the [martial law] administration."2
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last fifty years, many countries, having gained inde-
pendence after external colonial rule, have searched for suitable
constitutional frameworks to govern their societies. The search is
frequently disrupted by the usurpation of political power by the
military, engendering profound constitutional crises. Because mili-
tary regimes usually take power in contravention of constitutional
frameworks, what is the legal validity of such regimes? Can a con-
stitutional order survive such a blatant disregard of its provisions?
What is the scope of legislative power of such regimes? These ques-
tions are not of mere academic interest. Quite often, in the wake of
extra-constitutional assumptions of power, courts have had to pro-
1. Asma Jilani v. Punjab, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) 139, 229 (Pak.) (Yaqub Ali, J.,
concurring).
2. Della Denman, Crackdown on the Courts, FAR E. ECON. REv., Apr. 3, 1981,
at 13 (quoting General Zia ul-Haq, chief martial law administrator of Pakistan).
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nounce upon these and related questions.3
Judicial review is the power of the courts to declare a govern-
mental measure either contrary to, or in accordance with, the con-
stitution or other governing law. Such a judicial pronouncement
either renders the measure invalid and void or vindicates its validi-
ty. An independent judiciary's review of governmental acts is an
essential feature of democratic governance because such a review
facilitates orderly functioning of different organs of the state and
maintains the efficacy of constitutional guarantees of individual and
collective rights. Judicial review of military usurpation thus brings
into the sharpest possible focus the tension between law and force.
In order to draw conclusions applicable to other post-colonial
common-law settings, this Article will examine judicial responses to
constitutional breakdowns in Pakistan. There are several reasons to
make Pakistan a case study. During Pakistan's forty-six years of
existence, the military has directly ruled the country for twenty-
three years and has asserted dominant political control over Paki-
stan for another twelve.4 These military interventions occurred at
different stages of constitution-building, and adopted different
means and varied objectives for assuming political power. As a
3. As recent events in Russia demonstrate, this phenomenon is not confined to
post-colonial states. On March 23, 1993, the Russian Constitutional Court decided
that President Yeltsin's assumption of "special powers" violated the Constitution.
Serge Schmemann, Yeltsin and Rivals Are in a Standoff in Power Struggle, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at Al. On September 21, 1993, the President disbanded the
Parliament and on October 7, 1993, suspended the Constitution Court. Peter
Reddaway, Dictatorial Drift, N.Y. TIMES, October 10, 1993, at A15. This Article, how-
ever, deals with a post-colonial common-law setting. Extra-constitutional regimes in
post-colonial civil-law settings, particularly in Latin America, do not consider their
legitimacy open to either domestic or international question. This position is reflected
by the Estrada Doctrine in Latin America. The Estrada Doctrine, named after Don
Genaro Estrada, the Mexican secretary of foreign relation who pronounced it in 1930,
posits that foreign nations cannot affect the legitimacy of an incumbent regime by
withholding recognition, even if the regime is an extra-constitutional one. Jurispru-
dentially, the doctrine embraces the principle of unfettered state sovereignty and
implies that success is the only yardstick of the validity of extra-constitutional usur-
pation. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 422-23
(1991); BuRNs H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 854-55
(2d ed. 1990); Philip C. Jessup, Editorial Comment, The Estrada, Doctrine, 25 AM. J.
INT'L L. 719, 719-23 (1931).
4. For a general introduction to the history and politics of Pakistan, see
ANWAR HussAiN SYED, PAKISTAN: ISLAM, POLITICS, AND NATIONAL SOLIDARITY (1982);
OALAR NOMAN, THE POLITICAL EcoNoMaY OF PAKISTAN, 1947-85 (1988); PAKISTAN: THE
UNSTABLE STATE (Hassan Gardezi & Jamil Rashid eds., 1983); and MOHAMMAD
WASEEM, POLITICS AND THE STATE IN PAKISTAN (1989). For the history, organizational
structure, and political role of the military of Pakistan, see STEPHEN P. COHEN, THE
PAKISTAN ARMY (1984); and HASAN-ASKARI RiZvi, THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN
PAISTAN, 1947-86 (3d ed. 1986).
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result, each intervention presented the Pakistani courts with a
different set of constitutional issues and dilemmas. Judicial respons-
es to these questions, while varied both in their doctrinal underpin-
nings and in their impact, have been adopted by other post-colonial
common-law jurisdictions. This Article will both describe and cri-
tique these judicial responses,
Scholarly literature dealing with the problem,' besides being
scant, suffers from three shortcomings. First, this literature is dat-
ed. The most recent article directly addressing the issue appeared in
1983; much has happened since then. Second, the existing literature
is primarily focused on one particular doctrine of extra-constitution-
al legality invoked by the courts of Pakistan, that of state necessity.
Third, the literature is silent about the broader political and consti-
tutional contexts within which the constitutional crises arose, con-
texts which may well have influenced the judicial responses. This
Article aims to remedy these shortcomings by analyzing the judicial
responses within the respective constitutional and political context
of each crisis.
Pakistan is a praetorian state,
one in which the military tends to intervene and potentially could
dominate the political system. The political processes of this state
favor the development of the military as the core group and the
growth of its expectations as a ruling class; its political leader-
ship ... is chiefly recruited from the military, or from groups sym-
pathetic, or at least not antagonistic, to the military. Constitutional
changes are effected and sustained by the military, and the army
frequently intervenes in the government. In a praetorian state,
therefore, the military plays a dominant role in political structures
and institutions.'
Political analysts often treat the repeated military usurpation
of political power in post-colonial states' as a transient feature of
political development.8 According to some theorists, traditional
5. See generally Deiter Conrad, In Defense of the Continuity of Law: Pakistan's
Courts in Crises of State (1981), in 1 PAKISTAN IN THE 80S: LAW AND CONSTITUTION
123-207 (Wolfgang peter Zingel & Stephanie Zingel Ave Lallemant eds., 1985);
LESLIE WOLF-PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMAcY: A STUDY OF THE DOCTRINE OF
NECESSITY (1980); Mark M. Stavsky, The Doctrine Of State Necessity in Pakistan, 16
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 341 (1983).
6. Amos Perlmutter, The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a
Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities, 1 COMP. POL. 382, 383
(1969).
7. By one count there were 232 coups d'dtat in the world between 1945 and
1978, and all but eleven of these were in developing countries. See EDWARD
LU'PWAK, COUP D'9TAT: A PRAcTICAL HANDBOOK 190-207 (2d ed. 1979).
8. See, e.g., EDWARD FErr, THE ARMED BUREAUcRATS 1-21, 62-87 (1973) (not-
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states always have unruly armies; in modernizing states, armies
depose governments to accelerate the inevitable movement towards
the modern millennium, where the possibility of usurping armies
withers away.9 Many see in the military of newly decolonized states
a welcome instrument of modernization and change.' Others char-
acterize praetorianism as the result of structural deformation of
post-colonial societies, whereby economically dominant classes can
maintain their position only under the protection of the military."
Still others see the military in post-colonial societies as a self-ag-
grandizing power unto itself, seeking a dominant political role to
ensure perpetuation of its disproportionate share of societal resourc-
es.'2 Military intervention into politics, whether sporadic or institu-
tionalized, raises serious questions of conventional understanding
about constitutional governance, the rule of law, and the role of
judicial review.
ing role of military rule in developing countries generally, and Pakistan particularly);
MORRIS JANOWrlZ, THE MILITARY IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NEW NATIONS
23-30, 75-106 (1964) (discussing similarities in developing countries leading to mili-
tary rule, and ways military rule affects sociopolitical change); THE MILITARY AND
MODERNIZATION 96-98 (Henry Bienen ed., 1971) (examining cyclical and evolutionary
patterns of dictatorial governments); THE MILITARY INTERVENES passim (Henry
Bienen ed., 1968) (comprising six essays on the role of the military in political devel-
opment); ERIC A. NORDLINGER, SOLDIERS IN POLITICS: MILITARY CouPs AND GOVERN-
MENTS passim (1977) (discussing praetorianism in developing countries); Robert E.
Dowse, The Military and Political Development, in POLITICS AND CHANGE IN DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES 213, 213-27 (Colin Leys ed., 1969) (discussing how developing con-
ditions create "power vacuums" which are ripe for military intervention); Lucien W.
Pye, Armies in the Process of Political Modernization, in THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY
IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 69, 74-87 (John J. Johnson ed., 1962) (noting vari-
ous developmental roles of military in transitional societies).
9. See, e.g., JANOWlTZ, supra note 8, at 105-06 (suggesting political involvement
by military is transient feature in underdeveloped countries' political development);
JOHN H. KAUTSKY, POLITICAL CHANGE IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 51-52 (1962)
(suggesting military leaders, due to heightened education and status, likely agents of
post-colonial social change); Pye, supra note 8, at 74-87 (noting modernizing role of
military in developing countries).
10. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES
194-208 (1968); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 80-97 (1964);
Samuel P. Huntington, Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical Statement, in
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 380, 380-85 (Heinz Eulau et al. eds., 1956):
11. See, e.g., SAMIm AMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL
FORMATIONS OF PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM (Brian Pearce trans., 1976); ANDRE GUNDER
FRANK, LUMPENBOURGEOISIE, LUMPENDEVELOPMENT: DEPENDENCE, CLASS & POLITICS
IN LATIN AMERICA (Marion D. Berdecio trans., 1972); BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SO-
CIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY (1967); Hamza Alavi, The State in
Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh, in IMPERIALISM AND REVOLUTION IN
SOUTH ASIA 145 (Kathleen Gough & Hari P. Sharma eds., 1973).
12. See, e.g., SAMUEL DECALO, COUPS & ARMY RULE IN AFRICA: MOTIVATIONS
AND CONSTRAINTS (2d ed. 1990).
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The successive constitutional crises that confronted the Paki-
stani courts were not of their own making. But the doctrinally in-
consistent, judicially inappropriate, and politically timid responses
fashioned by these courts ultimately undermined constitutional
governance. When confronted with the question of the validity and
scope of extra-constitutional power, the courts vacillated between
Hans Kelsen's theory of revolutionary validity, Hugo Grotius's theo-
ry of implied mandate, and an expansive construction of the doc-
trine of state necessity. The judicial failure to challenge praetorian
tendencies facilitated a systematic erosion of constitutional gover-
nance and the rule of law. The result was the institutionalization of
a praetorian state, diminished power and prestige of the judiciary,
and the waning of judicial review. A more principled and realistic
response would have been to declare the validity of extra-constitu-
tional regimes a nonjusticiable political question. Besides ensuring
doctrinal consistency, a refusal to furnish extra-constitutional re-gimes with judicially pronounced validity may well have discour-
aged praetorian encroachment upon constitutional governance. A
consistent refusal to pronounce upon nonjusticiable political ques-
tions might have promoted a democratic constitution-building pro-
cess by implicitly reminding the body politic of its primary responsi-
bility to build and preserve constitutional orders.
During the Fourth Republic, when the courts in Pakistan actu-
ally had the opportunity to exercise judicial review under a demo-
cratically framed constitution, they failed to enunciate a consistent
and coherent standard of review. By misapplying the political ques-
tion doctrine, the courts implied that democratically elected legisla-
tures possess unfettered legislative power. By refusing to fashion ju-
dicial checks against potential tyranny of the majority, the courts
acquiesced in the contraction of fundamental rights and the diminu-
tion of federalism during the Fourth Republic. This facilitated the
demise of the Fourth Republic following yet another military usur-
pation of power.
A better approach would have been for the courts to invalidate
any legislation which jeopardized the basic structure and essential
features of the constitution. Thus, the Pakistani courts perversely
validated military governance rather than using the political ques-
tion doctrine to stand aloof from extra-constitutional usurpations of
power. Conversely, when a democratic regime could have been held
to the standard of the rule of law, the courts abandoned their role
as guardians of the constitutional order by unnecessarily retreating
to the political question doctrine.
1230 [1993: 1225
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J1. THE FIRST REPUBLIC, 1947-55: POST-COLONIAL TRANSITION
A The Constitutional Framework
Pakistan came into existence on August 14, 1947, by means of
the Indian Independence Act ("Act of 1947")." The Act of 1947 sub-
jected the government of Pakistan to the provisions of the Govern-
ment of India Act of 1935 ("Act of 1935") until the Constituent As-
sembly enacted a new constitution. 4 The head of the state was the
governor-general, and legislative functions were performed by the
Constituent Assembly as the Federal Assembly. 5
The Act of 1935 contemplated a federal system, incorporating
provinces into the federation. 6 A council of ministers aided and ad-
vised the governor-general of the federation in exercising his func-
tions. The governor-general appointed or dismissed ministers at his
discretion. He also had powers to assent to or withhold assent from
a bill, and could assume emergency power if the government of the
federation could not be carried on under the Act of 1935. The Act of
1947, which was passed to guarantee sovereignty of the Indian and
Pakistani legislatures, provided for a legislature that could legislate
on all matters, including the constitution. 7 The government con-
tinued to operate in accordance with the Act of 1935, subject to any
changes introduced by the Constituent Assembly. 8
B. The Political Context: Authoritarian Centralism
v. Representative Federalism
The Act of 1935, a framework designed by a colonial power to
govern a colony, provided for a strong central government, an execu-
tive not answerable to the legislature, and limited representation.
With the transfer of power in 1947, Pakistan inherited these cen-
tralized and nonrepresentative organs of government. Senior mem-
bers of the federal bureaucracy under the previous colonial rule
quickly came to assume leading political positions in the new gov-
ernment.' Early on, the bureaucracy-dominated government ex-
13. See Indian Independence Act of 1947, reprinted in SAFDAR MAHMOOD, CON-
STITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PAKISTAN 31-45 (2d ed. 1990).
14. Id. at 8(1).
15. Id. at 5, 6(1).
16. See KHAID B. SAYEED, PAKISTAN: THE FORuATIvE PHASE 1857-1948, at
75-86 (1968) (providing a general history of the Act of 1935).
17. See IVOR JENNINGS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN PAKISTAN 11-37 (1957)
(providing incisive commentary on the Act of 1947).
18. Id. at 21.
19. A number of factors contributed to the early prominence of former members
No. 4] 1231
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pressed its preference for a constitutional arrangement providing for
limited popular participation, a strong federal government, and
limited provincial autonomy. The government would be headed by a
strong executive, elected for a fixed term, and having little account-
ability to the federal legislature. The legislature, in turn, would
have limited legislative power.0 Political parties representing East
Bengal and the smaller provinces of the western wing of the country
opposed these designs. The opposition expressed its preference for a
directly elected representative government, a parliamentary system,
limited powers for the federal government, and a greater quantum
of provincial autonomy.21 In short, the regime wanted to maintain
the relatively authoritarian, unresponsive, and undemocratic struc-
of the colonial bureaucracy in the federal cabinet and governorship of the provinces.
First, Britain's two-hundred year colonial domination had left in its wake a sophisti-
cated bureaucratic apparatus significantly overdeveloped in comparison with other
sections of the society. See Hamza Alavi, Class and State in Pakistan, in PAKISTAN:
THE UNSTABLE STATE, supra note 4, at 40, 49-50. Second, the leadership of the
Muslim League, the political party which spearheaded the movement for indepen-
dence, hailed from those parts of India which did not become part of Pakistan. While
this leadership had a mass base of support in what became Pakistan, the local politi-
cal organization and political cadres never developed a level of maturity necessary to
become the obvious choice to lead the new state. See SAYEED, supra note 16, at
176-219. Finally, two events left the Muslim league without credible or popular lead-
ership: the early death in 1948 of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the indepen-
dence movement and first governor-general; and the assassination in 1951 of Liaqat
Ali Khan, Jinnah's lieutenant and the first prime minister. Senior bureaucrats quick-
ly moved to fill this leadership vacuum. See AYESHA JALAL, THE STATE OF MARTIAL
RULE: THE ORIGINS OF PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEFENSE 49-135 (1990);
KHALiD B. SAYEED, POLITICS IN PAKISTAN: THE NATURE AND DIRECTION OF CHANGE
32 (1980); WASEEM, supra note 4, at 138-48.
20. See SAYEED, supra note 16, at 233-57. Jinnah's decision to become governor-
general of the new state, instead of prime minister, as Jawahalal Nehru had done in
India, was a signal that he wanted Pakistan to have a strong executive with sweep-
ing authority. His decision was not without support. For example, the Prime Minister
defended Jinnah's decision to appoint British officers as governors of three out of the
four provinces, with the statement: "[U]nder the present Constitution, the man who
has been vested with all powers is the Governor-General. He can do whatever he
likes." Id. at 242 (quoting 1(8) Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debates
239 (Mar. 5, 1948)); see also ROBERT LAPORTE, JR., POWER AND PRIVILEGE: INFLU-
ENCE AND DECISION-MAKING IN PAKISTAN 39-54 (1975) (describing Jinnah's rule as
establishing "a tradition of strong, paternalistic executive rule"); SAYEED, supra note
16, at 233-300 (providing various theories on Jinnah's motivation to become gover-
nor-general); Ayesha Jalal, Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah and the Governor-Generalship
Issue, 19 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 29, 29-53 (1985) (positing Jinnah's motivation was de-
sire to avoid common governor-generalship with India). For comprehensive accounts
of the political career of Jinnah, see AYESHA JALAL, THE SOLE SPOKESMAN: JINNAH,
THE MUSLIM LEAGUE AND THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN (1985) and STANLEY WOLPERT,
JINNAH OF PAKISTAN (1984).
21. See KEITH B. CALLARD, POLITICAL FORCES IN PAKISTAN 1947-1959, at 5
(1959); JALAL, supra note 19, at 100-35; WASEEM, supra note 4, at 123-25.
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tures inherited from the colonizers, while most of the people sought
a more responsive and democratic system like that which the colo-
nizers had at home.
The Constituent Assembly was the locus of the political strug-
gle between these two tendencies. After meeting intermittently
since 1947 to devise a constitution, the Constituent Assembly
passed the Objectives Resolution on March 12, 1949Y The Resolu-
tion provided the guiding principles for the country's constitution."
The Resolution envisaged a representative government, a federal
system with extensive provincial autonomy, and guaranteed funda-
mental human rights, the rule of law, and an independent judiciary.
Realization of these objectives would have had three immediate
results: first, a shift of power to the eastern wing of the country, as
it comprised a majority of the population; second, a shift of power
from the federal government to the provinces; and third, a shift of
power from the bureaucracy-dominated executive to elected repre-
sentatives of the people in the legislature.
C. The Constitutional Crisis
Those in control of the state apparatus were alarmed by the
actions of the Constituent Assembly, which were designed to estab-
lish a parliamentary system and a federation with extensive provin-
cial autonomy. As the Constituent Assembly prepared for the adop-
tion of a new constitution, which was scheduled to follow the report
of a draft constitution by its drafting committee on October 27,
1954, 4 the governor-general, a retired bureaucrat, dissolved the
Constituent Assembly by proclamation on October 24, 1 9 54 .' 5
While the governor-general accused the Assembly of being unrepre-
sentative, "[hlis real objection was that the Assembly was about to
adopt a Constitution of which he disapproved."" Furthermore, the
22. See MAHMOOD, supra note 13, at 46 (providing complete text of resolution).
23. Id.
24. For the complete text of the draft constitution, see REPORT OF THE BASIC
PRiNCIPLES COMMITTEE, AS ADOPTED BY THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF PAKISTAN ON
THE 6TH OCTOBER, 1954, reprinted in MAHMOOD, supra note 13, at 157-287. While
the draft constitution retained the basic structure of the Act of 1935, its allocation of
165 of 300 seats to East Bengal in the lower house of a bicameral legislature, id.
(art. 46(2)(a)), and its requirement that the prime minister and cabinet be members
of and supported by the legislature, id. (art. 30(3), (4)), ensured formidable political
power for East Bengal.
25. See JENNINGS, supra note 17, at 80 (providing complete text of proclama-
tion).
26. SA. de Smith, Constitutional Lawyers in Revolutionary Situations, 7 W.
ONT. L. REv. 93, 97 (1968).
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legislative initiatives by the Constituent Assembly had "put the
governor-general in an intolerable situation."" Not sure of its po-
litical strength, the bureaucracy-dominated executive branch decid-
ed to recruit the military to its side.2" Simultaneously with the
proclamation of dissolution, the governor-general restructured his
council of ministers, and General Ayub Khan, the commander-in-
chief of the army, was sworn in as the defense minister. This ap-
pointment was contrary to the express provisions of the Act of 1935,
which stated that only a member of the legislature could be a minis-
ter. With these changes, the military formally entered the political
arena, setting Pakistan's course towards praetorianism.'
D. The Judicial Response: Doctrine of Necessity
The president of the Constituent Assembly petitioned the Chief
Court of Sind Province" to issue a writ of mandamus to restrain
27. 8 ALAN GLEDHILL, THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS
LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS 73 (George W. Keeton ed., 1957).
28. Until then, the military had been used as an instrument of internal coercion
only when political struggles resulted in a breakdown of law and order. See REPORT
OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY CONSTITUTED UNDER PUNJAB ACT 11 OF 1954 TO ENQUIRE
INTO THE PUNJAB DISTURBANCES OF 1953, at 1, 151 (1954).
29. Starting in 1953, Pakistan joined regional defense agreements such as
SEATO and CENTO, and entered into bilateral defense agreements with the United
States. One immediate result was the expansion of the military through foreign mili-
tary assistance. The strengthened military quickly established direct channels of
communication with its alliance partners, bypassing the political leadership. See
JALAL, supra note 19, at 180-93; Selig S. Harrison, Case History of a Mistake: India,
Pakistan and the U.S.-I, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 10, 1959, at 10, 14-17. As early as
1954, the military was drawing up blueprints for a desirable political structure. In
his autobiography, General Ayub Khan reproduced a remarkable memorandum he
wrote on October 4, 1954, prompted by "a premonition that [the Governor-General]
might draw [him] into politics," and which "contained [his] thinking and set out [his]
approach to the problems facing the country." MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN, FRIENDS NOT
MASTERS: A POLITICAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY 186 (1967). In this memorandum, entitled "A
short appreciation of present and future problems of Pakistan," General Ayub Khan
envisaged "abolish[ing] provincial ministries and legislatures" in the western wing of
the country, id. at 188, "creating one province of it under a Governor," id. at 191,
and establishing a "controlled form of democracy," id. at 188.
30. During the First Republic, the high court of the province was the Chief
Court and the highest court in the country was the Federal Court. After 1956, these
courts were renamed the High Court and the Supreme Court, respectively. The basis
of judicial review in Pakistan is furnished primarily by the writ jurisdiction of high
courts whereby a high court may declare "that any act done or proceeding taken
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court by a person performing functions in
connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority has
been done or taken without lawful authority and is of no legal effect." PAI. CONST.
of 1973, art. 199; see Leslie Wolf-Phillips et al., The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, in
XII CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein &
1234
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the Federation of Pakistan from dissolving the Assembly and a writ
of quo warranto to determine the validity of the appointment of the
members of the reconstituted council of ministers."' The Federa-
tion of Pakistan contended that the dissolution of the Assembly was
valid and that the court had no jurisdiction to issue the writs. The
federation argued that the Government of India (Amendment) Act,
1954, which had given the superior courts power to grant such
writs, was unenforceable for want of the governor-general's as-
sent.
32
In Tamizuddin Khan v. Pakistan,' the court issued the writs
prayed for, unanimously holding first, that acts of the Constituent
Assembly did not require the assent of the governor-general when it
functioned as a Constituent Assembly rather than as the federal
legislature; second, that the powers of the governor-general were
limited to government of the dominion; and finally, that such
powers did not extend to participation in constitution-making.34 On
appeal, the Federal Court of Pakistan, in Pakistan v. Tamizuddin
Khan (aTamizuddin Khan),35 reversed, holding that the chief
court's assumption of jurisdiction to issue writs was invalid because
the enabling legislation had not received the governor-general's
assent."
Tamizuddin Kan deepened the constitutional crisis. It invali-
dated most of the legislation of the Constituent Assembly, because
those laws had not been assented to by the governor-general. In
order to fill the constitutional vacuum, the governor-general sought
Gisburt H. Franz eds., 1986) [hereinafter XIII CONSTITUTIONS] (compiling constitution-
al text and commentary from various countries).
31. Tamizuddin Khan v. Pakistan, 1955 P.L.D. (Sind) 96, 97 (Pak.); see 8
GLEDHILL, supra note 27, at 73.
32. This unique situation issued from the Assembly acting as both a Constituent
Assembly and as the federal legislature. The enactment practice from 1947-1954 had
been to "present Bills passed by the Assembly, when acting as federal legislature, for
the assent of the Governor-General, but legislation of the Constituent Assembly,
when acting in that capacity, had been authenticated by its President, and published
in the Pakistan Gazette." 8 GLEDHILL, supra note 27, at 73.
33. 1955 P.L.D. (Sind) 96 (Pak.).
34. Id.
35. 1955 P.L.D. (F.C.) 240 (Pak.).
36. Id. at 315. The Court recognized that "in the Act of 1947 there was no
express provision for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly." Id. at 255. Howev-
er, the Court held that "extra legal acts . . . become legal concepts where the people,
deprived of political sovereignty which in a democracy is their birthright, seek to
assert that right." Id. Curiously, the Court viewed the governor-general, in his capac-
ity as the head of the state, as representing the sovereign will of the people, and
accordingly said, "in the case of a conflict between the ultimate and legal sovereign,
the latter must yield." Id.
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to validate selected acts of the Constituent Assembly by indicating
his assent, with retrospective operation, by the Emergency Powers
Ordinance No. 9 of 1955."7 Upon challenge, the Federal Court, in
Usif Patel v. The Crown, held this emergency ordinance invalid on
grounds that the governor-general had acted beyond the scope of his
powers.38 Although not mentioned in the case, a political issue of
vital importance lay behind the technicalities about retroactive
validation: The governor-general, besides claiming constituent pow-
ers generally, had already attempted to enact a most sensitive piece
of constitutional change, the amalgamation of the western provinces
into a single unit. 9
The governor-general responded to UsifPatel by summoning a
constitutional convention and issuing a proclamation granting him
such powers as were necessary to validate and enforce the laws
needed to avoid a constitutional and administrative breakdown. 0
The governor-general then exercised these powers by validating and
declaring enforceable those laws declared null and void in Usif
Patel. The governor-general then sought an advisory opinion from
the Federal Court to determine the legality of his actions.4'
The Federal Court, in a three-to-two decision, held that under
the doctrine of state necessity, which forms "part of the common law
of all civilized States and which every written Constitution of a
civilized people takes for granted,"42 the governor-general could act
37. The ordinance provided:
"Whereas none of the laws passed by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan
under the provisions of subsection (1) of section 8 of the Indian Indepen-
dence Act . . . received the assent of the Governor-General . . . it is hereby
declared and enacted that every law specified in . . . the Schedule to this
Ordinance shall be deemed to have received the assent of the Governor-
General on the date specified in . .. that Schedule, being the date on which
it was published . . . and shall be deemed to have had legal force and effect
from that date."
Usif Patel v. The Crown, 1955 P.L.D. (F.C.) 387, 391 (Pak.) (quoting Emergency
Powers Ordinance No. 9 of 1955).
38. Id. at 396.
39. The West Pakistan (Establishment) Order, 1955, Governor-General's Order
No. 4 (Mar. 27, 1955) was issued the same day as the Emergency Powers Ordinance,
which was formally at issue in Usif Patel.
40. The proclamation provided:
The Governor-General assumes to himself until other provision is made by
the Constituent Convention such powers as are necessary to validate and
enforce laws needed to avoid a possible breakdown in the constitutional and
administrative machinery of the country and to preserve the State and
maintain the government of the country in its existing condition.
See JENNINGS, supra note 17, at 53 (providing text of proclamation).
41. Reference by His Excellency the Governor-General, 1955 P.L.D. (F.C.) 435
(Pak.) ("Governor-General's Case").
42. Id. at 478. As is the practice in other commonwealth countries, Pakistan's
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in a legislative capacity and retrospectively validate laws, even
though he had no such authority under either the Act of 1935 or the
Act of 1947.' Relying upon the special circumstances set out in the
Special Reference, the Court held that but for the governor-general's
extraordinary action, "the constitutional and administrative machin-
ery of the country would have broken down."' UsifPatel's contrary
holding was distinguished on the ground that while the ordinance
at issue in Usif Patel made no reference to a new Constituent As-
sembly, and thus implied extra-constitutional power unlimited in
both its scope and duration, "the present Proclamation of Emergen-
cy is only temporary and the power has been exercised with a view
to preventing the State from dissolution.., before the question...
has been decided upon by the new Constituent Assembly."45
While self-consciously fashioning a "legal bridge" across the
constitutional chasm,4" the Court made it clear that the extra-con-
stitutional power bestowed by the doctrine of state necessity was
limited as to who can exercise such powers, to what ends, and for
how long. By emphasizing that the governor-general had assumed
extra-constitutional legislative power in his capacity as head of the
state, the Court limited the doctrine to the existing head of state.
The scope of the governor-general's extra-constitutional power was
limited to acts immediately necessary for the preservation of the
state. The power recognized "cannot extend to matters which are
not the product of the necessity, as for instance, changes in the Con-
stitution which are not directly referable to the emergency."' The
"legal bridge" provided by the doctrine was for a temporary period,
lasting only so long as necessary to re-create an appropriate consti-
tutional legislative organ 9 and only until the validity of the exer-
courts have always treated the case law and writings of legal scholars of other com-
mon-law jurisdictions, particularly those of England, India, and the United States, as
persuasive authorities. This is particularly true of constitutional cases. For example,
the Governor-General's Case is rife with citations to, and discussions of, constitutional
law doctrines developed in other common-law jurisdictions.
43. Id. at 520-29.
44. Id. at 477.
45. Id. at 478.
46. In the beginning of the opinion, the Chief Justice observed that "we have
come to the brink of a chasm with only three alternatives before us: (1) to turn back
the way we came by;, (2) to cross the gap by a legal bridge; (3) to hurtle into the
chasm beyond any hope of rescue." Id. at 445.
47. Id. at 485-86.
48. Id. at 486.
49. See id. Stanley de Smith notes that the Court "did not give the Executive
carte blanche .... The principle did not invest the Governor-General with power to
change the existing constitutional structure." de Smith, supra note 26, at 98; see also
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cise of emergency power was decided by the new Constituent As-
sembly.
5 D
The Court's enunciation of the doctrine was generally in line
with historical and contemporary understanding of state necessity
in other jurisdictions."' In spite of the limitations placed on the
application of the doctrine of necessity, one commentator issued the
prophetic warning that "the rather extravagant sweep of the Court's
decision in the Special Reference-both the actual holding and more
especially the language of the majority opinion-may well embar-
rass the courts in Pakistan sorely in the future. 52 Two factors
made the Court's application of the doctrine problematic. First, the
emergency that furnished the governor-general's justification for
assuming extra-constitutional power was of his own making. It was
the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by the governor-general
that had produced the constitutional crisis. Only where the emer-
gency issues from circumstances outside the control of the execu-
tive, such as war or natural disaster, may assumption of necessary
extra-constitutional powers be justified. Second, by acquiescing to
the constitutional convention summoned by the governor-general,
instead of insisting upon restoration of the dissolved Assembly, the
Court rendered meaningless the enumerated limitations on the doc-
trine of necessity."
Justice Cornelius, one of the two dissenting Justices, wrote that
the doctrine of necessity is "recognised but only in relation to mat-
ters falling within the police powers of the State ... but it is clearly
Stavsky, supra note 5, at 368 ("[The court seemed to draw narrow limits for the
circumstances under which an individual could lawfully usurp legislative authority in
direct violation of the constitution."). After the Governor-General's Case, an advisory
opinion, in Pakistan v. Hussain Shah, 1955 P.L.D. (F.C.) 522 (Pak.), a contentious
case, the Court held that a constitutional law not assented to by the governor-gener-
al could be given temporary retrospective validity by proclamation. Id. at 529.
50. Governor-General's Case, 1955 P.L.D. (F.C.) at 521.
51. See Stavsky, supra note 5, at 347-54 (discussing development of the doctrine
in the United States); Glanville Williams, The Defense of Necessity, 6 CURRENT LEGAL
PROB. 216, 216 (1953) (providing historical evolution of the doctrine in English juris-
prudence); see also Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98
YALE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1989) (analyzing historical expansion of executive's emergency
power).
52. EDWARD MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REvIEw 146 (4th ed. 1969).
53. The constitutional convention, summoned by the governor-general in response
to Usif Patel, consisted of members of the old Assembly and new members appointed
by the governor-general ostensibly to represent the tribal areas and the princely
states. The appointed members ensured that the convention adopted a constitution in
tune with the desires of the governor-general. See CALLARD, supra note 21, at 6; 8
GLEDHILL, supra note 27, at 76-77; JALAL, supra note 19, at 207-15; McWHINNEY,
supra note 52, at 146-48.
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very far removed from the power of interference with constitutional
instruments."' He also took strong exception to the sources drawn
from English history advanced by the federation and adopted by the
majority in upholding executive exercise of broad legislative powers:
These affairs belong to periods when, and to territories where, the
power of the King was, in fact, supreme and undisputed. The re-
cords of these affairs are hardly the kind of scripture which one
could reasonably expect to be quoted in a proceeding which is es-
sentially one in the enforcement and maintenance of representative
institutions. For they can bring but cold comfort to any protagonist
of the autocratic principle against the now universal rule that the
will of the people is sovereign.'
Adoption of the principle identified by Justice Cornelius, name-
ly that the will of the people is sovereign and is to be exercised
through representative institutions as the essential feature of the
constitutional order, would have saved the courts of Pakistan from
their long but inconclusive search for a consistent yardstick of judi-
cial review. Nonetheless, one significant impact of the decision was
the invalidation of the governor-general's attempt to restructure the
federal character of the state by executive order.56 Furthermore,
the bureaucratic-military coalition was disabused of imposing on the
country a constitution that provided for "controlled democracy"
under a strengthened executive."
Although commentators have been generally critical of the
Governor-General's Case," courts in other post-colonial common-
54. Governor-General's Case, 1955 P.L.D. (F.C.) at 511 (Cornelius, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 515-16 (Cornelius, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The cases relied
upon by the majority included the Saltpetre Case, XH Cox. Rep 12 (1606), and R. v.
Hampdon 3 St. Tr. 825 (1636). Governor-General's Case, 1955 P.L.D. at 480.
56. Following the proclamation of dissolution, the governor-general, by the West
Pakistan (Establishment) Order No. 4, 1955, dissolved the provinces of the western
wing of the country and reconstituted them as one province to be named'West Paki-
stan. This order was invalidated by Usif Patel, a holding which was affirmed by
implication in the Governor-General's Case. The same result was later achieved polit-
ically, by the general constitutional compromise known as the "Murree Pact," and
legally, by the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955, adopted by the Constituent
Assembly. See CALLARD, supra note 21, at 183-93.
57. The expertise of British constitutional lawyer Sir Ivor Jennings had been en-
listed to draft such a constitution. 8 GLEDHILL, supra note 27, at 77. For Sir Ivor
Jennings's views of constitutional problems in Pakistan, see JENNINGS, supra note 17,
at 38-75.
58. For Stanley de Smith, who characterizes the doctrine of necessity as "the
unruliest of all horses, which can gallop away with constitutional law into the do-
main of political expediency," the decision "was a not very well disguised act of polit-
ical judgment .... But the judges steered between Scylla and Charybdis and chose
what seemed to them the least of evils." de Smith, supra note 26, at 98. Mark
Stavsky, while characterizing the decision as an accommodation to an unconstitution-
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law settings have found the doctrine of necessity to be a useful tool
to validate politically motivated departures from constitutional
frameworks.59 In my view, the appropriate response of the courts,
al regime, states that the Court "Imlanaged to accomplish several seemingly worth-
while goals: (a) it officially eliminated a bickering, uncooperative, and ineffectual
legislative body; (b) it placed doctrinal restrictions upon the Governor-General's emer-
gency authority; and (c) iV helped to establish a new Constituent Assembly." Stavsky,
supra note 5, at 370 n.120.
59. Attorney-General v. Ibrahim, 1964 Cyprus L. Rep. 195, validated extensive
modifications of unamendable provisions of the Constitution of Cyprus on grounds of
necessity. Id. at 214-15. The Constitution was designed to ensure equitable participa-
tion in governmental structures by both the Greek majority and the Turkish minori-
ty. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 3, at 1299. The means of achieving this end
were provisions of ethnicity requirements for all branches of government, including
the judiciary. CYPRUS CONST. arts. 46, 48(f), 49(f), 62(c), 123(1), 133(l), 153(l), 159.
These provisions, which guaranteed proportionate representation, were unamendable.
Id. art. 182(l). Following armed confrontations between the Greek and Turkish com-
munities, the Turkish Cypriots stopped participating in governmental organs, includ-
ing the judiciary. The legislature, with its Turkish members absent, amended the
Constitution in violation of Article 182(l) and created a new Supreme Court. In
Ibrahim, the new Supreme Court, after taking notice of the situation prevailing in
the country, which had rendered the governmental organs dysfunctional, upheld the
actions of the legislature on grounds of necessity. Ibrahim, 1964 Cyprus L. Rep. at
265-67. The Court said "necessity renders validly applicable what would otherwise be
illegal and invalid .... Otherwise the absurd corollary . . . that a State, and the
people, should be allowed to perish for the sake of its constitution." Id. at 237. The
Court surveyed the doctrine of necessity as applied in different countries and con-
cluded that the doctrine can be read into provisions of the Constitution as an im-
plied exception in order to ensure the very existence of the state. Id. at 214, 265.
The Court established the following prerequisites to invocation of the doctrine of
necessity: "(a) an imperative and inevitable necessity or exceptional circumstances; (b)
no other remedy to apply, (c) the measure taken must be proportionate to the ne-
cessity; and (d) it must be of a temporary character limited to the duration of the
exceptional circumstances." Id. at 265. While the decision has been called "predict-
able," "expedien[t]," and a "misappli[cation]" of the doctrine, Stavsky, supra note 5, at
358, Pakistan's Supreme Court termed it "the true essence of the doctrine [which]
provides useful practical guidelines for its application." Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of
Army Staff, 1977 P.L.D. *(S.C.) 657, 710 (Pak.). In Lakanmi v. Attorney-General of
the Western Region, 1971 U. of IFE L. Rep. 201 (Nigeria), the Nigerian Supreme
Court validated the military's assumption of power in 1966 and suspension of many
provisions of the 1963 Constitution on the basis of the doctrine of necessity. See
Abiola Ojo, The Search for a Grundnorm in Nigeria-The Lakanmi Case, 20 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 117, 123 (1971). The Nigerian Court, however, held that the change in
government was not a revolution creating a new legal order and that the 1963 Con-
stitution remained the supreme law of the land. Id. Further, the Court refused to
extend the doctrine of necessity to validate the military regime's decrees which oust-
ed the Nigerian courts' jurisdiction to reviewing orders of a newly constituted Tribu-
nal of Inquiry and ad hominem decrees issued by the military regime. Id. at 124. On
May 9, 1970, within two weeks of this judgment, the military regime issued a decree
that nullified the Court's decision and declared the military takeover a revolution. Id.
at 134; see B.O. NwABUEZE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES 203-08
(1973).
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when confronted with constitutional rupture, is to hold that issues
regarding the validity and scope of extra-constitutional regimes are
nonjusticiable political questions. The political question doctrine
states that certain issues are political in nature, and hence, best
resolved by the body politic rather than by the judiciary. In other
words, the subject is inappropriate for judicial consideration.0
My position that the political question doctrine is a more suit-
able judicial response to the constitutional problem at hand is aug-
mented by the fact that the Governor-General's Case was an adviso-
ry opinion.6 One purpose of an advisory opinion is to allow the
government, before initiating legislation, to procure an impartial
authoritative opinion regarding the validity of a measure. An advi-
sory opinion is not binding upon the executive.62 A judicial adviso-
ry opinion, by definition, necessarily precedes executive action. To
seek an advisory opinion after executive action has been taken puts
the courts in an unenviable situation: An opinion contrary to the
action would be embarrassing for the executive, yet an opinion vali-
dating the action could put in question the integrity and credibility
of the judiciary. Consequently, motivations for seeking an opinion
after the executive has taken the relevant action are questionable.
A court retains the discretion whether to answer the referred ques-
tion." Where the answer to the referred question depends upon
the presence or absence of facts of a patently political nature, a
60. For a concise exposition of the political question doctrine, see JOHN E.
NOWAK ET AL., CONsTrrunoNAL LAW 102-10 (3d ed. 1986); B.O. NWABUEZE,
JuDIcIALism IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA: THE ROLE OF THE CouRTs IN GOVERNMENT
20-48 (1977); and LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96-107 (2d
ed. 1988). See also infra part VITA (providing detailed analysis of suitability of the
doctrine for Pakistan's constitutional crises).
61. Subsequent constitutions of Pakistan have retained the provision allowing
the executive to seek an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court. See PAM CONST.
of 1956, art. 162; PAr CONST. of 1962, art. 59; PAK CONST. of 1973, art. 186.
62. An opinion on a pure question of law, however, is by convention treated as
authoritative. According to de Smith, "such opinions are truly advisory, though they
will almost invariably be treated as authoritative." SA. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ADmNSTRATIVE LAW 143 (3d ed. 1977).
63. The Indian Supreme Court has held:
The plain duty and function of the Supreme Court under Article 143(1) [the
advisory opinion provision of the Indian Constitution] is to consider the
question on which the President has made the reference and report to the
President its opinion, provided of course the question is capable of being
pronounced upon and falls within the power of the Court to decide. If, by
reason of the manner in which the question is framed or for any other
appropriate reason the Court considers it not proper or possible to answer
the question it would be entitled to return the reference by pointing out the
impediments in answering it.
In re The Special Courts Bill, 1978, 1979 A.I.R. (S.C.) 478, 479 (India).
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court should recognize its own limitations and decline to answer the
question. Moreover, in its advisory capacity, a court does not sit as
a fact-finding tribunal, and must necessarily rely upon any recital of
facts by the referring authority. The Court in the Governor-
General's Case recognized this limitation," but still saw fit to pro-
nounce on the questions involved.
III. THE SECOND REPUBLIC, 1956-58: UNWORKABLE COMPROMISE
A. The Constitutional Framework
The new Constituent Assembly summoned after the Governor-
General's Case adopted a new constitution, and the new Republic
began its formal existence on March 23, 1956.65 The 1956 Constitu-
tion adopted the Objectives Resolution as its preamble, guaranteed
fundamental rights,6  abolished the office of governor-general, and
provided for power-sharing arrangements between the president
and the prime minister." The president was to be elected by the
national and provincial legislatures.' The prime minister and the
cabinet were to be members and enjoy the confidence of the legis-
lature. 9 The two wings of the country were to have equal seats in
the national legislature.7 ° The Supreme Court could exercise judi-
cial review.7 While parliamentary and federal in form, the 1956
Constitution's detailed provisions ensured both that the president
retained supreme powers and that central legislation superseded
provincial enactments.72
64. The Court noted:
We cannot, on this Reference, undertake this enquiry or record any findings
on the disputed questions of fact because any such course would convert us
into a fact finding tribunal which is not the function of this Court when its
advice is asked on certain questions of law. The answer to a legal question
always depends on facts found or assumed and since we cannot try issues of
fact the Reference has to be answered on the assumption of fact on which it
has been made.
Governor-General's Case, 1955 P.L.D. (F.C.) 435, 461-62 (Pak.).
65. See MAHMOOD, supra note 13, at 247-332 (providing text of 1956 Constitu-
tion).
66. PAK. CONST. of 1956, arts. 3-22,
67. Id. arts. 32-42.
68. Id. art. 32.
69. Id. art. 37.
70. Id. art. 44.
71. Id. arts. 156-64.
72. Characterizing it as a constitution of mistaken identity, Ayesha Jalal, in her
detailed analysis, shows how "[tihe Constitution's flirtations with parliamentary de-
mocracy and federalism were . . . light hearted." JALAL, supra note 19, at 215-16.
Many members belonging to the eastern wing and religious minorities absented
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B. The Constitutional Crisis
The first general elections under the 1956 Constitution were
scheduled for February 1959. Before the election, it seemed that
political parties likely to gain a popular mandate would be commit-
ted to asserting political leadership of the eastern wing, restoring
the dissolved provinces of the western wing, granting a greater
quantum of provincial autonomy, and increasing the powers of the
prime minister at the expense of the president."3
To forestall initiation of constitutional representative gover-
nance,'4 the president abrogated the 1956 Constitution on October
7, 1958. By proclamation, he dismissed the central and provincial
governments, dissolved the national and provincial assemblies,
abolished political parties, established martial law, and appointed
the commander-in-chief of the army as chief martial law adminis-
trator. 5 This set the stage for yet another judicial examination of
themselves from the final vote on.the Constitution. MCWHINNEY, supra note 62, at
147.
73. For a detailed description and analysis of political developments leading to
the declaration of martial law in 1958, see M. RAFIQUE AFZAL, POLITICAL PARTIES IN
PAKISTAN: 1947-1958 passim (1976); MUSHTAQ AHmAD, GOVERNMENT AND PoLITIcs IN
PAKISTAN 1-172 (3d ed. 1970); and Khalid B. Sayeed, Collapse of Parliamentary De-
mocracy in Pakistan, XIH MIDDLE E. J. 389-401 (1959).
74. One commentator asserts that:
[Tihe coup-makers . . . aimed at forestalling the prospective elections for the
fear that they would bring into power a regime based on popular support.
In fact, the military-bureaucratic establishment was afraid that the election
campaign had already opened up the floodgates of political participation,
which therefore had to be closed effectively.
WASEEM, supra note 4, at 246.
75. The proclamation gave the reasons for the Presidential Action:
My appraisal of the internal situation has led me to believe that a
vast majority of the people no longer have any confidence in the present
system of Government and are getting more and more disillusioned and
disappointed and are becoming dangerously resentful of the manner in
which they [are] exploited. Their resentment and bitterness are justifiable.
The Constitution . . . is full.of dangerous compromises so that Paid-
stan will disintegrate internally if the inherent malaise is not removed. To
rectify them, the country must first be taken to sanity by a peaceful revolu-
tion. Then, it is my intention to collect a number of patriotic persons to
examine our problems in the political field and devise a Constitution more
suitable to the genius of the Muslim people. When it is ready, and at the
appropriate time, it will be submitted to the referendum of the people.
It is said that the Constitution is sacred. But more sacred than the
Constitution or anything else is the country and the welfare and happiness
of its people.
HERBERT FELDMAN, REVOLUTION IN PAKISTAN: A STUDY OF THE MARTIAL LAW AD-
LM4STRATION 214-15 (1967).
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an extra-constitutional assumption of power. The context had, how-
ever, changed substantially since the Governor-General's Case.
Whereas in 1955, the civilian federal bureaucracy had attempted to
frustrate the constitutional process in order to forestall losing power
to a representative government, in 1958 the military played the
central role.
C. , The Judicial Response: Doctrine of Revolutionary Legality
The Pakistan Supreme Court examined the validity and scope
of extra-constitutional power in the context of four criminal appeals
pending before it. In State v. Dosso,76 announced on October 27,
1958, the Court, relying on Hans Kelsen's theory of revolutionary
legality, ruled that the abrogated 1956 Constitution was no longer
the governing instrument of the country, and that the new order
was legitimate. The Court stated:
[f the revolution is victorious in the sense that the persons assum-
ing power under the change can successfully require the inhabit-
ants of the country to conform to the new regime, then the revolu-
tion itself becomes a law-creating fact because thereafter its own
legality is judged not by reference to the annulled Constitution but
by reference to its own success. On the same principle the validity
of the laws to be made thereafter is judged by reference to the new
and not the annulled Constitution. Thus the essential condition to
determine whether a Constitution has been annulled is the efficacy
of the change.
... [Tihe revolution having been successful it satisfies the
test of efficacy and becomes a basic law-creating fact.7
76. 1958 P.L.D. (S.C.) 533 (Pak.).
77. Id. at 539-40. Chief Justice Munir, who relied upon Kelsen's theory of revo-
lutionary legality, defined a "revolution" as a situation where "a Constitution and the
national legal order under it is disrupted by an abrupt political change not within
the contemplation of the Constitution" and "its legal effect is not only the destruction
of the existing Constitution but also the validity of the national legal order." Id. at
538. Of significance is the following pronouncement, which did away with the limita-
tion on the doctrine of necessity requiring that it be invoked by the existing sover-
eign:
[F]rom a juristic point of view the method by which and the persons by
whom a revolution is brought about is wholly immaterial. The change may
be attended by violence or it may be perfectly peaceful. It may take the
form of a coup d'etat by a political adventurer or it may be effected by
persons already in public positions. Equally irrelevant in law is the motive
for a revolution, inasmuch as a destruction of the constitutional structure
may be prompted by a highly patriotic impulse or by the most sordid of
ends.
Id. The Court found that in international law, such a change did not effect the
"corpus or international entity of the State," and therefore, "a victorious revolution or
[1993: 12251244
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The Court held that the efficacy of the revolution not only legit-
imized the destruction of the old constitutional order, but also elimi-
nated any limits to the legislative powers of the new order. Under
the new legal order, any law could at any time be changed by the
president. Therefore, there was no such thing as a fundamental
right, there being no restriction on the president's law-making pow-
er.78 This doctrine was affirmed, even enlarged, by the Court in
East Pakistan v. Mehdi Ali Khan" and Iftikhar-ud-Din v.
Sarfraz. ° The Court held that pursuant to the unfettered legisla-
tive powers of a regime born of a successful revolution, the regime
could disregard any pronouncement of the superior courts."' A
more complete abdication of judicial power is difficult to imagine.
Dosso raised serious questions of doctrinal validity, the person-
al integrity of the Justices, and the political implications of the
sweeping holding. In terms of legal doctrine, the Court "swallowed
Kelsen hook, line and sinker,"82 in spite of the fact that Kelsen's
a successful coup d'etat is an internationally recognised legal method of changing a
Constitution." Id. at 539. The Court then recognized the impact of a revolution on
the power of judicial review: "Even courts lose their existing jurisdictions, and can
function only to the extent and in the manner determined by the new Constitution."
Id.
78. Id. at 541. In this sense, Dosso represents a radical departure from the Gov-
ernor-General's Case regarding the limits attendant to the doctrine of state necessity.
Specifically, questions such as who could invoke the doctrine, for what purpose, and
for how long, became irrelevant. The sole inquiry under Kelsen's theory is the effica-
cy of the extra-constitutional change.
79. 1959 P.L.D. (S.C.) 387, 404 (Pak.) ("I am convinced more than before that
[Dosso] was rightly decided.").
80. 1961 P.L.D. (S.C.) 585 (Pak.). Speaking about the effect of the Laws (Contin-
uance in Force) Order of October 10, 1958, which provided that "the Republic ...
shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the late Constitution,' id.
at 590, the Court declared:
[The Constitution] stood abrogated in spite of such adoption, for it was no
longer the supreme document to which all laws and all persons were sub-
ject. . . .It was no longer the Constitution of the country, but a creation of
the will of the President .... He could have adopted the Constitution of
any other country but this was more convenient. It is ... an enactment
adopted by the President and subject to his will.
Id. at 599.
81. The Mehdi Ali Khan Court declared:
As observed by us in the case of Dosso the present legal system derives its
authority from the success of the October Revolution, and if the authority in
whom, under the new regime, unfettered legislative powers vest, annuls or
alters the law declared by the Supreme Court, the superseding law has
supremacy over and prevails against the original law as declared by the
Supreme Court.
Mehdi Ali Khan, 1959 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 403.
82. de Smith, supra note 26, at 103.
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theory of revolutionary legality was just that, a speculative theory,
and not a legal principle that any court of law was obligated to
accept.'
There are no certain grounds to claim that "[ilt is, of course,
improbable that even if the Supreme Court's entire Bench had risen
as one man in protest and opposition, it would have made the
slightest difference to the changes that had taken place."' The
author of the main Dosso opinion had declared elsewhere that in
determining the merits of a case with political implications, "I am
quite clear in my mind that we are not concerned with the conse-
quences, however beneficial or disastrous they may be."' If the
Court felt that a contrary decision would engender a political crisis
of an unacceptable magnitude, it could have refrained from reaching
83. "[Kelsen's theory] is betrayed, on its own terms, if it is put to normative use
as a practical principle for guiding judicial decision and action." J.M. Finnis & B.C.
Gould, Constitutional Law, 1972 ANN. SURv. CommONwEALTH L. 1, 53-54 (1973).
Kelsen himself had occasion to clarify his position while responding to Julius Stone's
penetrating critique of the theory of revolutionary legality. See JULIUS STONE, LEGAL
SYSTEM & LAWYER'S REASONING 121-36 (1964); Julius Stone, Mystery and Mystique
in the Basic Norm, 26 MOD. L. REV. 34 passim (1963). Kelsen said:
I myself never confused the legal norm with the statements of the legal
science whose object is legal norms.
.. [M]y thesis [is] that science cannot create a norm because it can
only describe and not prescribe .... The science of law, referring to the
basic norm, does not arrogate a norm-creating authority.
Never, not even in the earliest formulation of the Pure Theory of
Law did I express the foolish opinion that the propositions of the Pure The-
ory of Law "bind" the judge in the way in which legal norms bind him.
Hans Kelsen, Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1128,
1132-34 (1965) (citations omitted). As for the relationship of efficacy and validity,
Kelsen stated:
The essence of my view of the relationship between validity and efficacy of
legal norms is that "the efficacy of the legal order is only the condition of
validity, not the validity itself' . . . positing (Setzung) of the norms and effi-
cacy (Wirksamkeit) of the norms are "conditions of the validity"; efficacy in
the sense that the established legal norms must be by and large obeyed
and, if not obeyed, applied; otherwise the legal order as a whole, just as a
single norm, would lose its validity. A condition is not identical with that
which is conditioned.
Id. at 1139-40 (citations omitted). This attempted clarification still does not answer
H.L.A. Hart's criticism that Kelsen's characterization of the "basic norm" as, for
instance, "hypothetical," "postulated," and "existing in the juristic consciousness,"
"obscures, if it is not actually inconsistent with, the point ... that the question
what the criteria of legal validity in any legal system are is a question of fact. It is
a factual question though it is one about the existence and content of a rule."
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 245 (1961).
84. FELDMAN, supra note 75, at 11.
85. Tamizuddin Khan, 1955 P.L.D. (F.C.) 240, 299 (Pak.).
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the extra-constitutionality issue by deciding the case narrowly," or
by exercising judicial restraint by invoking the political question
doctrine." That the military moved to oust the president from of-
fice only after Dosso was announced may well imply that the choices
before the military were partially contingent upon the pronounce-
ment of the Court." The question of whether the Court helped to
establish, rather than merely recognized, a successful revolutionary
order acquired critical importance because under Article 163 of the
1956 Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court was
binding on all courts and eventually on all public authorities. 9 If
"[t]he decision to accept a revolutionary regime as lawful is more
obviously a choice between competing values than is the case with
ordinary judicial decisions,"" then the Dosso Court, in relying up-
on Kelsen's theory of revolutionary legality, chose judicial abdica-
tion and surrender to praetorianism, because the "principle of po-
litical quietism is the core of Kelsen's attitude."9'
Moreover, these situations raise serious questions about the
personal preferences and values of the Justices. After all,
[t]here is a view, professing a pessimistic realism, which would
attribute the results of these [revolutionary legality] cases to per-
sonal or political motivation on the part of the judges. Sympathy
with the revolutionaries, unwillingness to relinquish office, even an
altruistic desire to prevent their replacement by lesser men may
indeed all have played a part."
Chief Justice Munir, author of the main opinion in Dosso, advised
the president before the president abrogated the 1956 Constitution,
86. See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (discussing why and how
Court could have narrowly decided the case).
87. See infra part VIIA (discussing political question doctrine and validity of
extra-constitutional usurpation).
88. Dosso was announced on October 27, 1958. That evening, three senior army
generals informed the president of General Ayub Khan's decision that the president
relinquish his office and leave the country. The president agreed. KHAN, supra note
29, at 75.
89. PAK. CoNsT. of 1956, art. 163. In Asma Jilani v. Punjab, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.)
139 (Pak.), Justice Yaqub Ali pointed out that by legally recognizing the new regime,
the Supreme Court had tied the hands of all lower courts and public officials. Id. at
247. R.W.M. Dias, after examining Dosso and the Rhodesian grundnorm decisions,
remarked that the judges "kept cementing effectiveness [of the revolution] layer by
layer until it reached a point at which they could look back on their own handiwork
and treat it as an objective fact." R.W.M. Dias, Legal Politics: Norms Behind the
Grundnorm, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 233, 253 (1968).
90. Dias, supra note 89, at 253.
91. A.M. Honor6, Reflections on Revolution, 2 IR. JURIST 268, 272 (1967).
92. J.M. Eekelaar, Principles of Revolutionary Legality, in OxFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 22, 23 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d ser. 1973).
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and advised General Ayub Khan before the general ousted the pres-
ident.3 Chief Justice Munir later acknowledged his prior involve-
mentin these events but did not deem them inappropriate.' Some
have speculated about a "tacit understanding as to... reciprocal
recognition" between the Chief Justice and the martial law re-
gime.9
5
In assessing the true significance of Dosso, it should be noted
that the Court could have avoided the political issue by deciding the
case on narrow grounds. There is a "general and basic judicial duty
to avoid decisions of constitutional questions."" A court's passing
upon the issue of constitutionality "is legitimate only in the last
93. In his autobiography, General Ayab Khan stated:
I]he army's legal experts came up with the opinion that since the Constitu-
tion had been abrogated and Martial Law declared, and a Chief Martial
Law Administrator appointed, the office of President was redundant ....
Chief Justice Munir was there, I think, when this point came up for discus-
sion. He had been advising [President] Iskander Mirza about certain matters
before the revolution. I called him and thought that I would see Iskander
Mirza too. I asked Colonel Qazi to state his point of view. His position was
that the President no longer had any place in the new arrangement. Munir
disagreed. I told Qazi, "I agree with Munir. This is final. Accept this as a
decision."
KHAN, supra note 29 at 76-77.
In his Asma Jilani concurrence, Justice Yaqub Ali quoted extensively from an
article written by Chief Justice Munir:
I received through the Army a message from the President [then Army
Chief] calling me to Karachi ....
At Karachi I was told that subject to any order by the President or
Regulation by the Chief Martial Law Administrator it was intended to keep
the existing laws and the jurisdiction of the civil authorities alive, and that
I was to scrutinise the draft instrument which the Law Secretary had been
required to prepare .... I suggested certain modifications, particularly with
reference to the superior Courts [sic] powers to issue writs and validation of
judgments which had been delivered after the proclamation. The instrument
was entitled the Laws Continuation in Force Order.
Asma Jilani, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 247 (Ali, J., concurring) (quoting Muhammad
Munir, The Days I Remember, PAY. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1968). On the question of
whether the Chief Justice, having associated himself with the drafting of the order,
was in principle precluded from sitting in judgment on its validity, Justice Ali com-
mented: "I can only venture to observe that no one was more deeply initiated in
judicial propriety than the learned Chief Justice." Id.
94. MUHAMMAD MUNIR, HIGHWAYS & BYE-WAYS OF LIFE 262-74 (1978).
95. Conrad, supra note 5, at 188 n.82. This charge is supported by the fact that
the Dosso decision was reached within three weeks of the Constitution's abrogation.
Significantly, the question of the validity of the abrogation and the imposition of
martial law was not put in issue by the parties. The Supreme Court noted this fact
when it overruled Dosso fourteen years later. See Asma Jilani, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) at
162-63.
96. JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.12, at 88
(4th ed. 1991).
1248
No. 4] PRAETORIANISM AND COMMON LAW 1249
resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and
vital controversy between individuals."97
The various appeals involved in Dosso concerned proceedings
and convictions under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (the "Regula-
tion"), a holdover from the colonial administrative scheme. In 1957,
two different high courts struck down the Regulation as violating
the due process and equal protection provisions of the 1956 Consti-
tution.98 Only if these holdings stood nullified by virtue of the
president's abrogation of the 1956 Constitution did the Court need
to decide whether thereafter the Constitution had been validly abro-
gated and replaced by the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order,
1958.' Rather than address the question of constitutional abroga-
tion, the Dosso Court could have held that the Regulation remained
invalid on either of two grounds. First, as the Regulation was void
for inconsistency with the fundamental rights protected by the 1956
Constitution, it was not a law "in force" immediately before the
Proclamation of Martial Law. As such, the Regulation could not be
retained or revived under the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order,
even if such order were itself valid.' 0 Second, because the Laws
(Continuance in Force) Order stated that "t]he Republic... shall
be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the late Consti-
tution,"'' the Court could have held that such language included
a reference by implication to the operation of fundamental rights. In
this new context, if fundamental rights had lost their paramount
status and retained only statutory force, they would still prevail
over a conflicting pre-constitutional statute.0 "
97. Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892), quoted
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1935) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring). For a summary of the doctrine, see Wellman, 143 U.S. at 346-48.
98. State v. Dosso, 1958 P.L.D. (S.C.) 533, 537, 544-45 (Pak.).
99. Id. at 540-41 (providing complete text of order).
100. This is consistent with the then leading interpretation of Article 4 of the
1956 Constitution, giving full effect to the article's use of the word "void." A.K.
BROHI, FUNDIABENTAL LAW OF PAKISTAN 320 (1958). It is as if, from the date of
adoption of the Constitution, an unconstitutional statute "had never been on the
Statute Book." Id. A pre-abrogation decision concurs with Brohi's view. See Bashir v.
West Pakistan, 1958 P.L.D. (Lah.) 853, 855-60 (Pak.) (holding law void if inconsis-
tent with fundamental rights); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF ENGLAND *70 ("[If it be found that the former decision is manifestly
absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it
was not law.").
101. See Dosso, 1958 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 540-41.
102. The Court rejected this argument on the ground that the Laws (Continuance
in Force) Order retained only those parts of the abrogated Constitution essential for
an orderly running of the structure and machinery of the government. Id. at 541.
This did not include fundamental rights. Chief Justice Munir supported this inference
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If the Court did not think it feasible to decide the case on nar-
row grounds, it should have declared the validity and scope of the
extra-constitutional order a nonjusticiable political question. It is a
significant sign of pervasive praetorianism in newly independent
countries that many courts in other post-colonial states, confronted
with extra-constitutional assumptions of power, found useful Dosso's
doctrine of revolutionary legality."3
by arguing that:
IThe very conception of a fundamental right is that it being a right guaran-
teed by the Constitution cannot be taken away by the law and that it is
not only technically inartistic but a fraud on the citizens for the makers of
a Constitution to say that a right is fundamental but that it may be taken
away by the law. Under the new legal Order any law may at any time be
changed by the President and therefore there is no such thing as a funda-
mental right, there being no restriction on the President's law-making pow-
er.
Id. Misgivings about this particular holding were later expressed by Justices
Cornelius and Kaikaus. See East Pakistan v. Mehdi Ali Khan, 1959 P.L.D. (S.C.)
387, 436-39 (Pak.) (questioning view that Laws (Continuance in Force) Order could
extinguish all cases which involved enforcement of a fundamental right); Iftikhar-ud-
Din v. Sarfraz, 1961 P.L.D. (S.C.) 585, 598-600 (Pak.) (recognizing Dosso interpre-
tation of Laws (Continuance in Force) Order was inconsistent with Article 2, which
retained the Constitution).
103. In Uganda v. Commissioner of Prisons ex parte Matovu, 1966 E.A. 514
(Uganda), the Court upheld the repeal of the 1962 Independence Constitution and
the concurrent adoption of the 1966 Constitution by the National Assembly. Id. at
539. While these actions were taken extra-constitutionally, the Court upheld them on
the grounds of efficacy. The Court adopted Dosso's language extensively: "[Tihe series
of events which took place in Uganda . . . were law-creating facts appropriately de-
scribed in law as a revolution; . . . there was an abrupt political change not contem-
plated by the existing Constitution, that destroyed the entire legal order and was
superseded by a new Constitution . . . and by effective government." Id. at 515. The
Court expressly adopted Kelsen's theory of the legitimacy of a usurper regime and
Dosso's rationale, noting that the attorney general had "referred the Court to
Kelsen's General Theory of Law and State ... and the [Dosso case] as his authori-
ties for the submission that the 1966 Constitution is legally valid and that the Court
should so hold. These submissions are doubtless irresistible and unavoidable." Id. at
535. The Court concluded:
Applying the Kelsenian principles, which incidentally form the basis of the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Dosso, our deliberate and
considered view is that the 1966 Constitution is a legally valid Constitution
and the Supreme Law of Uganda; and that the 1962 Constitution having
been abolished as a result of a victorious revolution in law does no longer
exist nor does it now form part of the Laws of Uganda, it having been de-
prived of its de facto and de jure validity.
We have . . . a large number of affidavits sworn to by a large num-
ber of officials, the purpose of which is to prove to the satisfaction of the
Court that the new Constitution is efficacious and that it has been accepted
by the people.
Id. at 539. In Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, 1968 (2) S.A.L.R. 284 (Rhodesia), the
Rhodesian High Court examined the validity of the white minority regime's 1965
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Uniform Declaration of Independence, which announced a new Constitution that
omitted the provisions for majority rule contained in the earlier 1961 Constitution.
Afer quoting from Dosso, Matovu, and Kelsen, Chief Justice Beadle remarked that
"[t]hese authorities show clearly enough that success alone is the determining fac-
tor .... It may be accepted that a successful revolution which succeeds in replacing
the old Grundnorm (or fundamental law) with a new one establishes the revolution-
aries as a new -lawful government." Id. at 318. In light of the continuing efforts of
Great Britain to regain control of the country, the Court held:
Mhe "status" of the present Government is that of a de facto government,
in the sense that it is in fact in effective control over the State's territory,
and that this control "seems" likely to continue. I do not find on the evi-
dence before me that at this stage it can be said to be so "firmly estab-
lished" as to justify a finding that its status is yet that of a de jure govern-
ment.
Id. at 326. The Court then elaborated on the difference between a de facto and a de
jure government:
The difference between the two types of government is the degree of cer-
tainty with which one can predict the likelihood of the rdgime continuing in
"effective control". The difference between the two types of government may
be narrowed down to the difference between "seems" likely and "is" likely
because a government which "is" likely to continue in effective control could
be said to be "firmly established". The difference here then is the difference
between "seems" and "is", a difference purely of the degree of certainty with
which the future can be predicted.
Id. at 320. The Court proceeded to hold that the 1961 Constitution was still the
grundnorm, but said that extra-constitutional actions of the de facto regime could be
validated under Grotius's theory of implied mandate. Id. at 348. Chief Justice Beadle
captured the essence of Dosso and Madzimbamuto when he said that "[niothing
succeeds like success; and this is particularly true of revolutions." Id. at 325. On
appeal, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council rejected the concepts of de facto
and de jure government as inappropriate for dealing with the legal position of a
usurper regime. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, 1968 (3) All E.R.P.C. 561, 562
(Rhodesia). The Judicial Committee held that while the legitimate government was
trying to regain control it was impossible to hold that the usurping government was
for any purpose a lawful government. Id. at 573-74. In the lead opinion, Lord Reid
drew attention to Dosso and Matovu, stating:
Their lordships would not accept all the reasoning in these judgments but
they see no reason to disagree with the results .... It would be very dif-
ferent if there had been still two rivals contending for power.., because
that would mean that by striving to assert its lawful right the ousted legiti-
mate government was opposing the lawful ruler.
Id. at 574. The Rhodesian High Court responded to this rebuff by the Privy Council
in R. v. Ndhlovu, 1968 (4) S.L.R. 515 (Rhodesia). The Court held "the present
Government is now the de jure government of Rhodesia and the 1965 Constitution
the only valid Constitution." Id. at 537. Consequently, the judgment of the Privy
Council was not binding on the extant High Court of Rhodesia. Id. at 535-37. Com-
menting on Dosso and Matovu, the Court pointed out that when the judges in these
cases
continued to sit after they had found as a fact that as a result of successful
revolutions the old constitutions had been effectively overthrown and re-
placed by new constitutions they, by continuing to sit, accepted the new
constitutions, and when they held that the new constitutions were de jure
constitutions they gave these decisions as judges sitting under the new con-
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IV. THE THIRD REPUBLIC, 1962-71: "GUIDED DEMOCRACY"
A. The Constitutional Order
Having secured a stamp of validity and the license for unfet-
tered legislative power in Dosso, the military regime, unencumbered
by constitutional history or popular mandate, proceeded to fashion a
new constitution for Pakistan."' Under the 1962 Constitution, the
executive power of the federation was concentrated in the presi-
dent,"5 who was to be indirectly elected by an electoral college
consisting of 80,000 "Basic Democrats."" 6 These Basic Democrats
were directly elected to perform local governmental duties but had
the additional function of serving as an electoral college for the
stitutions ....
Id. at 522. In Mokotso v. King Moshoeshoe II, 1989 L.R.C. (Const.) 24 (Lesotho), the
High Court of Lesotho examined the validity of the regime established following the
January 20, 1986 coup d'etat staged by the Lesotho Paramilitary Force. Following
Dosso and Kelsen, the Court held:
A Court may hold a revolutionary Government to be lawful, and its
legislation to have been legitimated ab initio, where it is satisfied that (a)
the Government is firmly established, there being no other government in
opposition thereto; and (b) the Government's administration is effective, in
that the majority of the people are behaving, by and large, in conformity
therewith.
Id. at 133. In Matanzima v. President of Transkei, 1989 (4) S.L.R. 989 (Transkei),
the Transkei High Court examined the validity of the regime established following
the Transkei Defence Force's usurpation of power on December 30, 1987. The Court
held:
A revolutionary Government becomes lawful and its legislation is legitimate
ab initio when
(a) it is firmly established, there being no real danger that it will
itself be ousted from power, and
(b) its administration is effective, in that the people, by and large,
have acquiesced in and are behaving in conformity with its mandates.
Id. at 997. But compare Sallah v. Attorney-General, 55 C.C. (S.C.) 118, 124-31 (Gha-
na 1970) (holding 1966 revolution abrogated 1960 Constitution, refusing to adopt
Kelsenian analysis) and Mitchell v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1986 L.R.C.
(Const.) 35, 53-71 (Grenada) (criticizing entire line of cases adopting Kelsen's theory)
with S.K. Date-Bah, Jurisprudence's Day in Court in Ghana, 20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
315, 320-23 (1971) (criticizing Sallah Court's analysis, but supporting outcome) and
Simeon C.R. McIntosh, Legitimacy, Validity & the Doctrine of Necessity: The Case of
Andy Mitchell & Others Considered, 10 W. INDIAN L.J. 127, 165 (1986) (criticizing
Mitchell court's line of reasoning).
104. The military, however, claimed the mandate to enact the Constitution on the
basis of a referendum held on February 14, 1960. The electorate for the referendum
consisted of 80,000 members of local bodies. Almost 96% of the electorate voted for
General Ayub Khan as president. FELDMAN, supra note 75, at 108-09 (1967);
WASEEM, supra note 4, at 154.
105. PAK. CONST. of 1962, art. 31.
106. Id. arts. 155-58.
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presidency and members of the federal and provincial legisla-
tures."7 The prime minister's office was abolished, and the
president's cabinet members did not have to be members of the
legislature. °8 The 1962 Constitution preserved parity between
East and West Pakistan in a smaller federal legislature,' which
the president had the power to summon, prorogue, or dissolve."'
The presidential veto was strengthened by giving the president the
right to seek a referendum of the electoral college when differences
between the legislative and the executive branches arose."' Fun-
damental rights did not form part of the 1962 Constitution."2 The
president had the power to issue ordinances when the Assembly
was dissolved or not in session and to issue a proclamation of emer-
gency under which fundamental rights could be suspended."' The
central legislature could make laws respecting matters enumerated
in the Constitution and, in cases where national interest required,
on matters not so enumerated."4 Thus, the federation could usurp
the provincial law-making powers on the basis of national interest.
A bill to amend the Constitution required a two-thirds majority of
the federal legislature before it was presented for the president's
assent." '5 The president, however, had the option to refer the bill
to a referendum."6 Most significantly, the intervention of the mili-
tary in politics was institutionalized by a constitutional provision
stating that for twenty years, the president or the defense minister
must be a person who had held a rank not lower than that of lieu-
tenant-general in the army."7
The 1962 Constitution established a model of praetorian "guid-
ed democracy," which promised at best a benevolent dictatorship.
The new regime dispensed with democratic representative govern-
ment, fundamental rights, separation of powers, and provincial au-
107. Id. arts. 155-73.
108. Id. art. 33.
109. Id. art. 20.
110. Id. arts. 22-23.
111. Id. arts. 24, 27.
112. Fundamental rights were later introduced by the Constitution (First
Amendment) Act, 1963. These were then suspended by the proclamation of emergen-
cy in September 1965, and not revived until the end of the Third Republic. See infra
part IV.B (describing military coup of 1969 and popular pressure leading to restora-
tion of fundamental rights).
113. PAX CONST. of 1962, arts. 29-30.
114. Id. art. 131.
115. Id. arts. 208-09.
116. Id.
117. Id. art. 238.
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tonomy. Nevertheless, the new order did enjoy political stability and
high economic growth for a few years."' This prompted commen-
tators to hail Pakistan as a model'of political and economic develop-
ment for newly independent states."9 However, persistent de-
mands for representation, fundamental rights, and democracy con-
tinued, erupting into a popular mass movement by fall of 1968.20
Mass demonstrations and civil disobedience paralyzed Pakistan's
economy and social life.
B. The Constitutional Crisis
Following prolonged civil turmoil, the president resigned on
March 25, 1969, and handed control of the country over to the
armed forces.' The next day, the commander-in-chief of the
army, General Yahya Khan, declared 'martial law throughout the
country and assumed the office of chief martial law administra-
tor.' On March 31, Yahya Khan announced that he had assumed
the office of president, so that he could discharge essential state re-
sponsibilities.' Under popular pressure, the military regime dis-
118. For an evaluation of this military-dominated phase of Pakistani politics, see
FELDMAN, supra note 75, at 194-211; ROUNAQ JAHAN, PAKISTAN: FAILURE IN NA-
TIONAL INTEGRATION 143-77 (1972); LAWRENCE ZIRING, THE AYUB KHAN ERA: POL-
ITICS IN PAKISTAN 1958-69 (1971); and Wayne Wilcox, Pakistan: A Decade of Ayub, 9
ASIAN SURv. 87, 87-93 (1969).
119. See, e.g., STEPHEN R. LEWIS, JR., ECONOMIC POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
IN PAKISTAN passim (1969) (exploring reasons for Pakistan's spectacular growth in
modem industry that occurred in an otherwise stagnant economy); GUSTAV F.
PAPANEK, PAKISTAN'S DEVELOPMENT passim (1967) (discussing factors contributing to
Pakistan's economic growth rate). But see, e.g., MAHBUBULUI HAQ, THE POVERTY
CURTAIN 12-26 (1976) (stating while Pakistan economic situation was strong, there
were problems with development policies and outcomes); PAKISTAN: THE ROOTS OF
DICTATORSHIP (Hassan Gardezi & Jamil Rashid eds. 1983).
120. For accounts of the mass movement against General Ayub Khan's regime,
see TARIQ ALI, PAKISTAN: MILITARY RULE OR PEOPLE'S POWER 156-216 (1970); HER-
BERT FELDMAN, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: PAKISTAN 1962-1969, at 237-71 (1972); and
SAYEED, supra note 19, at 143-52.
121. The president wrote to the army commander-in-chief informing him of the
change, saying that
"all civil administration and constitutional authority in the country has be-
come ineffective .... [I am left with no option but] to step aside and leave
it to the defence forces of Pakistan, which today represent the only effective
and legal instrument, to take over full control of the affairs of this country."
Asma Jilani v. Punjab, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) 139, 183 (Pak.).
122. WASEEM, supra note 4, at 233.
123. Asma Jilani, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 184. On April 4, 1969, the Provisional
Constitution Order, 1969, and Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order,
1969, were issued in the name of General Yahya Khan. Pakistan was to be "gov-
erned as nearly as may be in accordance with the [1962] Constitution." Provincial
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solved West Pakistan and restored the four provinces of the western
wing. Furthermore, the regime accepted the principle of representa-
tion according to population instead of parity between the two wings
of the country, and held direct elections for a new Constituent
Assembly.'24 In the December 1970 elections, a political party pri-
marily representing the eastern wing and clearly committed to a
parliamentary form of government, provincial autonomy, and funda-
mental rights, secured an absolute majority in the Constituent As-
sembly. Nevertheless, the military regime refused to summon the
Assembly, which triggered a mass movement of civil disobedience in
the eastern wing.' The military's response was the infamous
genocidal military action in East Bengal, which resulted in a war
with India and culminated in Pakistan's dismemberment. Having
lost the war and the eastern wing of the country, internationally
isolated and condemned, and confronted with an enraged citizenry
and mutinous troops, the military regime relinquished power in
favor of the political party then commanding a majority in the Con-
stituent Assembly.
C. The Judicial Response: Doctrine of Implied Mandate
Two pending criminal appeals, consolidated as Asma Jilani v.
Punjab,2s furnished an opportunity to test the validity of the 1969
extra-constitutional change of power. The Supreme Court held that
the assumption of power by General Yahya Khan was an illegal
usurpation." The Court, after an extensive analysis of Dosso, re-
Coast. Order, § 3(1)(1969); see Asma Jilani, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 193-96 (providing
full text of orders). The orders abrogated fundamental rights and ousted the courts'
jurisdiction over orders, actions, and proceedings instituted by martial law authorities
and special military courts. Id. at 184, 193-96.
124. For a detailed discussion of the political situation that forced the military
regime to agree to these changes, see WASEEM, supra note 4, at 245-55.
125. For detailed analyses of the 1970 election and its aftermath, see SHAHID J.
BURIU, PAKISTAN UNDER BHUTTO, 1971-1977, at 49-61 (1980); WASEEM, supra note 4,
at 255-96. See also THE SECRETARIAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JU-
RISTS, THE EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN, 1971 passim (1972) (discussing violations of
civil rights and international law in East Pakistan).
126. 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) 139 (Pak.).
127. Id. at 183-85. Before turning to the merits of the case, the Court considered
it important to reaffirm the power of the judiciary.
The Courts undoubtedly have the power to hear and determine any matter
or controversy which is brought before them, even if it be to decide whether
they have the jurisdiction to determine such a matter or not. The superior
Courts are, as is now well settled, the Judges of their own jurisdiction. This
is a right which has consistently been claimed by this and other Courts of
superior jurisdiction in all civilised countries ....
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nounced the doctrine of revolutionary legality and expressly over-
ruled Dosso.' One Justice saw fit to make a remarkable
.. . [So far as judicial power is concerned it must exist in Courts as
long as the Courts are there .... [Tihe Courts have and must have the
power to determine all questions of their own jurisdiction. It is a proposition
so well-settled that no one can challenge it.
Id. at 197-98.
128. Id. at 162-83. The Court provided several grounds for holding that Dosso
improperly adopted Kelsen's theory of revolutionary legality. Both Dosso's interpreta-
tion and application of Kelsen's theory came under attack.
Kelsen's theory was, by no means, a universally accepted theory nor was it
a theory which could claim to have become a basic doctrine of the science of
modem jurisprudence ....
... [Kelsen] was only trying to lay down a pure theory of law as a
rule of normative science consisting of "an aggregate or system of norms".
He was propounding a theory of law as a "mere jurists' proposition about
law". He was not attempting to lay down any legal norm or legal norms
which are "the daily concerns of Judges, legal practitioners or administra-
tors".
Id. at 179.
The Court rejected the proposition that a successful assumption of power is
itself sufficient to bestow legality:
It was, by no means, [Kelsen's] purpose to lay down any rule of law to the
effect that every person who was successful in grabbing power could claim
to have become also a law-creating agency. His purpose was to recognise
that such things as revolutions do also happen but even when they are
successful they do not acquire any valid authority to rule or annul the pre-
vious "grund-norm" until they have themselves become a legal order by
habitual obedience by the citizens of the country. It is not the success of the
revolution, therefore, that gives it legal validity but the effectiveness it ac-
quires by habitual submission to it from the citizens.
Id. at 180. The Court also expressly rejected the international law basis of Kelsen's
theory:
Kelsen's attempt to justify the principle of effectiveness from the standpoint
of International Law cannot also be justified, for, it assumes "the primacy of
International Law over National Law." In doing so he has ... overlooked
that for the purposes of International Law the legal person is the State and
not the community and that in International Law there is no "legal order"
as such. The recognition of a State under International Law has nothing to
do with the internal sovereignty of the State, and this kind of recognition of
a State must not be confused with the recognition of the Head of a State or
Government of a State An individual does not become the Head of a State
through the recognition of other States but through the municipal law of his
own State.
Id. at 181.
In conclusion, the Court said:
[We] would agree with the criticism that the learned Chief Justice [Justice
Munir, author of Dosso] not only misapplied the doctrine of Hans Kelsen,
but also fell into error in thinking that it was a generally accepted doctrine
of modem jurisprudence. Even the disciples of Kelsen have hesitated to go
as far as Kelsen had gone ....
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pronouncement about the relationship between political reality and
judicial review:
[Maybe], that on account of his holding the coercive apparatus of
the State, the people and the Courts are silenced temporarily, but
let it be laid down firmly that the order which the usurper imposes
will remain illegal and Courts will not recognize its rule and act
upon them as de jure. As soon as the first opportunity arises, when
the coercive apparatus falls from the hands of the usurper, he
should be tried for high treason and suitably punished. This alone
will serve as a deterrent to would be adventurers.'
By the time Asma Jilani was decided, Yahya Khan's martial
law regime had fallen and been replaced by an elected government.
The validity of the elected government rested on the elections of
1970, which were held under a framework pronounced by the mar-
tial law regime. Consequently, the Court considered giving legal
effect to certain acts of the illegal usurper regime.130 Having over-
turned Dosso, and confronted with limitations on the application of
the doctrine of state necessity implied by the Governor-General's
Case,"' the Court employed the doctrine of implied mandate first
enunciated by Hugo Grotius.3 2 According to Grotius, courts may
validate certain necessary acts of a usurper done in the interest of
preserving the state, because the lawful sovereign would also want
these acts to be undertaken." The Court relied upon Lord
... [The Chief Justice] erred both in interpreting Kelsen's theory
and applying the same to the facts and circumstances of the case before
him. The principle enunciated by him is ... wholly unsustainable, and [we
are] duty bound to say that it cannot be treated as good law either on the
principle of stare decisis or even otherwise.
Id. at 181-83.
129. Id. at 243 (Ali, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 204-05. The Court was careful to state that "this decision is confined
to the question in issue before this Court... and has nothing whatsoever to do
with the validity of the present regime." Id. at 208.
131. 1955 P.L.D. (F.C.) 435, 561-65 (Pak.); see supra notes 40-50 and accompany-
ing text (discussing use of doctrine of necessity in the Governor-General's Case).
132. See HuGO GROTiUs, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACLs LIB~I TRES 159 (Francis W.
Kelsey trans., 1925).
133. Id. The Court quoted Grotius to frame the doctrine of implied mandate as
follows:
Now while such a usurper is in possession, the acts of government which he
performs may have a binding force, arising not from a right possessed by
him, for no such right exists, but from the fact that one to whom the sover-
eignty actually belongs, whether people, or king, or senate, would prefer
that measures promulgated by him should meanwhile have the force of law,
in order to avoid the utter confusion which would result from the subversion
of laws and suppression of the courts.
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Pearce's dissent in the Privy Council's decision in Madzimbamuto v.
Lardner-Burke"4 to delineate the contours of the implied mandate
doctrine.'35 Accordingly, the Asma Jilani Court recognized that
acts validated by implied mandate must
(1) [be] directed to and reasonably required for ordinary orderly
running of the State; (2) not impair the rights of citizens under the
lawful Constitution; and (3)... [not be] intended to and do not in
fact directly help the usurpation and do not run contrary to the
policy of the lawful Sovereign.136
The Court stated that this re-fashioned use of the doctrine of
state necessity, coupled with the doctrine of implied mandate was
not a vehicle "for validating the illegal acts of usurpers.""7 Rather,
the Court claimed that "this is a principle of condonation and not
legitimization." 8' The Court proceeded to pronounce four inde-
pendent grounds upon which to condone the acts of an illegal usurp-
er regime:
(1) [AIll transactions which are past and closed, for, no useful pur-
pose can be served by reopening them, (2) all acts and legislative
measures which are in accordance with, or could have been made
under, the abrogated Constitution or the previous legal order, (3)
all acts which tend to advance or promote the good of the people,
(4) all acts required to be done for the ordinary orderly running of
the State and all such measures as would establish or lead to the
establishment of, in our case, the objectives mentioned in the Ob-jectives Resolution of 1954.'
Because Asma Jilani was decided aier the usurper regime had
fallen, Mark Stavsky views the opinion as "extremely politic, in that
the Court, by relying upon an implied mandate theory, had little to
lose and everything to gain."4 ' The merits of Asma Jilani lie in its
repudiation of Kelsen's theory of revolutionary legality and overrul-
ing of Dosso. The list of condoned acts, however, is problematic.
Points one, two, and the first part of point four fall within the scope
of the doctrine of necessity as developed in the Governor-General's
Asma Jilani v. Punjab, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) 139, 205 (quoting GROTIUS, supra note 132,
at 159).
134. 1968 (3) All E.R.P.C. 561, 578-87 (Rhodesia) (Pearce, J., dissenting).
135. Asma Jilani, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 205-06.
136. Id. at 206.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 207.
139. Id. Regarding the enactments challenged by the criminal appeals, the Court
found them both beyond the permissible limits of the doctrine of implied mandate
and declared them void. Id. at 207-08.
140. Stavsky, supra note 5, at 376 n.142.
1258 [1993: 1225
PRAETORIANISM AND COMMON LAW
Case. 4' The second part of point four validated the 1970 elections
as a means of moving toward a representative, federal, and parlia-
mentary system of government. But the sweeping principle of point
three, with its omnibus term "good of the people" is troublesome. It
is very close to constructs like "peace and good government," tradi-
tionally used to denote unfettered legislative powers of a sovereign
legislature. Furthermore, point three does not provide any verifiable
standard and is silent about who shall determine the "good of the
people." This construction was later deployed to bestow unfettered
legislative powers upon another military regime. 142 The Court, by
adding the "good of the people" language in its list of condoned acts,
in effect gave full recognition to the military regime as the de facto
government, with only some tenuous restrictions." The Asma
Jilani Court's use of such broad language is all the more surprising
in light of a bold judgment of the Lahore High Court in Mir Hassan
v. State,' where the court restrictively construed the doctrine of
necessity to assert jurisdiction of civil courts in defiance of martial
law regulations.45
A more suitable response would have been to decide the case on
narrow grounds. The immediate issue in Asma Jilani was the valid-
141. 1955 P.L.D. (F.C.) 435, 436 (Pak.); see also supra note 51 and accompanying
text (discussing use of doctrine of necessity in English and American jurisprudence).
142. See infra notes 231-46 and accompanying text (discussing Nusrat Bhutto v.
Chief of Army Staff, 1977 P.L.D. (S.C.) 657 (Pak.), where Court validated General
Zia's martial law regime).
143. The Court's principle of condonation expressly excluded
any act intended to entrench the usurper more firmly in his power or to
directly help him to run the country contrary to its legitimate objectives. I
would not also condone anything which seriously impairs the rights of the
citizens except in so far as they may be designed to advance the social wel-
fare and national solidarity.
Asma Jilani, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 207 (emphasis added). The emphasized text again
implies the broad legislative power of extra-constitutional regimes.
144. 1969 P.L.D. (Lah.) 786 (PakL).
145. Id. at 804-05. The Mir Hassan court emphasized that ouster of jurisdiction
was not dictated by necessity-
Martial Law in this country was imposed with a view to dealing with a
situation in the creation of which the Courts had played no part, at
all .... The malady, which was sought to be cured by the imposition of
Martial Law, was germinated and flourishing in places other than Courts of
law. That being so, there could possibly be no justification for taking away
the powers of such an institution.
Id.
The Court also stated that "the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, therefore,
continues to vest in them and the same cannot and has not been taken away by the
Proclamation of Martial Law. Particularly since it has been imposed in times of
peace and for the purpose of quelling riots and restoring order." Id. at 809-10.
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ity of a martial law regulation providing for preventive deten-
tion.146 The Court upheld the regulation because identical regula-
tions were present in the statutory scheme prior to the 1969 abro-
gation of the Constitution.47 By confining itself to this holding,
the Court could have avoided the wider question of the validity and
scope of legislative powers of the extra-constitutional regime.
V. THE FOURTH REPUBLIC, 1973-77: THE DEMOCRATIC INTERLUDE
A The Constitutional Order
The 1973 Constitution is unique for Pakistan because it is
Pakistan's first constitution to be framed by elected representatives,
and, in spite of ideological and other differences among political
parties represented in the Constituent Assembly, the Constitution
was passed unanimously.'1 The 1973 Constitution provides for a
parliamentary system in which the executive power is concentrated
in the office of the prime minister.' The formal head of the state
is the president, but he is bound to act on the advice of the prime
minister.50
Parliament consists of two houses-the National Assembly and
the Senate.'5 ' The National Assembly members are directly elect-
ed for a period of five years. 5' However, the National Assembly
146. Asma Jilani, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 207-08.
147. Id. at 261-62. The Court referred to The Security of Pakistan Act, 1952 and
The Defense of Pakistan Rules, 1965. Both regulations, like the regulation issued
under martial law, provided for the arrest of any person to prevent that person from
acting in a manner prejudicial to the security, public safety and interest, and defense
of Pakistan. Id. The martial law regulation, however, added an ouster of jurisdiction
clause, which the Court struck down. Id. at 247-48.
148. The historic importance of the 1973 Constitution is accurately reflected in
the following remark:
The fact that a consensus was reached is the greatest merit of the Constitu-
tion of 1973, which represents a social contract between the various sections
of Pakistan's plural society and contains the terms by which they are will-
ing to live together. It is improbable that another such consensus could take
shape between the various political parties on constitutional issues.
Kamal Azfar, Constitutional Dilemmas in Pakistan, in PAKISTAN UNDER THE MIM-
TARY: ELEVEN YEARS OF ZIA UL-HAQ 49, 64-65 (Shahid Javed Burki & Craig Baxter
eds., 1991). The consensus became possible only after resistance within the ruling
party, including resignation by the law minister, forced Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the
leader of the ruling party, to suppress his preference for a centralized presidential
system. STANLEY WOLPERT, ZULFI BHuTro OF PAKISTAN: His LIFE AND TIMEs 205-06
(1993).
149. PAK. CONST. of 1973, art. 90(1).
150. Id. arts. 41(1), 48(1).
151. Id. art. 50.
152. Id. arts. 51-52.
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can be dissolved at the will of the prime minister.15 The Senate,
with equal members elected by the provincial legislatures, is a per-
manent body not subject to dissolution.M Its members have a ten-
ure of six years, half of them retiring every three years. 55
The prime minister is the chief executive of the federation and
is elected by a majority of the National Assembly." Provincial
governors are appointed by the president. 57 Governors are bound
to act on the advice of the chief ministers of the provinces, who are
elected by a majority of the provincial legislatures.'58 Federal Par-
liament has exclusive power to legislate on federal subjects.'59
Both the national and provincial assemblies have power to make
laws concerning matters of common interest.6 Matters not so
designated remain with the provincial legislatures. 6'
To coordinate relations between the federation and the provinc-
es, the 1973 Constitution establishes a new institution known as
the Council of Common Interests, consisting of the chiefministers of
the provinces and an equal number of ministers from the federal
government.62 Fundamental rights are guaranteed under the
Constitution." In light of the constitutional vicissitudes of the
country, subversion of the Constitution is designated "high
treason."' Finally, the 1973 Constitution provides for judicial
review.16
B. Scope of Judicial Review: Missed Opportunity
Adoption of the 1973 Constitution provided Pakistan's superior
courts with a new opportunity to assert judicial independence and
enunciate the scope of judicial review conducive to stable constitu-
tional governance. This section will examine how the courts re-
sponded to this historic opportunity.
153. Id. art. 58.
154. Id. art. 59.
155. Id. The federal capitol and federally administered tribal areas are also rep-
resented in the Senate. Id. art. 59(1).
156. Id. arts. 90-91.
157. Id. art. 101.
158. Id. arts. 129-32.
159. Id. arts. 141-42, ch. 1, part V; see also, Craig Baxter, Constitution Making:
The Development of Federalism in Pakistan, 14 ASIAN SuRv. 1074, 1080 (1974).
160. PAY. CONST. of 1973, art. 142.
161. Id.
162. Id. art. 153.
163. Id. arts. 8-28.
164. Id. art. 6.
165. Id. art. 199(1).
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The Asma Jilani Court's designation of the military takeover of
1969 as an illegal usurpation left the civilian government, which
had taken over as a martial-law government pending the adoption
of a new constitution, without legal basis. This legal void was
bridged by the 1972 Interim Constitution, which was promulgated
one day after the announcement of Asma Jilani. This Interim Con-
stitution was to provide for the functioning of the government until
a constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly.166 Article
281 of the Interim Constitution validated all laws made after the
military's usurpation of power in 1969, notwithstanding any prior
judgment of any court. Furthermore, the article immunized from
legal challenge all orders, proceedings, and acts taken pursuant to
the validated laws.
1 7
The Pakistan Supreme Court examined the validity of Article
281 in State v. Zia-ur-Rahman."6 ' The Court upheld the ouster of
jurisdiction over validated laws and made extended pronouncements
about judicial review under a written constitution. 6 9 While Zia-
166. See WASEEM, supra note 4, at 310.
167. State v. Zia-ur-Rahman, 1973 P.L.D. (S.C.) 49, 77-78 (Pak.).
168. 1973 P.L.D. (S.C.) 49 (Pak.).
169. Id. at 166-70. "[It] cannot ... be said that a Legislature, under a written
Constitution, possesses the same powers of 'omnipotence' as the British Parliament.
Its powers have necessarily to be derived from, and to be circumscribed within, the
four corners of the written Constitution." Id. at 66. The Court affirmed the right of
judicial review:
[The Court] has the right to interpret the Constitution and to say as to
what a particular provision of the Constitution means or does not mean,
even if that particular provision is a provision seeking to oust the jurisdic-
tion of this Court.
This is a right which it acquires not de hors the Constitution but by
virtue of the fact that it is a superior Court set up by the Constitution
itself. It is not necessary for this purpose to invoke any divine or super-
natural right but this judicial power is inherent in the Court itself. It flows
from the fact that it is a constitutional Court and it can only be taken
away by abolishing the Court itself.
Id. at 69.
The Court also highlighted the relationship of judicial review and separation
of powers:
In exercising this power, the judiciary claims no supremacy over other or-
gans of the Government but acts only as the administrator of the public
will. Even when it declares a legislative measure unconstitutional and void,
it does not do so, because, the judicial power is superior in degree or digni-
ty to the legislative power; but because the Constitution has vested it with
the power to declare what the law is in the cases which come before it. It
thus merely enforces the Constitution as a paramount law whenever a legis-
lative enactment comes into conflict with it because, it is its duty to see
that the Constitution prevails ....
... [Ilt is equally important to remember that it is not the function
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ur-Rahman has been hailed as "a tour de force in judicial re-
view," 7° others have criticized the decision for implicitly falling
back on the doctrine of revolutionary legality to validate the Interim
Constitution of 1972."71 The criticism is misplaced. To rule other-
wise would have revived the 1962 Constitution, which even the
Asma Jilani Court had refrained from doing. Instead, validity of the
Interim Constitution of 1972 could be independently based on its
ratification by the National Assembly, an assembly elected as a con-
stituent body through the first general and fair elections held in the
country.
Although Zia-ur-Rahman did not embrace the doctrine of revo-
lutionary legality, it nevertheless suffered from three flaws which
subsequently proved fatal to the democratic 1973 Constitution.
First, validation of the blanket immunity for martial law legislation
ignored the limits of condonation pronounced in Asma Jilani only
two years earlier. In doing so, the Court undermined Asma Jilani,
which is rightly hailed as "the bright star in Pakistan's constitution-
al firmament."'72 Second, the Court's position, that no extra-con-
stitutional principles exist to test the validity of a constitution en-
acted by a representative parliament, is potentially troublesome.'73
Standing on its own, this proposition is unassailable. But Asma
Jilani condoned martial law measures, as they related to the
election of the Constituent Assembly, on the ground that these
"would establish or lead to the establishment of... the objectives
of the judiciary to legislate or to question the wisdom of the Legislature in
making a particular law if it has made it competently without transgressing
the limitations of the Constitution. Again if a law has been competently and
validly made the judiciary cannot refuse to enforce it even if the result of it
be to nullify its own decisions. The Legislature has also every right to
change, amend or clarify the law .... The Legislature which establishes a
particular Court may also, if it so desires, abolish it.
Id. at 70.
170. MAKHDOom ALi KHAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
PAKISTAN, 1973, at xxii (1986). "[Not] only did the Court reject the doctrine of parlia-
mentary sovereignty, but extended the power of judicial review to each and every
legislative measure including constitutional amendment. The role of the judiciary in a
federal system of government was emphasized with great courage and imagination."
Id. at xxii-xxiii.
171. Conrad, supra note 5, at 134-35. Conrad bases his criticism on the Court's
acceptance of the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution as a "fait accompli." Id.; see
Zia-ur-Rahman, 1973 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 76.
172. Azfar, supra note 148, at 64.
173. Zia-ur.Rahman, 1973 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 76. "There can be no question,
therefore, of any organ or functionary under the Constitution questioning the authori-
ty of the Constitution under which it is functioning or striking down any provision of
the Constitution on the basis that it is repugnant to some other document, however
important or sacred." Id.
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mentioned in the Objectives Resolution of 1954."'17 Just as the va-
lidity of the Constituent Assembly rested upon Asma Jilani, and
thus indirectly on the Objectives Resolution, the validity of the
Assembly's legislation could be tested against the directives of the
same Objectives Resolution.
Lastly, and most dangerously, the Court held that disregard by
the constituent body of a mandate by the people is a nonjusticiable
political question, which only the people through the democratic
process have the right and the power to correct.'75 The Court ac-
knowledged that the Objectives Resolution had been referred to in
Asma Jilani as the "'cornerstone of Pakistan's legal edifice," "the
bond which binds the nation,"' "'a transcendental part of the Consti-
tution,' and "a supra-constitutional instrument which is unalter-
able and immutable." 76 Nevertheless, the Court rejected any su-
pra-constitutional principles, simply remarking that "[tihere is no
mention in these observations ... of the Objectives Resolution being
the 'grund norm' for Pakistan."7 ' By entangling itself in a
Kelsenian search for a grundnorm, the Court put itself in a no-win
situation. The Court had recently renounced the doctrine of revolu-
tionary legality in Asma Jilani, and in the process had subjected
Kelsen's theories of law to serious criticism. To now provide a
Kelsenian grundnorm for the constitutional order would have
amounted to an unprincipled reversal. Concurrently, the preoccupa-
tion with Kelsenian concepts and language precluded identification
of some other yardsticks for judicial review of legislation. This fail-
174. Asma Jilani, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 207.
175. Zia-ur-Rahman, 1973 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 76-77. The Court made this point by
stating,
[The validity of the Interim Constitution] does not, however, mean
that the body having the power of framing a Constitution is "omnipotent" or
that it can disregard the mandate given to it by the people for framing a
Constitution or can frame a Constitution which does not fulfil the aspira-
tions of the people or achieve their cherished objectives political, social or
economic. These limitations on its power, however, are political limitations
and not justiciable by the judiciary. If a Constituent Assembly or National
Assembly so acts in disregard of the wishes of the people, it is the people
who have the right to correct it. The judiciary cannot declare any provision
of the Constitution to be invalid or repugnant on the ground that it goes
beyond the mandate given to the Assembly concerned or that it does not
fulfil the aspirations or objectives of the people. To endeavor to do so would
amount to entering into the political arena which should be scrupulously
avoided by the judiciary. With political decisions or decisions on questions of




Id. (quoting Asma Jilani, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 182).
Id. at 72-73.
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ure forced the Court to adopt a very restrictive approach to judicial
review. Specifically, so long as the procedures of legislation were
followed, the substance of legislation was outside the purview of the
courts. The Court's failure is even more surprising in view of the
important distinction between judicial power and jurisdiction articu-
lated in the opinion.'78 An assertion of inherent judicial power
could have easily preceded an enunciation of principles against
which all legislation would be reviewed, even where these principles
were not expressly within the four corners of a written constitution.
The Zia-ur-Rahman Court should have adopted a basic struc-
ture/essential features test to examine the validity of constitutional
legislation. The basic structure/essential features test, fashioned by
the Supreme Court of India in Bharati v. Kerala,"9 provides that
the theory of unfettered legislative power has no place under a
written federal constitution.8 0 Additionally, due to implied and in-
herent limitations, the federal legislature cannot employ its power
to amend, abrogate, or destroy the "basic structure" and "essential
features" of the constitution.' In later cases, the Indian Supreme
Court has firmly held the position that it has the power to review
constitutional amendments under the basic structure/essential fea-
tures test, even in the face of the legislature's incorporation of ex-
press ouster-of-jurisdiction provisions in constitutional amend-
ments.'82 The basic structure/essential features test recognized
that a constitution "is an organic document which must grow and
must take stock of the vast socioeconomic problems."" The test
178. See id. at 69-70; see also infra note 373 and accompanying text (articulating
distinction between court's judicial power as inherent under separation of powers,
and jurisdiction as right to adjudicate given case).
179. 1973 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1461 (India). The Supreme Court of India reaffirmed the
test in Indira Gandhi v. Narain, 1975 A.I.R. (S.C.) 2299, 2342-43 (India).
180. Bharati, 1973 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 1535-36.
181. Id. at 1565. The Court held that the power to amend bestowed by a written
constitution "does not enable Parliament to abrogate or take away fundamental
rights or to completely change the fundamental features of the Constitution so as to
destroy its identity. Within these limits Parliament can amend every article". Id.
182. See Indira Gandhi, 1975 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 1242-43; Minerva Mills Ltd. v.
Union of India, 1980 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1789, 1795 (India); Waman Rao v. Union of India,
1981 A.I.R. (S.C.) 271, 284-85 (India); Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal
Ltd., 1983 A.I.R. (S.C.) 239, 246-49 (India).
183. Bharati, 1973 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 1566 (Shelat & Grover, JJ., concurring). This
case significantly departed from earlier holdings of the Court whereby the Court held
any infringement on a fundamental right unconstitutional.
The Indian Supreme Court's inflexible protection of private property rights
and its blocking of important socioeconomic legislation was reminiscent of the United
States Supreme Court's early response to the New Deal legislation. Compare Scindia
v. India, 1971 A.I.R. (S.C.) 530, 555-58 (India) (finding Indian rulers have property
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introduced flexibility in judicial review without giving the legisla-
ture the opportunity to bend the constitution out of shape. The
Court found that the Preamble to the Indian Constitution furnished
the primary key to the basic structure."M The Court identified re-
publicanism, democracy, equality of status and opportunity, secular-
ism, adult franchise, separation of powers, and rule of law as basic
features of the Constitution.185
Commentators characterize the basic structure/essential fea-
tures test as "an important safeguard against legislative despotism
and the tyranny of shifting majorities"'86 and as "an instrument of
control to prohibit a political party, ambitious of power with hatred
of liberty and contempt of law, from destroying the democratic fea-
tures of the [Indian] Constitution." 7 The Fourth Republic in Pa-
kistan needed such a safeguard, and the instrument of control could
be furnished by the principles of democracy, federalism, guaranteed
fundamental rights, equality of opportunity before the law, and
independence of the judiciary, as enshrined in the Objectives Reso-
lution.
right in privy purses); R.C. Cooper v. India, 1970 A.I.R. (S.C.) 564, 592-602 (India)
(discussing property rights under Indian constitution); and Nath v. Punjab, 1967
A.I.R. (S.C.) 1643, 1651-71 (India) with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 288,
310 (1936) (holding coercive tax improper use of taxing power and violation of due
process); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68-70 (1936) (invalidating Agricultural
Adjustment Act under Tenth Amendment); A.L.. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 547-48 (1935) (invalidating hour and wage regulation as viola-
tion of commerce clause); RailRoad Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 357, 361-62
(1935) (invalidating statute transferring property rights under retirement system as
violation of commerce and due process clauses); and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388, 431-33 (1935) (invalidating presidential order limiting interstate trans-
portation of petroleum as violation of due process). Both lines of cases created simi-
lar conflicts between the judiciary and other branches of government. See also JOHN
E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW 147 (3d ed. 1986) (describing conflict be-
tween United States Supreme Court and other branches of government); 1 H.M.
SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA: A CRrrIcAL CoMMNTARY 645-48 (2d ed.
1975) (describing conflict over economic regulations between Indian judiciary and
other branches of government).
184. Indira Gandhi, 1975 A.I.R. (S.C.) at 2455.
185. Id. at 2465-66. The list is not exclusive. The Court observed that "the theo-
ry of Basic Structure has to be considered in each individual case, not in the ab-
stract, but in the context of the concrete problem." Id. at 2467.
186. KHAN, supra note 170, at xviii.
187. Mohammad Ghouse, Constitutional Law-I: Fundamental Rights, 9 ANN.
SURv. INDIAN L. 326, 364 (1973); see also V.S. Deshpande, Constitutional Law-I: Po-
litical and Civil Rights, in THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 18, 46-53 (Joseph Minattur
ed., 1978) (describing origin and character of basic structure/essential features test).
For a general commentary on the constitutional law of India, see SEERVAI, supra
note 183 passim; and T.K. TOPE, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA passim (2d ed.
1992).
1266
PRAETORIANISM AND COMMON LAW
Zia-ur-Rahman represented a unique historic opportunity for
the Supreme Court of Pakistan to make a fresh start by defining
the scope of judicial review. The praetorian tendencies in the body
politic lay defeated and marginalized, and had been repudiated by
the Court itself in Asma Jilani.'ss The new popularly elected rep-
resentative government embarked on constitutional governance
under a constitution created from a consensus of contending politi-
cal forces.189 To prevent a temporary majority in the legislature
from frustrating the agreed-upon constitutional order, it was im-
perative that the Court not leave such unlimited legislative power
with the legislature. After Zia-ur-Rahman, the government in pow-
er, which had an absolute majority in the legislature, felt free to
adopt constitutional amendments dictated by political expediency
without fear of judicial intervention.
During the transition phase between the demise of the military
regime and the adoption of the 1973 Constitution, the government
called upon the Supreme Court to render an advisory opinion re-
garding the recognition of Bangladesh." The government favored
recognition, but there was sharp division within the body politic on
the issue. The Supreme Court considered the merits of the Special
Reference and responded that the government may rightfully recog-
nize Bangladesh. Recognition of foreign states has long been consid-
ered a nonjusticiable political question, and within the exclusive
discretion of the executive branch of government.'
The Court's willingness to participate in a politically conten-
tious area beyond judicial competence raises questions about its
independence and credibility. Later, the Court was drawn directly
188. Asma Jilani v. Punjab, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) 139, 182-85, 191 (Pak.).
189. See Azfar, supra note 148, at 91.
190. See Special Reference No. 1 of 1973, 1973 P.L.D. (S.C.) 563, 576 (Pak.). The
military regime's refusal to abide by the results of the general elections of 1970
resulted in the dismemberment of the country, and the eastern wing declared itself a
sovereign state and adopted the name Bangladesh. See WASEEM, supra note 4, at
285-96.
191. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962) (stating courts should not
interfere in executive decision to recognize foreign state). In a subsequent United
States Supreme Court case, one Justice summarized the rationale of the political
question doctrine in terms of three relevant inquiries: "(i) Does the issue involve
resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate
branch of government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court
move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel
against judicial intervention?" Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell,
J., concurring); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITIcAL QUEsTIONS/JUDIcIAL ANSWERS:
DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY To FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 6, 31-44, 69-71 (2d ed. 1992)




into the vortex of politics when the government, having banned the
main opposition party on charges of activities contrary to the securi-
ty and ideology of Pakistan, sought an advisory opinion.192 Ignor-
ing the unmistakable political nature of the issue, the Court ap-
proved the federal government's action.'93 As a result, during the
Fourth Republic, the regime felt free to curtail political freedoms by
successive amendments to the Constitution, which ultimately led to
the downfall of the Republic.
In Dewan Textile Mills Ltd. v. Pakistan,' the court heard a
challenge to the validity of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment)
Act, 1975."95 The amendment provided that an interim order,
passed by the high courts in exercise of their constitutional jurisdic-
tion in fiscal and financial matters, would cease to have effect after
sixty days. 9 ' The petitioner argued that the amendment effec-
tively destroyed the judicial power bestowed by the 1973 Constitu-
tion. 97 Moreover, Articles 238 and 239 of the Constitution pre-
cluded the legislature from effecting such a change. 8 Reflecting
the temper of the time set by Asma Jilani and Zia-ur-Rahman,
even the Attorney General submitted that the judiciary has "the
power to scrutinise the validity of even the constitutional measure
seeking to amend the Constitution."99
The court found the amendment not ultra vires of the Constitu-
192. See SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT ON DISSOLUTION OF NAP (Government of
Pakistan Publication 1975). The National Awami Party ("NAP"), besides being the
main opposition party in the Federal Parliament, controlled the provincial govern-
ments of the two small provinces of Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Prov-
ince ("NWFP"). The federal government, contrary to the political consensus which
resulted in unanimous adoption of the 1973 Constitution, dismissed the NAP govern-
ment of Baluchistan. The NAP government in NWFP resigned in protest. The.
government's response to the resulting political crisis was to adopt the Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, all designed to abridge crucial political
rights, to initiate a military action in Baluchistan, and to declare the NAP illegal.
For detailed accounts of these developments, see AMNESTY INT'L, ISLA Ic REPUBLIC
OF PAKISTAN 11-20, 50-59 (1977); SAYEED, supra note 16, at 113-38; WASEEM, supra
note 4, at 326-40; and Eqbal Ahmad, Pakistan: Signposts to a Police State, 4 J.
CONTEMP. ASIA 423, 428-38 (1974). The Special Reference was made possible by the
Political Parties (Amendment) Act, 21 of 1975 (effective Feb. 13, 1975), which provid-
ed that the Supreme Court's decision was final.
193. WASEEM, supra note 4, at 335.
194. 1976 P.L.D. (Kar.) 1368 (Pak.).
195. Id. at 1377-78.
196. Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 21 of 1975 (effective Nov. 21, 1975).
197. Dewan Textile Mills, 1976 P.L.D. (Kar.) at 1380.
198. Id. at 1383.
199. Id. at 1385.
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tion,co as it only imposed a time limit on the courts' interim or-
ders in certain specified areas, did not restrict the Supreme Court's
power to decide the case finally, and permitted the courts to avoid
this provision by deciding the matter within sixty days.20' The
court, following Zia-zir-Rahman, deferred to the legislature's power
to adopt constitutional measures so long as the legislature followed
the procedure laid down in the 1973 Constitution."2 The court al-
so rejected the proposition that there were any supra-constitutional
limitations on the power of the legislature to amend the Constitu-
tion.0 ' In its insistence upon finding the scope of legislative pow-
ers within the four corners of the Constitution, the court rejected
the petitioner's claim that the people, in exercise of the sovereign
power vested in them, gave the Constitution to themselves,"' and
therefore the legislature could not exercise its legislative power to
change the basic structure and essential features of the Constitu-
tion.20
5
The validity of the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 1975,
was challenged in the Lahore High Court.05 Under Article 232 of
the Constitution, a proclamation of emergency, unless approved by
a joint sitting of the two houses of Parliament within thirty days,
ceased to be in force.0 7 Even the joint sitting of the Parliament
could prolong the state of emergency for only six months, where-
after another resolution had to be passed to extend the state of
emergency for another six months.0 8 The Third Amendment dis-
200. Id. at 1407.
201. Id. at 1398, 1407.
202. See id. at 1391.
203. Id. at 1394-97.
204. Id. at 1391.
205. Id. at 1388-91. The court retorted: "[Tihe proposition that the 'people' estab-
lish[ed] the Constitutional fabric of the Government under a written Constitution is
just a myth-perhaps a useful fiction-a convenient metaphor." Id. at 1388. The
court then pointed out the "fact" that the Constitution had been drafted and adopted
by the Constituent Assembly, not by the people. Id. at 1393. Compare this with the
view of two Justices of the Indian Supreme Court:
Where there is a written Constitution .. . there is, firstly, no question of
the law-making body being a sovereign body, for that body possesses only
those powers which are conferred on it. Secondly, however representative it
may be, it cannot be equated with the people. This is especially so where
the Constitution contains a Bill of Rights, for such a Bill imposes restraints
on that body, i.e., it negates the equation of that body with the people.
Bharati v. Kerala, 1973 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1461, 1586 (India) (Shetat & Grover, JJ., con-
curring).
206. Suleman v. Pakistan, 1976 P.L.D. (Lah.) 1250, 1256-57 (Pak.).
207. PAY. CONST. of 1973, art. 232(7).
208. Id. art. 232(7)(b).
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pensed with the necessity of such biannual parliamentary approval.
Under the Third Amendment, the proclamation continued until it
was disapproved by a joint sitting of the two houses."9
The court refused to strike down the amendment because the
legislature's power over the subject remained intact, and only the
procedure of its exercise had been changed.2" Given the fact that
any declaration of emergency suspended fundamental rights, the
court's position is indefensible. By operation of the amendment,
legislative inaction in the face of a declaration would result in sus-
pension of fundamental rights. Legislative action required by un-
amended Article 232 would have necessitated legislative delibera-
tion and debate, which in turn would have invited public comment
and scrutiny. Legislators consequently would hesitate to associate
with legislation that left the citizens without constitutional
protections against the powers of the state. The amendment tilted
the balance of power in favor of the executive, precluded public de-
liberation, and allowed legislators, through their silence, to become
party to the denial of the rights of the people.
The Constitutional (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1976, restricted
the jurisdiction of the high courts from reviewing executive orders
of preventive detention, and denied bail to a person detained under
such an order.21' A challenge to the amendment reached the Su-
209. Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 22 of 1975, § 3 (effective Feb. 13,
1975). Passage of the Third Amendment was in tune with the elected government's
increasing use of arbitrary and extreme measures to deal with the political opposi-
tion. These measures included dismissal of Baluchistan's opposition government, de-
ployment of the military to suppress the resulting protest, and banning the main
opposition party, the NAP. For enumeration and analysis of the undemocratic tenden-
cies of the elected regime, see SAYEED, supra note 16, at 84-112; and Ahmad, supra
note 192, at 423-38. In 1976, the government secretly engaged Professor Leslie Wolf-
Phillips of the London School of Economics to draft a new constitution providing for
a centralized presidential system, which was to be introduced after the next general
elections. See SAYEED, supra note 16, at 106; WOLPERT, supra note 148, at 267.
210. Suleman, 1976 P.L.D. (Lah.) at 1263. The court, after discussing implied
limitations on the legislature's power arising from the separation of powers doctrine,
made a remarkable display of judicial caution or even abdication:
We, however, should not be understood to have said that there are
any fetters on the powers of the Parliament to amend the Constitution. The
amendment, after it is made in conformity with the provisions ... of the
Constitution, will be the expression of the will of the vast majority of the
people, and the remedy for correcting such a violation will lie not with the
Judiciary but with the people who are to express their will through their
chosen representatives in the Parliament.
Id. at 1264.
211. Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 71 of 1975, § 8 (effective Nov. 21,
1985).
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preme Court in Pakistan v. United Sugar Mills Ltd.2" The peti-
tioner argued that the amendment unconstitutionally eroded the
high courts' judicial powers and violated the principle of separation
of powers.21 The Court denied the petition on the grounds that
the erosion of judicial power was not absolute.214 In the process,
the Court again enunciated a restrictive view of the concept of sepa-
ration of powers."5
The Constitutional (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976, further re-
stricted the high courts' jurisdiction in relation to orders and proce-
dures for preventive detention of any person.2"6 The amendment
was challenged before the Peshawar High Court in Jehangir Iqbal
Khan v. Pakistan,7 on the grounds of unconstitutional ouster of
jurisdiction of the high courts and abuse of legislative power.218
The court upheld the amendment on the curious ground that the
ouster of jurisdiction did not violate fundamental rights because
those rights had been suspended by operation of a valid declaration
of a state of emergency.2 ' The court did not examine what the im-
pact of the amendment would be when Parliament lifted the state of
emergency. In addition, the court failed to acknowledge that the
right to enjoy the protection of the law and to be treated in accor-
dance with law was enshrined in the 1973 Constitution apart from
the chapter on fundamental rights." The court ignored the fact
212. 1977 P.L.D. (S.C.) 397, 401 (Pak.).
213. Id. at 404.
214. See id. at 411. The Court agreed that "it is not disputed that the power of
making final decision[s] remains with the High Courts and not transferred to the
Executive. Even the power to afford interim relief has not been entirely taken away,
its operation has been curtailed . " Id.
215. Id. The Court stated:
It is also important to observe that our Constitution, like many other
modem written Constitutions, does not provide for rigid separation of pow-
ers. Indeed there is no direct provision in that behalf except that the Con-
stitution by various provisions provides for the setting up of the principle
institutions for the exercise of the sovereign powers of the State in the
appointed.field. In actual practice in all modem Governments, separation is
only functional to subserve the practical necessity of an efficient and enlight-
ened Government by providing for checks and balances to avoid abuse of
public power. Nowhere . . . the principle is pushed to its logical conclusion
so as to create watertight compartments within the Government.
Id.
216. Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 62 of 1976, § 11 (effective Sept. 13,
1976).
217. 1979 P.L.D. (Pesh.) 67 (Pak. 1977).
218. Id. at 69.
219. Id. at 74.
220. PAK. CONST. of 1973, art. 4.
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that, during the Third Republic, courts derived certain emergency-
proof minimum guarantees of due process from the interplay of this
right to legality with the superior courts' extraordinary writ juris-
diction. 1
The court's decision proffered two curiously contradictory state-
ments about legislative power and, by implication, judicial review.
On the one hand, the court said that "[t]he Legislature is the su-
preme authority to make any amendment in any part of the Consti-
tution or modify it short of complete abrogation or abrogation of the
fundamentals of the Constitution." 2 On the other hand, however,
the court said that "[t]here should be no hesitancy in conceding that
there are no fetters on the powers of the Parliament to amend the
Constitution."223 If there truly were no fetters on Parliament's
power to amend the Constitution, it could abrogate the "fundamen-
tals of the Constitution," or for that matter, the entire Constitution.
However, if Parliament could not abrogate the "fundamentals of the
Constitution," then there were limits on its powers, and the high
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, had the duty to ensure
that these limits were observed.
The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1977, ousted the
high courts' jurisdiction with regard to areas where armed forces
were called upon to act in aid of civil power under Article 245 of the
Constitution."4 The amendment was challenged in Arbey v. Paki-
stan.' The court held that because the conditions laid down in
Article 245 for the ouster of jurisdiction were not met, the court had
jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the merits of the petitioner's
grievances arising from the declaration of martial law in
221. The court accomplished this by holding that the "subjective satisfaction" of
the executive to invoke laws authorizing preventive detention is incompatible with
Article 2, read in conjunction with Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution. See West
Pakistan v. Kashmiri, 1969 P.L.D. (S.C.) 14, 31-33 (Pak.); Baluch v. Pakistan, 1968
P.L.D. (S.C.) 313, 325-26 (Pak.); Ghulam Jilani v. West Pakistan, 1967 P.L.D. (S.C.)
373 (Pak.). A similar result may be obtained by reading Article 4 of the 1973 Con-
stitution in conjunction with Article 199.
222. Jehangir Iqbal Khan, 1979 P.L.D. (Pesh.) at 74. This language implies adop-
tion of a basic structure/essential features test.
223. Id.
224. Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 23 of 1977, § 4 (effective May 16,
1977).
225. 1980 P.L.D. (Lah.) 206, 218-20 (Pak. 1977). The Seventh Amendment was
adopted against the backdrop of mass protest and civil disobedience. Uprisings began
in the spring of 1977 following allegations of electoral fraud in the first general elec-
tions under the 1973 Constitution, held in February of 1977. After the civil
administration's failure to contain the disturbances, the regime declared martial law
in selected urban areas under Article 245 of the Constitution. See WASEEM, supra
note 4, at 342-58; SAYEED, supra note 16, at 157-64.
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Lahore."5 In their concurring opinions, two judges referred to the
basic features/essential framework judgments of the Supreme Court
of India and Zia-ur-Rahman, and observed that any amendment of
the Constitution must be within the broad contours of the Preamble
and the Directive Principles of Policy of the Constitution."2 They
identified Islam, federalism, and democracy as the essential fea-
tures of the Constitution, and concluded that if these features did
not survive on account of an amendment to the Constitution, then
such an amendment would be ultra vires.'
C. The Constitutional Crisis
Five years after Asma Jilani, Pakistan was embroiled in yet
another constitutional breakdown. On July 5, 1977, the chief of the
226. Arbey, 1980 P.L.D. (Lah.) at 254.
227. Id. at 262-64, 295-98 (Kadri & Pal, JJ., concurring).
228. Id. As Judge Kadri stated, "It]he power of Parliament to amend the Consti-
tution certainly does not extend to alter, repeal, modify or replace the Constitution."
Id. at 262 (Kadri, J., concurring). During the Fifth Republic, some courts increasingly
used the Objectives Resolution to test the validity of any law challenged as repug-
nant to the basic tenets of Islam. This resulted from the adoption of the Objectives
Resolution as part of the text of the Constitution rather than the Preamble, and the
establishment of the Federal Shariat Court, a parallel superior court with exclusive
jurisdiction to examine and decide "whether or not any law or provision of law is
repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam." PAK. CONST. of 1973, arts. 2-A, 203D, cl. 1
(1985); see id., arts. 2-A, 203C; Pres. Order No. 14 (1985), reprinted in KHAN, supra
note 170, at 6 n.3; Pres. Order No. 3 (1979), reprinted in KHAN, supra note 170, at
149 n.194. Many subsequent cases then adopted the position that the Objectives
Resolution was the supra-constitutional grundnorm of the polity, and its incorporation
in the Constitution gave the superior courts the jurisdiction to examine all matters
against the benchmark of Islam. See Haroon v. Durrani, 1989 P.L.D. (Kar.) 304,
312-17 (Pak.); Raza v. Begum, 1988 P.L.D. (Kar.) 169, 192-94 (Pak.); Bank v. Huss-
ain, 1987 P.L.D. (Kar.) 612, 623 (Pak.); Khan v. Ajaz, 1987 P.L.D. (Kar.) 466, 474
(Pak.); Bank of Oman v. East Trading Co., 1987 P.L.D. (Kar.) 404, 432-36 (Pak.); see
also Khalid Ishaque, Constitutional Relief. Need for a New Foundation, 1987 P.L.D.
J. 213; Nasim Hasan Shah, The Objective Resolution and its Impact on the Adminis-
tration of Justice in Pakistan, 1987 P.L.D. J. 186, 194 (discussing emerging domi-
nance of Islamic Shariat legal system in Pakistan). Some commentators have ques-
tioned the validity of such use of the Objectives Resolution. See e.g., Asif Sayeed
Khan Khosa, The Ineffective Effect of Article 2-A Constitution of Pakistan, 1989
P.L.D. J. 50 (arguing that reliance on Article 2-A as supra-constitutional provision is
temporary aberration, likely to be overruled by the Supreme Court following Zia-ur-
Rahman). If the superior courts acknowledged the supra-constitutional status of the
Objectives Resolution, there is no reason why they could not review legislation, in-
cluding constitutional amendments, against the basic features of governance enunciat-
ed by the Objectives Resolution. One case along this line, Chaudhury v. Services
Indus. Textiles, Ltd., 1988 P.L.D. (Lah.) 1 (Pak.), ruled that Article 2-A gave the
courts the right to examine provisions of the Companies Act to ensure that the af-
fairs of a company are not conducted in a manner prejudicial to the public interest.
Id. at 44-45.
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army staff, General Zia ul-Haq, declared martial law, removed the
prime minister, dissolved the national and provincial assemblies,
and dismissed provincial governors and their ministers.' After
proclaiming martial law, General Zia announced:
[T]he Constitution has not been abrogated. Only the operation of
certain parts of the Constitution has been held in abeyance. Mar-
tial Law Orders and Instructions, as and when required, will be is-
sued under my orders ....
I hold the judiciary of the country in high esteem. However,
under unavoidable circumstances, if and when Martial Law Orders
and Martial Law Regulations are issued, they would not be chal-
lenged in any Court of law.no
D. The Judicial Response: Constitutional
Deviation Dictated by Necessity
Begum Nusrat Bhutto, wife of the deposed and detained prime
minister, in a petition before the Supreme Court under Article
184(3) of the 1973 Constitution, challenged the former prime
minister's detention under Martial Law Order No. 12 of 1 97 7 .2i
The Supreme Court admitted the petition for hearing, in apparent
defiance of the Martial Law Proclamation that expressly ousted the
jurisdiction of the courts .1 2 The military regime expressed its dis-
approval quickly by removing the Chief Justice within two days of
admission of the petition. The petitioner, relying largely on
229. See KHAN, supra note 170 at 299 (providing complete text of proclamation of
martial law). For events leading up to the declaration of martial law, see WASEEM,
supra note 4, at 340-53; and William L. Richter, Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's
Third Military Regime, 51 PAC. AFF. 406, 406-26 (1978).
230. Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff, 1977 P.L.D. (S.C.) 657, 714-15 (Pak.)
(quoting General Zia ul-Haq).
231. Id. at 669. Relying upon the fundamental rights section of the 1973 Con-
stitution, Bhutto argued that the Laws Order of July 5, 1977, violated numerous con-
stitutional rights. The rights include the right to security of person (Article 9), the
right to procedural protections upon arrest (Article 10), the right to freedom of asso-
ciation (Article 17), and the right to equal protection of the laws (Article 25(1)). See
id. at 670. The Laws (Continuance of Force) Order, 1977, Section 2(3) provided that
"tihe Fundamental Rights conferred by... the Constitution, and all proceedings
pending in any Court, insofar as they are for the enforcement of any of those Rights,
shall stand suspended." Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1 of 1977, § 2(3) (effec-
tive July 5, 1977), reprinted in KHAN, supra note 170, at 302.
232. See supra text accompanying note 229 (describing martial law proclamation).
233. The chief martial law administrator, by the Laws (Continuance in Force)
(Fifth Amendment) Order of September 22, 1977, revoked the Fifth and Sixth Con-
stitutional Amendment Acts insofar as they amended Article 179 of the Constitution.
See KHAN, supra note 170, at 305. As a result, Yaqub Ali was forced to retire as the
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Asma Jilani, contended that General Zia ul-Haq had no authority
under the 1973 Constitution to impose martial law; that the
general's action amounted to treason under Article 6 of that Consti-
tution; and, as a consequence, the Proclamation of Martial Law and
the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977," 4 lacked lawful
authority 5 The petitioner further contended that even if any or
all of these were justifiable under the doctrine of necessity, the
former prime minister's arrest and detention was highly discrimi-
natory and mela fide."
The government argued that the petitioner could not maintain
her action because Article 4 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Or-
der, 1977, precluded any court from questioning the validity of any
martial law order. In addition, Article 2(3) of the same order pro-
vided for suspension of fundamental rights and their enforce-
mentY7 Relying upon the Kelsenian arguments of Dosso, the gov-
ernment argued that the proclamation by General Zia ul-Haq estab-
lished a new legal order, and that this new legal order, even if it
were only temporary, had displaced the former legal order."
Chief Justice of Pakistan. Pakistani Military Ruler Ousts the Chief Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1977, at AS. Yaqub Al's removal violated Article 209 of the 1973
Constitution, which reserved such removal powers for the Supreme Judicial Council,
composed of five senior judges and the president of the Republic. See PAK. CONST. of
1973, art. 209.
234. See KHAN, supra note 170, at 300-07 (providing complete text of the Laws
(Continuance in Force) Order, 1977).
235. Nusrat Bhutto, 1977 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 670.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 671.
238. Id. at 671-72. According to the government, means not recognized or con-
templated by the suspended constitution precipitated the transition to the new order,
and therefore the new order constituted a meta-legal or extra-constitutional fact that
attracted the doctrine of "revolutionary legality." Id. at 671. Confronted with this
situation, the only tack of the Court was to determine the "constitutional fact" of
acceptance of the new legal order by the institutions of state power. Id. The new
legal order, if declared "effective," would then furnish the context for all questions of
"legality." Id. The Court also had to deal with the fact that all Justices of the Su-
preme Court were required to take a new oath of office on September 22, 1977,
under the President's (Post-Proclamation) Order No. 9 of 1977, Supreme Court Judg-
es (Oath of Office) Order, 1977, at the pain of removal from office. In Nusrat Bhutto,
the Chief Justice took the position that
[tihe taking of the fresh oath . . . does not in any way preclude [the Su-
preme Court Justices] from examining the question of the validity of the
new Legal Order and decide the same in accordance with their conscience
and the law.
Id. at 674. Moreover, the Chief Justice acknowledged that
[lt only indicates that the superior judiciary, like the rest of the country,
has accepted the fact, which is even otherwise also evident, that on the 5th
of July 1977 a radical transformation took place in the pre-existing Legal
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In the alternative, the government argued that the circum-
stances prior to July 5, 1977, "fully attract the doctrine of State
necessity and of salus populi est suprema lex." 9 Consequently,
the government argued, the Court must accept all actions taken by
the martial law administrator as valid and not merely condone the
actions, as it did in Asma Jilani.
The Court refused to resurrect Dosso, and rejected the
government's argument that a political change not contemplated by
the Constitution, if successful, is valid."' The Court also rejected
petitioner's argument that the Court declare General Zia ul-Haq a
usurper and judge his regime by the terms dictated in Asma
Jilani. 2 Instead, the Court examined the "total milieu" of the cir-
cumstances in which the extra-constitutional assumption of power
occurred to determine the new regime's validity.2" The Court con-
cluded that the general's assumption of power constituted "an extra-
constitutional step, but obviously dictated by the highest consider-
ations of State necessity and welfare of the people."' The Court
Order.
Id.
239. Id. at 673.
240. Id. at 672-74.
241. Id. at 692-93.
242. Id. at 706. The Court reasoned that the Asma Jilani doctrine pertaining to
usurpers only applies where there is no state necessity for an extra-constitutional
assumption of power. The Court held that since state necessity justified General Zia
ul-Haq's takeover of political authority, Asma Jilani was not applicable. Id. at 708.
243. Id. at 692-93. Ironically, the Court recognized its own limitation to deter-
mine "the factual correctness or otherwise of the several allegations and counter alle-
gations made by the parties against each other." Id. at 693. Nevertheless, it took
judicial notice of "the broad trends and circumstances" which led to the change of
regimes. Id.
244. Id. at 703. Quoting extensively from General Zia ul-Haq's speech, the Court
highlighted the general's professed commitment to hold elections and restore democ-
racy at an early date. Id. at 703-04, 714-15. Before the decision, the military de-
clared an indefinite postponement of the elections originally scheduled for October,
1977, in order to initiate and complete a process of accountability of the deposed
regime for alleged abuses of power. Id. at 715. This postponement did not dilute the
Chief Justice's confidence in the regime's commitment to restore democratic rule, and
he legitimized the accountability process by terming it necessary:
Soon after the polls the power is to be transferred to the elected representa-
tives of the people. It is true that owing to the necessity of completing the
process of accountability of holders of public offices, the holding of elections
had to be postponed for the time being but the declared intention of the
Chief Martial Law Administrator still remains the same, namely, that he
has stepped in for a temporary period and for the limited purpose of ar-
ranging free and fair elections so as to enable the country to return to a
democratic way of life.
In the presence of these unambiguous declarations, it would be high-
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termed the new legal order "a phase of constitutional deviation dic-
tated by necessity."24 Having found the doctrine of state necessity
applicable, the Court proceeded to limit the doctrine. For the doc-
trine to apply, the regime must demonstrate four criteria: "(a) An
imperative and inevitable necessity or exceptional circumstances; (b)
No other remedy [is applicable]; (c) The measure taken must be pro-
portionate to the necessity; and (d) It must be of a temporary char-
acter limited to the duration of the exceptional circumstances.""4
The Court held that "the 1973 Constitution still remains the
supreme law of the land subject to the condition that certain parts
thereof have been held in abeyance on account of State necessi-
ty.247 The Court also asserted its power of judicial review in defi-
ance of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977,' but dis-
ly unfair and uncharitable to attribute any other intention to the Chief
Martial Law Administrator, and to insinuate that he has not assumed power
for the purposes stated by him ....
Id. (emphasis added).
245. Id. at 716. The Court reasoned that
[tihe new Legal Order is only for a temporary period, and for a specified
and limited purpose, and does not seek to destroy the old Legal Order but
merely to hold certain parts thereof in abeyance or to subject it to certain
limitations on the ground of State necessity or on the principle of salus
populi suprema lex .... [Tihe new regime then represents not a new Legal
Order, but only a phase of constitutional deviation dictated by necessity.
[Tihe Court would like to state in clear terms that it has found it possible
to validate the extra-Constitutional action of the Chief Martial Law Adminis-
trator not only for the reason that he stepped in to save the country at a
time of grave national crisis and constitutional break-down, but also because
of the solemn pledge given by him that the period of constitutional deviation
shall be of as short a duration as possible, and that during this period all
his energies shall be directed towards creating conditions conducive to the
holding of free and fair elections, leading to the restoration of democratic
rule in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution.
Id. at 723.
246. Id. at 710. Having determined that the new legal order met the first re-
quirement, the Court did not even attempt to apply the other three limitations to
the facts of the case. It merely concluded: "[0In facts, of which we have taken judi-
cial notice, namely, that the imposition of Martial Law was impelled by high consid-
erations of State necessity and welfare of the people, the extra-constitutional step
taken ... stands validated in accordance with the doctrine of necessity." Id. at 712.
247. Id. at 715.
248. The Court reasoned that:
The 1973 Constitution provides for a clear trichotomy of powers between the
executive, legislative and judicial organs of the State. However, owing to
reasons of necessity, the executive and the legislative power now stands
combined in one authority, for the reason that these two organs of the State
had lost their constitutional and moral authority ... but no such consider-
ations arose in regard to the judicial organ of the State. Accordingly, on no
principle of necessity could powers of judicial review vested in the superior
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missed the petition on the ground that the martial law regime's
suspension of fundamental rights had the same effect as the Proc-
lamation of Emergency contemplated in the 1973 Constitution. 9
Significantly, the Court held that the martial law regime was
entitled to perform all such acts and promulgate legislative mea-
sures which fell within the scope of the doctrine of necessity, includ-
ing the power to amend the Constitution:
(a) All acts or legislative measures which are in accordance with, or
could have been made under the 1973 Constitution, including the
power to amend it; (b) All acts which tend to advance or promote
the good of the people; (c) All acts required to be done for the ordi-
nary orderly running of the State; and (d) All such measures as
would establish or lead to the establishment of the declared objec-
tives of the proclamation of Martial Law, namely, restoration of law
and order, and normalcy in the country, and the earliest possible
holding of free and fair elections for the purpose of restoration of
democratic institutions under the 1973 Constitution .... 260
Only parts (c) and (d) fall within the scope of the doctrine of
necessity enunciated by the Governor-General's Case."' The Court
drew the part (b) omnibus provision from Asma Jilani, which, in
combination with part (a), bestows upon the extra-constitutional re-
gime the license for unfettered legislative power."2
In later years, the military regime amended the Constitution
wholesale and cited this judgment as an answer to all resulting
charges of abuse of power. Indeed, the Supreme Court retained for
the superior courts the jurisdiction to examine all acts and mea-
sures of the military regime on the criterion of necessity. But when
there appeared a conflict between the regime's and the courts' view
of what was necessary, the courts lost. The military regime used the
sword supplied by the judiciary to strike at judicial power.
In Nusrat Bhutto, the Court addressed the preventive detention
of the deposed prime minister and other leaders of his party under
a martial law order. The Court could have disposed of this question
on the narrow grounds .suggested above in relation to Asma
Jilani. In the alternative, the Court could have declared the is-
sue of the validity of extra-constitutional power a nonjusticiable
courts under the 1973 Constitution, be taken away.
Id. at 716-17.
249. Id. at 722.
250. Id. at 716.
251. Governor-General's Case, 1955 P.L.D. (F.C.) 435, 470-78 (Pak.).
252. Nusrat Bhutto, 1977 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 716; see Asma Jilani v. Punjab, 1972
P.L.D. (S.C.) 139, 207 (Pak.).
253. See supra part IV.C (discussing Asma Jilani).
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political question. The Court would have therefore avoided the doc-
trinal vacillation apparent in its jurisprudence and would have
denied the extra-constitutional regime the stamp of judicially pro-
nounced legitimacy and acceptance.
Almost immediately, the opportunity arose to test whether the
courts would assert their right to ensure that the military regime's
actions remain within the bounds enumerated in Nusrat Bhutto. In
Nusrat Bhutto, the Court used as a rationale the new regime's stat-
ed objective of providing the earliest possible return to civilian rule
by holding free and fair elections under the 1973 Constitution. In
contrast, the military regime, by presidential orders, made numer-
ous changes in laws related to the holding of the elections and the
structure of the election commission.' These orders were chal-
lenged on the grounds that they were an impermissible departure
from the constitutional provisions and fell outside the scope of the
doctrine of necessityY5 The Supreme Court held that once the
Court validated a regime under the state necessity doctrine, the
regime's individual actions had to be construed as being necessary,
if the actions reasonably fell into one of the categories enumerated
in Nusrat Bhutto.256  Moreover, the Court recognized the
executive's broad discretion in this respect.17 The Court's notion
of constructive necessity, moving from validation of the regime to
legality of its individual acts, expanded the doctrine of necessity
beyond recognition, and destroyed its practical value, as a consti-
tutional limitation upon legislative powers of any extra-constitu-
tional regime. The Supreme Court's virtual abdication of its role as
the guardian of the Constitution was quickly duplicated by the
appellate courtsY
254. These orders included appointment of the high court judge, who was pre-
siding over the murder trial of the deposed prime minister as the chief election com-
missioner. WASEEM, supra note 4, at 371-72.
255. Zulfiqar All Bhutto v. State, 1978 P.L.D. (S.C.) 40, 57 (Pak.) (1977).
256. Id. at 57-59.
257. Validating all the challenged orders, the Court stated:
[I]t must be clearly understood that in judging whether an action taken by
the President or the Chief Martial Law Administrator is valid under the law
of necessity, the Court is not to sit in appeal over the executive or legisla-
tive authority concerned, nor substitute its own discretion for that of the
competent authority. The responsibility for the relevant action, its methodol-
ogy and procedural details, must rest on that authority.
Id. at 59.
258. For example, the Quetta High Court, relying on Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, defined
as "necessary" any "such action which in normal course the Government thinks is
necessary to take." Khudiadad v. Deputy Martial Law Adm'r, 1978 P.L.D. (Quetta)
177, 185 (Pak.). The Karachi High Court then followed suit:
[1If a power to amend the Constitution was rgognised by the Supreme
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Even in the posture of general retreat, the superior courts occa-
sionally asserted their right to determine the scope of the doctrine
of necessity. The superior courts claimed exclusive jurisdiction over
ordinary criminal casbs;s military interference in civil disputes
was prohibited;26 and martial law administrators were directed to
give reasons for their orders transferring cases from ordinary to
military courts and to show how this would serve law and order or
public interest.2 1 When Article 212-A was inserted in the Consti-
tution by the Constitution (Second Amendment) Order, 1979, to bar
the jurisdiction of the superior courts in matters tried by military
courts,262 the Karachi High Court held that pending petitions had
not abated.263
When the Constitution (Amendment) Order, 1980 2 '-which
ousted jurisdiction of the superior courts to issue process or make
any interim or final order in respect to acts, proceedings, or orders
of the military courts or tribunals-amended Article 199, the
Karachi High Court upheld the validity of the legislation.2" While
two judges dissented from the holding,266 even the majority recog-
nized that trichotomy of powers was a basic feature of the Constitu-
tion.2 7 Nevertheless, the majority held that this trichotomy of
powers was not displaced or impaired, because the amendment was
of a transitory nature and would become ineffective with the lifting
Court this Court cannot sit as an Appellant Tribunal to find out if the test
of necessity or public good or achievement of the objects of Martial Law was
fulfilled in accordance with the Supreme Court judgment . . .. How, and in
what circumstances [the Chief Martial Law Administrator] would utilise that
power has to be judged by him and we would reiterate . . . that embarking
upon such an enquiry was indeed a perilous path to tread.
Abdullah v. Presiding Officer, Summary Military Court No. 9, 1980 P.L.D. (Kar.) 498,
523 (Pak.). Compare this with the restrictive approach to the doctrine of necessity
taken by a court in the wake of the Governor-General's Case: "If any thing was
conceded to the Governor-General, it was conceded grudgingly. We do not, therefore,
wish that the opinion of the Federal Court should be misunderstood at this critical
juncture as conceding anything beyond the starkest, barest necessity, and to the
starkest, barest limit we shall confine it." Akram Shah v. The Crown, 1955 P.L.D.
(Lah.) 464, 478 (Pak.).
259. Ahmed v. Summary Military Court, 1979 P.L.D. (Lah.) 373 (Pak.).
260. Younis v. Major Shahid, 1980 N.L.R. (Civ. Lah.) 428, 429 (Pak.).
261. Ilyas v. Martial Law Adm'r, 1980 P.L.D. (Lah.) 165, 168-70 (Pak.).
262. See KHAN, supra note 170, at 174 n.238 (providing text of order).
263. Nazir v. Chairman Summary Military Court, 1980 P.L.D. (Kar.) 444, 448-49
(Pak.).
264. See KHAN, supra note 170, at 144 n.180 (providing text of order).
265. Yaqoob Ali v. Presiding Officer, 1985 P.L.D. (Kar.) 243, 243-44 (Pak.) (1980).
266. Id. at 312 (Mirza & Memon, JJ., dissenting).
267. Id. at 295.
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of martial law.288
The Quetta High Court announced a contrary holding on the
question of the validity of amendments to Article 199.269 The court
held that the amendments failed to meet the test of necessity laid
down by Nusrat Bhutto, and were therefore invalid.270 The court
specifically remarked that attempts to remove the superior courts'
power to determine the necessity of the actions of the martial law
regime would signal "the stage where doubts would be cast as to the
continued validity of Constitutional deviation."27' More signifi-
cantly, the court broadly pronounced that "the interim Government
is not entitled to make basic changes in the Constitution so as to
alter the fundamental structure of the Constitution."72
Besides these periodic assertions of judicial independence and
power, as long as the military regime's legitimacy issued from
Nusrat Bhutto, its obligation to restore normal constitutional pro-
cess remained. Encouraged by a favorable international climate,27
the military regime broke with the minimal limitations upon its
legislative powers implied by Nusrat Bhutto and issued the Provi-
sional Constitutional Order, 1981.4 With this order, the regime
dispensed with its earlier pretense that the 1973 Constitution was
alive, though in abeyance. The import of Nusrat Bhutto was nulli-
fied by the following provision:
Notwithstanding any judgment of any Court, including any judg-
ment in respect of the powers of the, courts relating to judicial re-
view, any Court, including the Supreme Court and a High Court,
shall not... make an order relating to the validity or effect of any
Order or Martial Law Regulation made by the Chief Martial Law
Administrator or any Martial Law Order made by the Chief Mar-
tial Law Administrator or a Martial Law Administrator or of any-
thing done, or action taken, or intended to be done or taken, there-
268. Id. at 312.
269. Suleman v. President Special Military Court, 1980 N.L.R. (Civ. Quetta) 873,
887-90 (Pak.).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 888.
272. Id. at 891 (Chaudhary, J., concurring). Suleman was still pending on appeal
before the Supreme Court when the military regime promulgated the Provisional
Constitution Order, 1981. Justice MA. Rashid and Chief Justice Mir Khuda Bakash
Marri lost their offices as a consequence of their refusal to take a new oath of office
on the provisional Constitution. See MIR KHUDA BAKHSH MARRI, A JUDGE MAY
SPEAK 71-120 (1990).
273. See SELIG S. HARRISON, IN AFGHANISTAN'S SHADOw: BALUCH NATIONALISM
AND SOVIET TEMP0TATIONS 1-2, 71-72, 87 (1981) (providing perceptive analysis of
international climate).
274. See XIII CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 149-58 (providing complete text
of order).
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This blanket ouster of the courts' jurisdiction over any matter
which fell under the various martial law enactments was coupled
with the requirement that all superior court judges take a new oath
of office.276 The text of this new oath included fidelity to the Provi-
sional Constitutional Order.2 77 This situation, which "sealed the
defeat of the courts' constitutional endeavors,"27' had been fore-
seen by perceptive commentators of judicial practice.279
VI. THE FIFTH REPUBLIC, 1985-PRESENT:
INSTITUTIONALIZED PRAETORIANISM
A. The Constitutional Order
The regime sanctioned by Nusrat Bhutto on grounds of necessi-
ty came to a formal end with the promulgation the Provisional Con-
stitutional Order. The military regime secured the obedience of the
judges by yet another oath of office, which included a pledge to
abide by the Provisional Constitutional Order.Y Only selected
judges were invited to take the new oath."' Under Article 16 of
the order, the military regime assumed the power to amend the
Constitution at will. 2 For the next four years, the military ruled
275. Id. at 156.
276. See XIII CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 157 (providing complete text of
new oath).
277. Id.
278. See Conrad, supra note 5, at 124.
279. As K.C. Wheare warned:
[A] suspension of constitutional government is justified on the ground that if
it is to exist again in the future, it must be in abeyance for the present.
There is nothing theoretically wrong in this. Human beings can understand
that it may be necessary for them to submit themselves to supreme authori-
ty today, if they are to survive to enjoy freedom tomorrow. The danger in
practice is that those to whom supreme authority has been confided may be
reluctant to deliver it up. Temporary dictatorship may become an estab-
lished and permanent tyranny. When the safeguards of constitutional gov-
ernment are delivered up to the rulers, the means of getting them back
have been delivered up also.
KC. WHEARE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 140-41 (Michael Abercrombie & A.D. Woozley
eds., 2d ed. 1966)
280. See XIII CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 157 (providing complete text of
new oath).
281. Id. Those judges not invited or who refused to take the new oath, including
Chief Justice Anwarul Haq, author of Nusrat Bhutto, automatically lost their office.
See Della Denman, Pakistan: Crack Down on the Courts, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 3,
1981, at 14. Commentators have correctly pointed out that "[a]n interference with the
composition of the superior courts and judicial independence on this scale is unprece-
dented in the history of Pakistan." Conrad, supra note 5, at 166.
282. See XIII CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 156 (The President as well as
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the country with complete immunity from judicial interference or
review."8 This immunity gave the regime time to fashion a new
constitutional order for the post-martial law period. 4
The regime unveiled the new constitutional order on March 2,
1985, when it promulgated the Revival of the Constitution of 1973
Order (Pres. Order No. 14 of 1985).' The order effected such ex-
tensive amendments in the 1973 Constitution that it was the same
constitution in name only. The regime deemed that a referendum
held on December 19, 1984, furnished it with the legitimacy to rede-
sign the constitutional order." Partyless nonpolitical elections
were held for the two houses of Parliament.8 7 The Revival of the
Constitution Order precipitated the Constitutional (Eighth Amend-
the Chief Marshall Law Administrator shall have, and shall be deemed always to
have had, the power to amend the Constitution.").
283. Fauji Found. v. Rahman, 1983 P.L.D. (S.C.) 457 (Pak.), is the only signifi-
cant constitutional judgment of this period. The Court expressly refused to adopt the
basic structure/essential features test fashioned by the Indian Supreme Court and
held that an amendment to the Constitution "is a political question and a matter of
policy for the Parliament." Id. at 627. The Court further restricted the scope of judi-
cial review by stating that "the scope of judicial review . . . does not extend to pry-
ing into the affairs of the Legislature." Id. at 546. It also held that, "in our constitu-
tional system though there is the trichotomy of powers ... it is a misnomer to say
that the separation of powers is an accepted feature of our Constitution . . . ." Id. at
628. This judgment is viewed as being "instrumental in closing all doors of judicial
review." SHAMEEM HUSSAIN KADRI, JUDGES AND PoLITICS 46 (2d ed. 1990).
284. For detailed discussion of the new constitutional order fashioned by the mili-
tary and the political context in which this was done, see WASEEM, supra note 4, at
405-17; William L. Richter, Pakistan in 1985: Testing Time for the New Order, 26
ASIAN SuRv. 207, 207-14 (1986) [hereinafter Testing Time]; William L. Richter, Paki-
stan: Out of the Praetorian Labyrinth, 85 CURRENT HIST. 113, 113-16 (1986); and'
Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan, 26 ASIAN SURV.
1067, 1067-81 (1986).
285. See XIII CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 195-222 (providing complete text
of order).
286. Testing Time, supra note 284, at 209-10. On December 1, 1984, the regime
issued the Referendum Order, 1984, providing for a referendum on the question:
[Wihether the people of Pakistan endorse the process initiated by General
Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan for bringing the laws of
Pakistan in conformity with the injunctions [of Islam] as laid down in the
Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (peace be on him), and for the
preservation of the ideology of Pakistan for the continuation and consolida-
tion of that process and for the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the
elected representatives of the people.
XIII CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 190. The order also provided that a conse-
quence of the positive result of the referendum would be that General Zia ul-Haq
would be deemed to have been duly elected president of Pakistan for a term of five
years. Id. at 64.
287. Testing Time, supra note 284, at 208.
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ment) Bill adopted by the new Parliament." Martial law was lift-
ed by proclamation on December 30, 1985."8
With the lifting of martial law, the country is technically gov-
erned under the 1973 Constitution. 290  But the Eighth
Amendment's fundamental changes in the structure of that Consti-
tution warrant designating the new order as a new republic. The
changes involved the parliamentary system, the federal structure,
fundamental rights, the independence of the judiciary, and the role
of judicial review.291 As General Zia ul-Haq observed, "[the new
order] is no rival or adversary of the outgoing system. It is, in fact,
the extension of the system in existence for the past several
years. 292
The Eighth Amendment fundamentally altered the basic struc-
ture and essential features of the 1973 Constitution to bring it in
line with the military's preferences. It created a strong executive, a
weak legislature, a docile judiciary, and diminished provincial au-
tonomy. The executive authority of the federation was now vested in
the president instead of the prime minister.2 3 The president was
given power to appoint the prime minister, provincial governors,
judges of the Supreme Court and high courts, and chiefs of the
armed forces. 294 He could also dissolve the National Assembly at
his discretion. Moreover, the validity of anything done by the presi-
dent in his discretion could not be called into question. 5 The
president's power to issue ordinances when the National Assembly
was not in session was enlarged to include matters falling within
the ambit of provincial legislatures." Provincial chief ministers
were to be invitees of the provincial governors, who, in turn, were
appointed by the president. 297 The president could transfer a judge
of a high court to another high court or any other assignment,"8
and a judge who did not accept such transfer would lose his of-
288. Id. at 209.
289., KHAN, supra note 170, at 311-12 (providing complete text of proclamation of
withdrawal of martial law).
290. Rizvi, supra note 284, at 1070.
291. See id. at 1070-71.
292. Id. at 1067 (quoting General Zia ul-Haq).
293. PAK. CONST. of 1973, art. 90 (1985); see also Hussain Haqqani, Checks, No
Balances, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 14, 1985, at 14, 15 ("[C]hecks for everyone else
but none for the President.").
294. PAr. CONST. of 1973, arts. 91(2), 101(1), 177(1), 193(1), 243(1)(a)-(2) (1985).
295. Id. arts. 48(2), 58(2).
296. Id. art. 89(1).
297. Id. arts. 101, 130.
298. Id. art. 200(4).
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fice.2" The only provision of the Revival of the Constitution of
1973 Order, 1985, that did not form part of the Eighth Amendment
was the one designed to permanently institutionalize the military's
supervision of the country's governance by establishing a National
Security Council.00
B. The Constitutional Crisis
A hand-picked prime minister, a nonpolitically elected and
initially docile legislature, and a concentration of power in the
hands of the president did not ensure stability for long.30' With
the lifting of martial law, the political process assumed its own
dynamic,s°2 and the news media sought independence in reviewing
the governing process. 3' Before long, conflicts appeared between
the president and the prime minister.0 4 First, the prime minister
encouraged the emergence of parliamentary groupings reflecting dif-
ferent political affiliations, in defiance of the president's desire to
keep the legislature nonpolitical.0 5  Then, contrary to the
president's desire, the prime minister was unwilling to aid the pas-
sage of a bill introduced in Parliament which would have obligated
all courts to decide all suits in accordance with Islamic Shariah."'
299. Id. art. 200(1).
300. The Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order, 1985, provided: "There shall
be a National Security Council to make recommendations relating to the issue of a
Proclamation of Emergency under Article 232, the security of Pakistan and any other
matter of national importance that may be referred to it by the President in consul-
tation with the Prime Minister." See XIII CONSTrrTTONS, supra note 30, at 212
(providing text of order). Under this provision, the chairman, joint chiefs of staff, and
chiefs of staff of the army, air force, and navy were to be members of this council,
along with the president, the prime minister, and the chief ministers of provinces.
Id.
301. For accolmts of the nonparty, nonpolitical elections held in 1985, see Husain
Haqqani, Contested Walkover, FAR E. ECON. REv., Feb. 21, 1985, at 28, 28-30;
Husain Haqqani, Pandora's Ballot Box, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 7, 1985, at 22,
22-24; Husain Haqqani, Zia's Gains and Losses, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 7, 1985, at
12, 12-13.
302. See Paula R. Newberg, Pakistan's Troubled Landscape, 4 WORLD POLY J.
313, 313-19 (1987).
303. For examples of the media's assertion of independence, see Maleeha Lodhi,
Towards Political Fragmentation, THE MUSLIM (ISLAABAD), Jan. 8, 1987; and Abbas
Rashid, Lahore Seminar Calls for Change in Afghan Policy, THE MUSLIM
(ISLAMABAD), Jan. 5, 1987.
304. See Eliza Van Hollen, Pakistan In 1986: Trials of Transition, 27 ASIAN
SuRv. 143, 151-52 (1987).
305. Id. at 144.
306. See Charles H. Kennedy, Repugnancy to Islam-Who Decides? Islam and
Legal Reform In Pakistan, 41 INVL & COMP. L.Q. 769, 771-87 (1992) (describing ef-
forts of military to bring legal system in line with dictates of Islam).
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Finally, confronted with budgetary constraints, the prime minister
expressed his desire to reduce defense expenditures."0 '
On May 29, 1988, the president issued an order under Article
58(2)(b) of the Constitution dissolving the National Assembly and
the cabinet.0 8 Provincial governors followed suit and dissolved the
provincial assemblies and cabinets.
C. The Judicial Response: Unfettered Executive Discretion
The Presidential Order of May 29 was challenged in Pakistan v.
Saiffulah Khan."9 The Supreme Court, after reviewing the legis-
lative history, held "[tlhe discretion conferred by Article 58(2)(b) of
the Constitution on the President cannot... be regarded to be an
absolute one, but is to be deemed to be a qualified one, in the sense
that it is circumscribed by the object of the law that confers it.""'0
After refusing to suspend judicial review on the ground that politi-
cal questions were involved,31' the Court held the dissolution un-
constitutional:?1 2
[Girounds stated in the Order for dissolution, were... extraneous
having no nexus with the preconditions prescribed by... the Con-
stitution empowering the President to dissolve the National Assem-
bly in his discretion .... Hence, in the eyes of law, no basis existed
on which the President could form the opinion "that a situation had
arisen in which the Government of Pakistan cannot be carried on
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal
to the electorate is necessary.
3 13
307. Van Hollen, supra note 304, at 151-52.
308. Husain Haqqani, Constitutional Coup, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 9, 1988, at
15.
309. 1989 P.L.D. (S.C.) 167 (Pak.) (decided Oct. 5, 1988).
310. Id. at 189. The Court defined the scope of the president's "discretion" as fol-
lows:
According to the rules of reason and justice, not private opinion, according
to law and not humor, it is to be not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but
legal and regular, to be and for substantial reasons and must be exercised
within the limits to which an honest man competent in the discharge of his
office ought to confine himself i.e. within the limits gnd for the objects in-
tended by the Legislature.
Id. (citations omitted). The Court held that before the president may exercise his
discretionary power he must form a valid "opinion" about the situation described
under Article 58(2)(b). Id. at 190. [hIf it can be shown that no grounds existed on
the basis of which an honest opinion could be formed, the exercise of the power
would be unconstitutional and open to correction through judicial review." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 195.
313. Id. at 190.
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The Court, however, declined the appellant's request for resto-
ration of the National Assembly and reinstatement of the federal
cabinet, on the grounds that an election campaign was afoot for new
elections scheduled for November 16 and 19, 1988. The Court add-
ed, however, that in order "to see that elections are actually held on
these dates, the said dates [are] made a binding part of the Court's
judgment." 14
It should be noted that by the time Saifullah Khan was decid-
ed, the president, along with a number of senior generals, had died
in an airplane crash on August 17, 1988. The parallel with Asma
Jilani, which declared General Yahya Khan to be a usurper only
after his regime had fallen, is noteworthy.315 The courts of Paki-
stan have yet to dismount a military ruler still in the saddle.
Within two years after Saifullah Khan, the courts again con-
fronted the question of discretionary exercise of presidential power.
The political party whose government the military had overthrown
in 1977 had won a majority in the National Assembly as a result of
the November 1988 elections. The leader of the party was invited to
become the prime minister, with the clear understanding that de-
fense and foreign policy would remain under the president's
control."' Conflicts between the prime minister and the president
soon emerged. 7 These conflicts centered around the prime
minister's declared aim to repeal the Eighth Amendment, her ap-
pointments of senior military commanders, and the use of the mili-
tary to contain ethnic strife in the province of Sind.3"
314. Id. at 195. Justice Shafiur Rahman, in his concurring opinion, supported the
non-reinstatement decision on the ground that the Assembly had been chosen in the
partyless elections of 1985:
Partyless elections are not in consonance with the Scheme of our Constitu-
tion and when this Court is possessed of a discretion, or a choice whether
to revive, restore or perpetuate by resuscitating such Assemblies, the Court
will stand for constitutionalism rather than departures and deviations from
it and refuse to restore them.
Id. at 220. The Court's decision may have been influenced by a secret message from
the chief of the army advising the Court against restoring the Parliament and rein-
stating the cabinet. See Candor and Contempt: Former General Starts a Political
Row, FAR E. ECON. REv., Feb. 25, 1993, at 18.
315. Asma Jilani v. Punjab, 1972 P.L.D. (S.C.) 139, 208 (Pak.).
316. The new prime minister admitted that "I am in office but not in power."
CHRISTINA LAMB, WAITING FOR ALLAH: PAKISTAN'S STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 107
(1991); see Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in 1990: The Fall of Beiiazir Bhutto, 31 ASIAN
SuRv. 113, 113-22 (1991).
317. See, e.g., Salamat Ali, Military Misgivings, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 9, 1990,
at 17, 17-18 ("[Ihe immediate cause of the political speculation is ethnic strife in
Sindh.").
318. See Ziring, supra note 316, at 113-22.
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On August 6, 1990, the president issued an order under Article
58(2)(b) whereby he dissolved the National Assembly and dismissed
the prime minister and her cabinet.319 The order was challenged
in the Lahore High Court as being an unconstitutional abuse of
power. The court, relying upon Saifullah Khan, reaffirmed the
jurisdiction of the superior courts to examine the constitutionality of
such orders, but carefully demarcated the scope of review.3 2' The
court implied a two-prong test to examine the exercise of the
president's discretion under Article 58(2)(b). The test was comprised
of first, an objective test to determine whether the opinion about
ungovernability was formed on the basis of material which could
lead a reasonable person to form such opinion; and second, a subjec-
tive test to determine whether the opinion was an honest one
formed in good faith. 22
Mindful of the holding and language of Saifullah Khan,323 the
dissolution order specified thirteen reasons for the exercise of dis-
cretion by the president. 4 Under the objective prong of its test,
319. See Tariq Rahim v. Pakistan, 1991 P.L.D. (Lah.) 78, 93-95 (Pak.) (quoting
text of order); see also Salamat Ali, Marching Orders, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 16,
1990, at 8 (giving details of dissolution and its political ramifications).
320. Tariq Rahim, 1991 P.L.D. (Lah.) at 95, 116.
321. Id. at 138. As the court stated:
The power of judicial review cannot be over-stated so as to make this Court
an appellate forum against the order passed by the competent authority
under the Constitution viz. the President in the instant case, so as to sub-
stitute his opinion by the opinion of the Court. The scope and extent of
judicial review . . . would only be to the extent that the Court has to find
out whether the opinion formed by the President is honest and is such
which could be formed by a reasonable person keeping in view the atten-
dant circumstances. If there be some material on the basis of which an
opinion could be reasonably formed by the President, then the Court cannot
interfere therewith merely because another view may be possible.
Id.
322. Id. at 103-04, 148. The court appeared to contradict itself elsewhere in the
opinion, when it seemed to both champion the reasonable person standard and find
application of the standard a nonjusticiable question. The court stated: "[Tihe Presi-
dent applied his mind to the facts and accompanying events and recorded reasons in
the self-contained Order. The sufficiency and adequacy of the reasons are not justicia-
ble." Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
323. See supra notes 309-14 and accompanying text (discussing Saifullah Ian).
324. One of the reasons given was that "the Superior Judiciary has been publicly
ridiculed and its integrity attacked and attempts made to impair its independence."
Tariq Rahim 1991 P.L.D. (Lah.), at 94. The court found this to be an objectively
valid reason for issuing the order because "Ithe material on the record further shows
that the former Federal Government ridiculed the Judiciary, for instance, it allowed
holding of a seminar where the verdict of the Supreme Court in a decided case, was
publicly ridiculed and termed as a Judicial murder'." Id. at 112-13. The seminar to
which the court referred analyzed the Supreme Court's 1979 decision to deny the
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the court examined all these reasons on the basis of statements
made in court, affidavits, newspaper accounts, and interdepartmen-
tal communications. The court then concluded that "the President
had rightly formed an opinion, that a situation had arisen in which
the Government of Federation could not be carried on in accordance
with the provisions of [the] Constitution."" Additionally, "the
grounds which weighed with the President for passing the im-
pugned Order had direct nexus with the preconditions prescribed by
Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution."326
As for the subjective prong of the test, the court simply de-
clared that the president's action was not "tainted with malice."327
Curiously, the only support the Court offered for this conclusion was
[the] well-settled principle of law that before striking down an
order passed by a public authority the Court must explore every
possible explanation for its validity and examine the entire field of
powers conferred on the authority by which the impugned order
has been passed and all efforts must be made to uphold it.3"
deposed prime minister's appeals of his murder conviction and death sentence. See
Leslie Wolf-Phillips, Comment, 1979 PUB. L. 109, 110-18.
325. Tariq Rahim, 1991 P.L.D. (Lah.) at 110. The court admitted into evidence
newspaper accounts and inter-departmental communications concerning the events
leading up to the order. Id. at 105.
326. Id. at 116.
327. Id. at 107.
328. Id. at 147 (citing Lahore Improvement Trust v. Evacuee Property, 1971
P.L.D. (S.C.) 811, 837 (Pak.) and East Pakistan R.R. v. Sardar, 1966 P.L.D. (S.C.)
509, 513 (Pak.)). Both Lahore and Sardar involved challenges against administrative
actions of governmental agencies, a factual situation far removed from a determina-
tion of inter se powers of separate branches of government.
The Supreme Court later used this "well-settled principle" of judicial deference
toward public duthorities in a related case. See Sherpao v. Governor N.W.F.P., 1990
P.L.D. (Pesh.) 192 (Pak.). Following dissolution of the National Assembly, the gover-
nor of the North West Frontier Province announced the dissolution of the Provincial
Assembly and the dismissal of the provincial cabinet. The governor exercised the
power conferred on him by Article 112(2)(b). A notification to the effect was issued
August 7, 1990, under the signature of the Additional Secretary of the Law Depart-
ment. The dissolution and dismissal were challenged in the Peshawar High Court,
which held these actions unconstitutional under the test of validity laid down in
Saifullah Khan. Id. at 211. Additionally, the court held the governor's actions suf-
fered from fatal procedural defects. Id. On September 16, the governor formally cor-
rected the dissolution/dismissal notification of August 6, 1990. The Corrigendum list-
ed the factual grounds upon which the governor had based his opinion that the prov-
ince could not be governed in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, and
removed the procedural defects. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the
Peshawar High Court. See Pakistan v. Sherpao, 1992 P.L.D. (S.C.) 723, 749 (Pak.).
The Supreme Court held that the grounds listed in the notification, by virtue of the
Corrigendum, passed the test of validity set down by Saifullah Khan. Id. at 746-47.
The Supreme Court then expressed disapproval of the high court's examination of
procedural defects; such an examination, in the Court's view, violated the principle of
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D. Is the Fifth Republic Legal?
Over the last few years, the courts in Pakistan have had occa-
sion to address the validity of the Eighth Amendment, which con-
tains the constitutional framework of the praetorian Fifth Repub-
lic."' The Eighth Amendment incorporated Article 270-A into the
Constitution. Article 270-A provides that all legislative measures
made between July 5, 1977, and December 31, 1985, are valid and
immune from challenge in any court on any ground whatsoever,
notwithstanding any judgment of any court or anything contained
in the Constitution."'0 Thus, protection and immunity were ex-
tended to orders made and acts done, or purported to have been
made or done, in exercise of powers derived from martial law enact-
ments.3 ' Additionally, all orders made, acts done, and sentences
passed, or purported to have been made or done in the exercise of
such legislation, were deemed to be and always to have been valid
and could not be called into question in any court on any grounds
whatsoever."3 2
Article 270-A was soon challenged. In Mustafa Khar v. Paki-
stan,"3 the Lahore High Court held that while laws protected un-
der the Eighth Amendment were immune, superior courts could
judicial deference toward public authorities. Id. at 749.
329. The praetorian nature of the Fifth Republic is reflected in comments such
as: "M[The army chief along with the president and the prime minister forms the
country's ruling triumvirate," Salamat Ali, Army Chiefs Tough Task, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Jan. 28, 1993, at 17; and "the army chief is the most important member of the
informal troika that rules the nation," Salamat Ali, Mortal Blow, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Jan. 21, 1993, at 19. The praetorian nature of the Fifth Republic has been under-
scored by the most recent constitutional crisis. In early 1993, the president appointed
a new chief of staff of the army without consulting the prime minister. Salamat Ali,
The Battle of Wits, FAR E. ECON. REv., Mar. 18, 1993, at 18-19. The prime minister
reacted by taking steps aimed at repeal of the Eighth Amendment, the foundation of
the Fifth Republic. Id. The president responded on April 18, 1993, when he dis-
missed the prime minister and dissolved the Parliament. Edward A. Gargan, Presi-
dent of Pakistan Dismisses Premier and Dissolves Parliament, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
1993, at A3. On May 26, 1993, the Supreme Court held the president's actions un-
constitutional and ordered the National Assembly and the dismissed government re-
stored. Edward A. Gargan, Pakistan Chiefs Dismissal is Overturned, N.Y. TImES,
May 27, 1993, at A3. This decision failed to resolve the political crisis and the mili-
tary forced both the president and the prime minister to resign on July 18, 1993.
See Edward A. Gargan, Pakistan Government Collapses; Elections are Called, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 1993, at A3. A "non-political" caretaker government was installed
and general elections called for October 1993. Id.
330. PAM. CONST. of 1973, art. 270-A(1) (1985).
331. Id. art. 270-A(2).
332. Id.
333. 1988 P.L.D. (Lab.) 49 (Pak.).
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review acts, actions, and proceedings for errors of jurisdiction, for
coram non judice, or for taint with malice in law as distinguished
from malice in fact.'
The Eighth Amendment had not merely incorporated Article
270-A into the Constitution, it had also radically altered the whole
constitutional framework." 5 Mustafa Khar presented the court
with the opportunity to review the validity of the amendment. Rely-
ing upon two judgments of the Supreme Court of India, the petition-
ers argued that the Eighth Amendment was ultra vires because it
altered the basic structure and essential features of the Constitu-
tion. 6 In deciding the case, the court first looked at the text of
Part XI of the Constitution, and noted that Article 238 gave Parlia-
ment the power to amend the Constitution subject only to the proce-
dure laid down in Article 239. The court then focused on clauses (5)
and (6) of Article 239, which affirmed Parliament's unlimited power
to amend and oust the jurisdiction of the courts from the sub-
ject. 7 The court acknowledged that clauses (5) and (6) of Article
239 were introduced by the Constitution (Second Amendment)
(Pres. Order No. 20 of 1985), one of the military regime's presiden-
tial orders promulgated during martial law. But the court did not
even attempt to test the validity of this legislation under Nusrat
Bhutto. The court refused to adopt the basic structure/essential fea-
tures test fashioned by the Indian Supreme Court in Bharati and
its progeny " on the ground that
there is no need to determine as to whether or not these amend-
ments have the effect of altering fundamental character of the
Constitution .... [Ihe consistent view of our Supreme Court is
that exercise of constituent power unduly or against the wishes of
the people, is a political question which cannot be subjected tojudicial scrutiny.'
334. Id. at 65, 143.
335. See supra notes 293-300 and accompanying text (discussing changes in Con-
stitution introduced by Eighth Amendment).
336. Mustafa Mhar, 1988 P.L.D. (Lah.) at 115. Petitioners relied upon Bharati v.
Kerala, 1973 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1461 (India); and Indira Gandhi v. Narain, 1975 A.I.R.
(S.C.) 2299 (India).
337. Mustafa Khar, 1988 P.L.D. (Lah.) at 116. Specifically, Article 239(5) pro-
vides: "No amendment of the Constitution shall be called in question in any Court
on any ground whatsoever." PAY- CONST. of 1973, art. 239(5) (1985). Article 239(6)
provides: "For the removal of doubt, it is hereby declared that there is no limitation
whatever on the power of the (Parliament) to amend any of the provisions of the
Constitution." Id. art. 239(6).
338. Mustafa IKar, 1988 P.L.D. (Lah.) at 116-17.
339. Id. at 117 (citing State v. Zia-ur-Rahman, 1973 P.L.D. (S.C.) 49, 76 (Pak.)).
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The court's reliance on the people's "right to correct" ° ultra
vires legislation is remarkable given that (a) the democratic process
enshrined in the 1973 Constitution was in abeyance; (b) clauses (5)
and (6) of Article 239 (which provided immunity from judicial re-
view to amendments) were brought into existence by a presidential
order of the martial law regime; and (c) the Eighth Amendment bill
was passed by a Parliament not elected under the framework fur-
nished by the 1973 Constitution.
A related issue before the court was a challenge to Parliament's
competence to pass the Eighth Amendment Act, which incorporated
Article 270-A into the Constitution. The petitioner argued that the
present Parliament had been installed, not under the terms of the
1973 Constitution," but through a process of nonparty elections.
Under this nonparty process, political campaigning was restricted,
discussion of fundamental issues was prohibited, candidates were
arbitrarily disqualified, and public meetings, canvassing or cam-
paigning were outlawed. 2 Consequently, petitioner argued, Par-
liament did not have the mandate of the people to amend the Con-
stitution or otherwise exercise authority in the nature of constituent
power." In response, the court simply referred to Article 270-B of
the Constitution, another insertion by the Eighth Amendment,
which provided: "Nlotwithstanding anything contained in the Con-
stitution, the elections held under the Houses of (Parliament) and
Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977 to the Houses and the
Provincial Assemblies shall be deemed to have been held under the
Constitution and shall have effect accordingly."'
The Supreme Court consolidated and ruled on all the cases
dealing with Article 270-A in Pakistan v. Mustafa Khar. 5 The
Court's language again underscored a narrow construction of legis-
lation aimed at ouster of judicial review. 6 The Court invoked the
340. Id. (quoting Zia-ur-Rahman, 1973 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 76-77).
341. See Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff, 1977 P.L.D. (S.C.) 657, 672-73
(Pak.). While upholding the imposition of martial law, the Nusrat Bhutto Court called
upon the regime to hold free and fair elections in terms of the 1973 Constitution at
the earliest possible date. See supra notes 241-52 and accompanying text (discussing
Court's validation of General Zia ul-Haq's extra-constitutional actions).
342. Mustafa iar, 1988 P.L.D. (Lah.) at 82-83.
343. Id. at 92.
344. Id. at 112-13.
345. 1989 P.L.D. (S.C.) 26 (Pak.).
346. The Court took the view that "there is a presumption against ouster of
jurisdiction of the Superior Courts and any law which has the effect of denying ac-
cess to them has to be narrowly construed for the reason that these are the fora cre-
ated by the people for obtaining relief from oppression and redress for the in-
fringement of their right." Id. at 44.
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"constitutional deviation" doctrine of Nusrat Bhutto, and held that
the enactment's purpose was "merely to afford protection to the dis-
pensation which came into existence as a result of 'constitutional
deviation'; it is difficult to interpret it as conferring validity andimmunity upon such acts, actions and proceedings as were illegal or
indefensible even under that dispensation.""4
The Court then noted that the Lahore High Court confirmed
both the validity the Eighth Amendment and the competency of
Parliament to enact such an amendment. However, the Court re-
fused to discuss these issues, thus implicitly adopting the Lahore
High Court's position as dicta.' It is unfortunate that the Su-
preme Court shied away from squarely confronting the issue of the
legality of the Fifth Republic. If and when it chooses to do so, even
the Court's restrictive scope of judicial review and misapplication of
the political question doctrine enunciated in Zia-ur-Rahman will not
save the Eighth Amendment. Zia-ur-Rahman held that the only
limitation on Parliament's power of constitutional legislation is the
procedure laid out for the exercise of such power. 9 In addition,
constitutional legislation that goes beyond the mandate of the elec-
torate presents a nonjusticiable political question that only the
people "have the right to correct."' 0
Nothing is more fundamental to a legislature than the proce-
dure of its establishment. The Parliament which adopted the Eighth
Amendment came into existence in blatant .disregard of the election
procedures prescribed by the 1973 Constitution. The Saifullah Khan
Court's refusal to reinstate the National Assembly after declaring
its dissolution invalid was expressly based on the fact that the As-
sembly had been elected through partyless nonpolitical elec-
tions."' Later, in Benazir Bhutto v. Pakistan,"2 the Supreme
Court expressly ruled that partyless elections were unconstitution-
al.' The political question proposition of Zia-ur-Rahman arises
347. Id. at 54.
348. Id. at 45.
349. See Zia-ur-Rahman, 1973 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 76-77; see also supra note 175
and accompanying text (discussing justiciability of constituent body's disregard of con-
stitutional mandate).
350. Zia-ur-Rahman, 1973 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 76.
351. See supra note 314 and accompanying text (discussing Court's decision not
to reinstate National Assembly in Saiffulah Kian).
352. 1988 P.L.D. (S.C.) 416 (Pak.).
353. Id. at 540. Since the institution of martial law in July 1977, significant
amendments have been made to the Political Parties Act, 1962. The amendments
were instituted through Ordinance No. XLI of 1978, Ordinance No. XLII of 1979,
Ordinance No. LII of 1979, and Act XXI of 1985. For the texts of the amendments,
see id. at 465-74. See also KHAN, supra note 29, at 323-41 (providing complete text
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from the assumption that when electoral processes envisaged by the
Constitution are in place, the body politic has the opportunity to
check Parliament's power of constitutional legislation. Consequent-
ly, because the parliament which adopted the Eighth Amendment
was the product of an unconstitutional electoral process, and be-
cause the body politic did not have an opportunity to check that
parliament through normal electoral process, the judiciary could
review the amendment. The standard of review, in turn, can be
furnished by the basic structure/essential features test. At the first
opportunity, the Supreme Court should hold the Eighth Amendment
invalid because it destroyed the basic structure and essential fea-
tures of the 1973 Constitution. Such a course of action, by restoring
the 1973 Constitution as the only true social contract of the people
of Pakistan, would help to rehabilitate the prestige and integrity of
the courts, would roll back institutionalized praetorianism, and
would move the country towards stable rule of law.
VII. ROADS NOT TAKEN: APPROPRIATE JUDIcIAL
RESPONSES TO CONSTrTUTIONAL BREAKDOWNS
In this Article, I have taken the position that each time the
courts of Pakistan were confronted with the question of the validity
of extra-constitutional power, they should have avoided the consti-
tutional issue by deciding the cases on narrow grounds. Where this
was not possible, the courts should have declared the issue a
nonjusticiable political question. The first part of this section will
examine the rationale of the political question doctrine to demon-
strate why the courts of Pakistan should have used it to respond to
extra-constitutional usurpations of power. The second part of this
section critically examines the discontinuity-of-law posture adopted
by the Pakistani courts when confronted with constitutional rup-
tures. My position is that while extra-constitutional usurpation of
power is a nonjusticiable political question, subsequent actions of an
extra-constitutional regime should be reviewed by the courts. A
continuity-of-law approach provides a more coherent and consistent
yardstick of judicial review in this context.
of Political Parties Act). The amendments, along with the Freedom of Association
Order, 1978 (President's Order No. 20 of 1978), were challenged as unreasonable re-
straints on the functioning of political parties, thus violating the fundamental right
of association provided by the Constitution. Benazir Bhutto, 1988 P.L.D. (S.C.) at
474-75. The Supreme Court found the amendments unconstitutional because so many
provisions unreasonably burdened political parties. Id. at 540-41. The Court found
that the existence and free functioning of political parties were indispensable for a
parliamentary democracy. Id. at 515-16.
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A. The Political Question Doctrine and the Validity
of Extra-Constitutional Usurpation
The United States Supreme Court provided a succinct enuncia-
tion of the political question doctrine in Baker v. Carr.54 Many
have cautioned against lightly accepting the idea that under a writ-
ten constitution, any parts or provisions of the constitution are not
justiciable."55 Others have pointed to the realism and functionality
of the doctrine.356 In ascertaining the doctrine's suitability to the
constitutional crises of Pakistan, Alexander Bickel's view is very
useful. According to Bickel:
Such is the foundation, in both intellect and instinct, of the politi-
cal-question doctrine: the Court's sense of lack of capacity, com-
pounded in unequal parts of (a) the strangeness of the issue and its
intractability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness
of it, which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety,
not so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that
perhaps it should but will not be; (d) finally .... the inner vulnera-
354. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker, the Court held:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217. The political question doctrine was first enunciated in Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 39-55 (1849).
355. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 60, at 96-107 (discussing confused state of po-
litical question doctrine); Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85
YALE L.J. 597, 600 (1976) ("There may be no doctrine requiring abstention from judi-
cial review of political questions."); see also Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability
Myth and the Concept of Law, 14 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 595, 614 (1987) ("[Tlhere is
no such thing as justiciability."); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political
Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031, 1059-60 (1985) (explaining why political question
doctrine should not be used); Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, The "Political Ques-
tion Doctrine" and Foreign, Relations, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1136 (1970) (arguing
that political question doctrine does not exist).
356. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUs BRANCH 63-64,
69-71, 183-98 (1962) (arguing that political question doctrine has valid functions); J.
Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 97,
162-75 (1988) (discussing existence of political question doctrine and how courts
share responsibility of constitutional interpretation); Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review
and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 519 (1966) (us-




bility, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irrespon-
sible and has no earth to draw strength from."?
As acknowledged in Nusrat Bhutto, for example, there is the
problem of ascertaining facts, compounded by the lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards. All extra-constitutional re-
gimes in Pakistan claimed to have assumed power because the
replaced order had degenerated into chaos and threatened the secu-
rity and stability of the state. In Nusrat Bhutto the Court indulged
in a laborious discussion of this issue but, lacking any standards
and comprehensive evidence, adopted the new regime's pronounce-
ments at face value. 58 Unacceptable chaos for one may be the nor-
mal tumult of democratic political process for another. Determina-
tion of facts in the midst of political struggles and characterization
of sociopolitical situations uninformed by opinion' of disinterested
and trained observers is a hazardous task in any circumstance. This
endeavor becomes inexcusable when a court ventures along this
path knowing that its "factual" pronouncements are pregnant with
far-reaching political implications. The problem is compounded
because any "factual" finding of acceptability of the extra-constitu-
tional order is used to equate efficacy with legitimacy. To designate
as acceptance the palpable silence that descends on the society for a
few days when troops in full battle gear are deployed at every inter-
section is a grave error. Furthermore, a sudden change of facts in
the midst of political instability can embarrass a court. This oc-
curred in Pakistan when the regime that was legitimized based
upon efficacy in Dosso was itself overthrown within one day of the
Court's pronouncement.359
There is also the problem that determining the validity of ex-
tra-constitutional regimes is an issue intractable to principled reso-
lution. Even a cursory survey of the leading cases on the issue
shows that while the Pakistan Supreme Court validated most extra-
357. See BICKEL, supra note 356, at 184.
358. Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief Army Staff, 1977 P.L.D. (S.C.) 657, 693-703 (Pak.).
The Nusrat Bhutto Court admitted that it was in no position to determine "the fac-
tual correctness or otherwise of the several allegations and counter allegations made
by the parties against each other." Id. at 693. Nevertheless, it relied upon "the broad
trends and circumstances" which led to the replacement of the constitutional govern-
ment. Id.
359. See KHAN, supra note 29, at 75 (stating that President Iskander Mirza
stepped down after discussion with three senior generals). This has led one percep-
tive commentator to remark, "[w]hat appears debatable in Dosso are the timing and
some peculiar circumstances surrounding that judgment; more precisely, the question
as to what is implied by 'success' or 'efficacy' of the revolutionary change, and wheth-
er the Court helped to establish, rather than merely recognize an established revolu-
tionary order." Conrad, supra note 5, at 127.
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constitutional arrangements, these decisions demonstrate a singular
lack of consistency of rationale. At various junctures, the Supreme
Court adopted and rejected the Kelsenian theory of revolutionary
validity and gave varied content to the theory of implied mandate
and the doctrine of state necessity. Utterly lacking in legal coher-
ence and any measure of continuity, the contradictory pronounce-
ments rendered the Court vulnerable to the charge of political expe-
diency. Even if the earlier cases are considered excursions into
unchartered waters, by the time it decided Nusrat Bhutto, the Court
was well aware, as its own laborious review of the case law and
legal doctrines shows,36 that there was no room for doctrinal con-
tinuity or consistency of principle. Such a situation warranted a dec-
laration of nonjusticiability, instead of adding new twists to the
doctrinal maze.
Finally, there is the problem that the sheer momentousness of
the issue of the validity of extra-constitutional regimes may unbal-
ance judicial judgment. Constitutional ruptures and extra-constitu-
tional assumptions of power are highly charged and volatile social
events often accompanied by the risk or actuality of loss of life,
rebellion, and civil strife. Such circumstances are ill-suited for con-
sidered and coolheaded judicial inquiry and pronouncement.
There are two other fundamental justifications for holding that
the question of the annulment of a constitution is not justiciable.
First, courts, being products of a constitution, cannot logically deter-
mine that the constitution under which they were created has dis-
appeared; nor can they logically continue, after dissolution of the
constitution, to enforce some other constitutional order.36' Second,
the success of a usurpation depends upon its effectiveness. But ef-
fectiveness is conditioned not by law, but by the ability of the
usurper regime to compel acceptance of, and obedience to, its au-
thority. Not being governed by law, the effectiveness of a usurper
regime is a political, nonjusticiable, question. Consequently, the
Pakistani courts should recognize that "all legal questions are politi-
cal, but some political questions should not be legal.""2
There remains the issue of whether Pakistan's judiciary could
have diverted constitutional developments in the country in differ-
360. See Nusrat Bhutto 1977 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 675-93, 706-12 (reviewing historical
treatment of doctrines of necessity and implied consent in Pakistan, Rhodesia, Cy-
prus, and Nigeria.).
361. See Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, 1968 (2) S.L.R. 284, 429-31 (Rhode-
sia).
362. James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially Unen-
forceable Rules That Combine With Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to Regulate
Political Behavior, 40 BuFF. L. REV. 645, 738 (1992).
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ent directions by adopting alternative approaches to the question of
the validity and scope of extra-constitutional assumptions of power.
After all, "[a] judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces
liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws
supposed already to exist."3" The ability to enforce its judgments
is critical to the very identity and nature of a judiciary. "If a body
which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision is able
to take action so as to enforce that decision, then, but only then...
all the attributes of judicial power are plainly present."31 Would
the military regimes have abided by contrary rulings in Dosso and
Nusrat Bhutto? The answer to this question must be speculative.
However, given the importance of the issue, any doubts about the
ability of the judiciary to enforce its decisions in revolutionary situa-
tions makes invoking the political question doctrine more desirea-
ble. Invoking the political question doctrine signals to the populace
that those in power have gone above the law and refers the issue
back to the body politic, where it belongs.
B. Continuity of Laws and the Scope of Extra-
Constitutional Legislative Power
The Pakistan Supreme Court's various responses to extra-con-
stitutional assumptions of power, while premised on varied theoreti-
cal and doctrinal approaches, have had one uniform implication: all
these responses have adopted the discontinuity-of-law approach
following constitutional ruptures, leaving the judiciary without any
pre-rupture yardsticks by which to measure the postrupture order.
Dosso, along with its progeny of African cases, explicitly adopted the
Kelsenian view of revolutionary legality and discontinuity-of-
law.36 While in theory Nusrat Bhutto proclaimed the survival of
the pre-rupture constitution, 66 its broadening of the scope of the
doctrine of state necessity, and the Court's deference to the discre-
tion of the extra-constitutional regime 3" amounted to an implicit
adoption of the discontinuity-of-law view. In its basic form, this view
postulates that any extra-constitutional change in the constitution
363. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
364. Rola Co. (Australia) Ltd. v. The Commonwealth, 69 C.L.R. 185, 199 (1944)
(Austl.).
365. See supra part II.C (discussing Courts' reasons for adoption of Kelsenian
theory).
366. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing Court's pronounce-
ment that 1973 Constitution remained in effect).
367. See supra notes 250-58 and accompanying text (discussing Court's validation
of martial law regime's amendment of 1973 Constitution).
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of a state is a revolution, and that all revolutions overturn the en-
tire legal order, replacing it with a new one.
By adopting the theory of revolutionary legality and disconti-
nuity-of-law, the judiciary wittingly or unwittingly becomes party to
its own powerlessness. The view has been rightly characterized as
being "not only mistaken, but.., it also arbitrarily and dangerously
limits the scope of juristic thought."368 This view, as rooted in the
positivist theories of law, has been adequately critiqued by others
and thus need not detain us.3" 9 I will instead focus on how the Su-
preme Court of Pakistan could have and still can exercise its power
of judicial review to examine the conduct and powers of any post-
rupture extra-constitutional regime.
The constitutional ruptures in Pakistan, like such ruptures
elsewhere, did not aim at any fundamental reordering of the society;
that is, reordering which may warrant a fundamental change in the
entire legal system. In fact, among the first actions of the extra-
constitutional regimes in 1958, 1969, and 1977 was to issue an
order proclaiming the continuation in force of all preexisting laws.
The only laws not retained were those related to the functioning of
political organs of the state, which were directly affected by the
extra-constitutional assumption of power. In light of this, adherence
to a theory of revolutionary discontinuity-of-law simply perpetuates
a legal fiction suitable only for abdication of judicial responsibility
and cessation of legal inquiry. In Nusrat Bhutto, the Court itself
enunciated a distinction between constitutional rupture and discon-
tinuity-of-law, 70 but then made limited use of the distinction in its
368. Eekelaar, supra note 92, at 23; see also J.M. Finnis, Revolutions and Conti-
nuity of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENcE 75 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d ser.
1973) ("A revolution is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for anything
that should be described as a change in the identity of the state or the legal sys-
tem.").
369. See, e.g., F.M. Brookfield, The Courts, Kelsen, and the Rhodesian Revolution,
19 U. TORONTO L.J. 326, 327 (1969) (arguing that Rhodesian judges could not lawful-
ly determine success of revolution as matter of law); Dias, supra note 89, at 253-55,
258-59 (discussing positive results of not following discontinuity of law philosophy);
J.M. Eekelaar, Rhodesia: The Abdication of Constitutionalism, 32 MOD. L. REv. 19,
19 (1969) (criticizing major lines of argument employed in grundnorm cases); J.M.
Eekelaar, Splitting the Grundnorm, 30 MOD. L. REV. 156, 161 (1967) (discussing
Rhodesian Court's reliance on Kelsen's theories in grundnorm cases); Farooq Hassan,
A Juridical Critique of Successful Treason: A Jurisprudential Analysis of the Constitu-
tionality of a Coup d'-Otat in the Common Law, 20 STAN. J. INTL L. 191, 191 (1988)
(concluding courts should refrain from deciding legality of coups d'itat); Honor6, supra
note 91, at 272 (-The [argument], at least in its Kelsenian form, seems unsatisfacto-
ry."); Stone, supra note 83, at 35 (criticizing Kelsen's theory of grundnorm); R.S.
Welsh, The Function of the Judiciary in a Coup d'9tat, 87 S. AFR. L.J. 168 (1970)
(criticizing Rhodesian grundnorm cases).
370. As the Court stated:
No. 4] 1299
1300 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1993: 1225
substantive holding.
Another argument, rooted in the discontinuity-of-law theory, is
that courts, being the creatures of the constitution in force, cannot
extend their inquiry beyond that source of their jurisdiction to ques-
tion its validity.71 This argument, while structurally elegant, sup-
presses many relevant questions rather than accounting for them.
Where the constitutional rupture does not directly affect the juris-
diction of the courts, or where continuation of the nature and scope
of jurisdiction is confirmed, the courts remain creatures of the
prerupture legal order. Accordingly, any formal "continuance in
force" provision, being merely declaratory in character, does not
change the identity or jurisdiction of the courts.372 Even where the
post-rupture regime reconstitutes the courts, requires new oaths,
and alters their composition and jurisdiction, the courts are not
necessarily rendered impotent to review conduct and powers of the
post-constitutional regime. In these situations, the important dis-
tinction between judicial power and jurisdiction, as articulated in
Zia-ur-Rahman,7 3 becomes relevant. The courts' very existence
[f it is assumed that the old Constitution has been completely suppressed
or destroyed, it does not follow that all the judicial concepts and notions of
morality and justice have also been destroyed, simply for the reason that
the new Legal Order does not mention anything about them. On the con-
trary, I find that the Laws (Continuation in Force) Order makes it clear
that, subject to certain limitations, Pakistan is to be governed as nearly as
may be in accordance with the 1973 Constitution, and all laws for the time
being in force shall continue. These provisions clearly indicate that there is
no intention to destroy the legal continuity of the country, as distinguished
strictly from the Constitutional continuity.
Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff, 1977 P.L.D. (S.C.) 657, 706 (Pak.) (emphasis
added).
371. This argument, while implicit in Dosso, was developed at great length in
Madzimbamuto. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing awkwardness
of court's declaring invalid a constitution establishing that court's own jurisdiction).
372. See Inayat Khan v. Anwar, 1976 P.L.D. (S.C.) 354, 373-75 (Pak.). This inter-
esting case was a contempt proceeding brought against a lawyer for blaming in a
newspaper interview all of Pakistan's misfortunes squarely on the Supreme Court
itself, and particularly on Chief Justice Muhammad Munir, the author of the main
opinions in the Governor-General's Case and Dosso. Referring to the abrogation of the
Constitution in 1958, the Supreme Court said:
The change in the nature of the jurisdiction enjoyed by the High
Courts . . . was not of such a radical character as to lead to the inference
that there was a break in their continuity. . . we have no doubt in our
mind that the Supreme Court as establish[ed] under the 1956 Constitution
continued in existence, without a break, even though the 1956 Constitution
itself was abrogated in 1958 on the proclamation of Martial Law .... It
follows, therefore, that it is a misconception to think that the present Su-
preme Court . . . was, in any manner, a new or a different institution.
Id.
373. As the Court stated in Zia-ur-Rahman:
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bestows upon them an inherent power to determine the law and in-
quire into their own jurisdiction. During or after a constitutional
crisis, such inquiry may lead to a paradoxical impasse. If the court
finds the constitution-the basis of its jurisdiction-invalid, the
court's own identity and thus its inherent power of inquiry is put in
doubt. But such a legal impasse, just because it cannot be resolved
with reference to any enacted text, does not have to end the matter
and result in judicial abdication. The courts, confronted with such
an impasse, may rightfully invoke the doctrine of state necessity as
a source of their power and continuing jurisdiction to examine the
validity and legislative powers of the extra-constitutional order.
There is no logical reason why the judiciary is any less entitled than
the executive to assume extra-constitutional powers under the doc-
trine of state necessity, in order to bridge legal chasms and effect a
transition to legality. Confronted with a constitutional crisis, the
courts may invoke the doctrine of state necessity as an independent
basis of their jurisdiction. For example, courts in Cyprus, Malta,
and Grenada have adopted this route when confronted with a con-
stitutional breakdown.374
That an extra-constitutional regime may require the judges to
take a new oath of office does not necessarily change this position.
Madzimbamuto and Nusrat Bhutto addressed this issue without any
uniform resolution. 75 A new oath does not preclude courts from
[JIudicial power is inherent in the Court itself. It flows from the fact that it
is a Constitutional Court and it can only be taken away by abolishing the
Court itself. In saying this, however, I should make it clear that I am mak-
ing a distinction between 'judicial power" and "jurisdiction." In a system
where there is a trichotomy of sovereign powers, then ex necessitate rei from
the very nature of things the judicial power must be vested in the judicia-
ry .... This power, it is said, is inherent in the judiciary by reason of the
system of division of powers itself under which . . . "the Legislature makes,
the executive executes, and the judiciary construes, the law." Thus, the de-
termination of what the existing law is in relation to something already
done or happened is the function of the judiciary . . . . It may well be
asked at this stage as to what is meant by "jurisdiction?" How does it differ
from 'judicial power?" . . . Jurisdiction is . . . a right to adjudicate concern-
ing a particular subject-matter in a given case, as also the authority to
exercise in a particular manner the judicial power vested in the Court.
Zia-ur-Rahrnan, 1973 P.L.D. (S.C.) 49, 69-70 (Pak.).
374. See Attorney General v. Ibrahim, 1964 Cyprus L. Rep. 195, 204 (Cyprus);
Archbishop Joseph v. Prime Min., 11 Commonwealth L. Bull 44, 44 (Malta Const. Ct.
1985); Mitchell v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1986 L.R.C. (Const.) 35, 94 (Grena-
da); see also Cahir Davitt, The Civil Jurisdiction of the Courts of Justice of the Irish
Republic, 1920-1922, 3 IR. JURIST (n.s.) 112, 121-30 (1968) (discussing rise and fall
of extra-constitutional court, "the DAil," during time of constitutional crisis).
375. See supra notes 103, 238 and accompanying text (discussing divergent posi-
tions about the question of whether a court has authority to examine legality of
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inquiring into the scope of legislative powers of the extra-constitu-
tional order if the nature and function of the courts are defined and
understood in relation to the aggregate legal system rather than to
a particular political constitution. Typically, the new oaths adminis-
tered by the extra-constitutional regime include the obligation to
uphold the law.376 Regardless, the general duty to uphold the law
is a legal reservation implicit in any oath sworn under any constitu-
tional or extra-constitutional order. This position enables a court to
retain its inherent judicial power to inquire into the scope of legisla-
tive powers of any order, constitutional or otherwise, even though
the court's jurisdiction is expressly conferred by that order.
This express or implied duty to uphold the law, in turn, opens
the door for courts to adopt a continuity-of-law posture and seek out
legal principles from the legal culture of the society relevant to test
the scope of legislative power of extra-constitutional regimes. In this
inquiry, courts will find useful the distinction drawn between
"rules" and "principles" by Ronald Dworkin377  and J.M.
Eekelaar."7 ' Principles to be identified may be ones whose "author-
ity lies outside the four corners of the positivist legal system"379
and whose origin is to be found "not in a particular decision of some
legislature or court, but in a sense of appropriateness developed in
the profession and the public over a time."' ° This construction
leads to a certain inevitable vagueness regarding the content and
source of validity of these principles. But such vagueness calls for
legal analysis, not judicial abdication. Varied catalogues of such
relevant principles forwarded by Eekelaar,3"' John Finnis,"2 and
extra-constitutional usurpation of power after judges have taken new oath of office).
376. For example, in Pakistan, the new oath prescribed by the martial law re-
gime under the Supreme Court Judges (Oath of Office) Order, 1977 (Pres. Order No.
9, 1977 of September 22, 1977), simply adopted the wording prescribed in the third
Schedule to the 1973 Constitution after deleting references to the Constitution: "I
will discharge my duties, and perform my functions, honestly, to the best of my
ability and faithfully in accordance with [the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan and] the law .... " Id.
377. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Law The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHi. L. REV. 14,
25 (1967) (asserting that principles are more fundamental than rules).
378. See Eekelaar, supra note 92, at 30-37 (arguing difference between rules and
principles is one of degree of generality, not difference in kind).
379. Id. at 34.
380. See Dworkin, supra note 377, at 41.
381. Eekelaar's list includes:
[T]he principle of effectiveness; the principle of legitimate disobedience to
authority exercised for improper purposes; the principle of necessity; the
principle that violation of a right demands a remedy and that no one should
profit from his own wrongful act ... ; the principle that a Court will not
permit itself to be used as an instrument of injustice; the principle that it
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Deiter Conrad3" may be instructive. In fact, in Nusrat Bhutto, the
Court itself cited with approval Eekelaar's contribution in this re-
gard,3" but then expanded the doctrine of necessity beyond rec-
ognition. As the Court recognized in both the Governor-General's
Case and Nusrat Bhutto, the doctrine of state necessity is extra-
constitutional, or at best implied in any constitution.385 If this is
true, the doctrine's sweep must be tempered in light of other coun-
tervailing principles emanating from the wider legal culture. Conse-
quently, when construed narrowly and applied grudgingly, the doc-
trine of state necessity may become an instrument of affirmation
and continuation of the rule of law. But where, as in Nusrat Bhutto
and its progeny, the doctrine is grossly expanded to grant what is,
in effect, a carte blanche to an extra-constitutional regime, the de-
ployment of the doctrine of state necessity simply "transforms na-
ked power into legal authority."38
VIII. CONCLUSION
Representative constitutional governance is the exception rath-
er than the rule in most societies today. This is particularly true of
new post-colonial states whose search for stable and democratic con-
stitutional frameworks is repeatedly derailed by the military's ex-
tra-constitutional usurpations of power. Very often, courts, partic-
is in the public interest that those in de facto impregnable control should be
accorded legal recognition ... ; the principle that promises are to be
kept ... ; the principle that government should be by consent of the gov-
ered ... ; the principle of the right to self-determination.
Eekelaar, supra note 92, at 39-40.
382. Finnis fashions the basic principle thus:
A law once validly brought into being, in accordance with criteria of validity
then in force, remains valid until either it expires according to its own terms
or terms implied at its creation, or it is repealed in accordance with condi-
tions of repeal in force at the time of its repeal.
Finnis, supra note 368, at 63. For a critique of Finnis's position on revolutions, see
Simeon C.R. McIntosh, Continuity and Discontinuity of Law: A Reply to John Finnis,
21 CONN. L. REV. 1 passim (1988).
383. According to Conrad, the "cardinal, and perhaps the first, guiding principle"
is "that continuation of ordinary judicial functions in non-constitutional matters ought
to be ensured as long as at all possible." Conrad, supra note 5, at 140. Then he
offers "[tihe most important countervailing principle," quoting Eekelaar: '[A] Court
will not permit itself to be used as an instrument of injustice." Id. at 142. Lastly,
Conrad states "that the courts should minimize, as far as possible, the degree of rec-
ognition accorded to illegal constitutional change." Id. at 143.
384. Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff, 1977 P.L.D. (S.C.) 657, 688-89 (Pak.).
385. Governor-General's Case, 1955 P.L.D. (F.C.) 435, 478 (Pak.); Nusrat Bhutto,
1977 P.L.D. (S.C.) at 692-93.
386. Stavsky, supra note 5, at 344.
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ularly in common law jurisdictions, are called upon to determine the
validity and scope of extra-constitutional power. These judicial re-
sponses, while doctrinally inconsistent, typically validate the extra-
constitutional assumption of power and hold the legislative power of
extra-constitutional regimes as unfettered. The result is gradual
institutionalization of permanent praetorian rule and blockage of all
avenues towards representative democratic governance. Not surpris-
ingly, the fate of the courts is diminished power, restricted jurisdic-
tion, and waning prestige.
There is a better way. When confronted with the question of
the validity of an extra-constitutional assumption of power, courts
should avoid the constitutional issue by deciding the case or contro-
versy on narrow grounds. Where this is not feasible, courts should
designate the extra-constitutional assumption of power a
nonjusticiable political question. This response will be doctrinally
consistent, deny extra-constitutional regimes judicially pronounced
legitimacy, keep the judiciary insulated from politics, and acknowl-
edge that the primary responsibility for establishing and safeguard-
ing representative democracy lies with the body politic.
Designating an extra-constitutional assumption of power as a
nonjusticiable political question does not necessarily imply subse-
quent unfettered legislative power of extra-constitutional regimes.
Theories of revolutionary legality and discontinuity-of-law which
warrant abdication of judicial review are to be eschewed. To exam-
ine the legislation and acts of extra-constitutional regimes, courts
should seek the basis of their power, scope of their jurisdiction, and
standards of review in the aggregate legal system and the wider
legal culture. Effective judicial review in this context calls for the
courts' adoption of a continuity-of-law approach, developed over
time in the legal culture, in order to identify principles of appropri-
ate conduct by public officials. During the period that the body poli-
tic resolves the question of a suitable constitutional order, such
active judicial oversight is essential to protect minimal basic rights
of citizens against arbitrary and repressive exercise of power by
extra-constitutional regimes.
Judicial oversight of extra-constitutional regimes will be facili-
tated if courts develop consistent yardsticks of judicial review when
constitutional orders are in place. The courts must guard against
whims of shifting majorities in order to promote stability and conti-
nuity of constitutional orders in post-colonial societies, remarkable
for their cultural, linguistic, and regional diversity. Once a written
constitution has been adopted through a representative process,
courts must dispense with doctrines of unfettered legislative capaci-
ty and scrutinize any attempts to amend the constitution, by ensur-
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ing the survival of the basic structure and essential features of the
constitution. In the end, continuity of constitutional frameworks
promotes political stability, which is the best antidote for praetorian
tendencies in any society.

